Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Lecture notes in computer science

Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and Secure Channels

Ran Canetti, Hugo Krawczyk

Published Jan 1, 2002• 773 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/3-540-46035-7_22

Related papers

Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and Secure Channels.

Ran Canetti, Hugo Krawczyk

•Jan 1, 2002•88 citations

Universally Composable Password-Based Key Exchange

Ran Canetti, Shai Halevi, Jonathan I. Katz +2 more

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2005•291 citations

Universally Composable Non-Interactive Key Exchange

Eduarda S. V. Freire, Julia Hesse, Dennis Hofheinz

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2014•13 citations

Universally Composable Authentication and Key-Exchange with Global PKI

Ran Canetti, Daniel Shahaf, Margarita Vald

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2016•52 citations

Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels

Ran Canetti, Hugo Krawczyk

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2001•1,721 citations

Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and Secure Channels (Extended Abstract)

Ran Canetti, Hugo Krawczyk

Recently, Canetti and Krawczyk (Eurocrypt'2001) formu- lated a notion of security for key-exchange (ke) protocols, called SK- security, and showed that this notion suffices for constructing secure channels. However, their model and proofs do not suffice for proving more general composability properties of SK-secure ke protocols. We show that while the notion of SK-security is strictly weaker than a fully-idealized notion of key exchange security, it is sufficiently robust for providing secure composition with arbitrary protocols. In particular, SK-security guarantees the security of the key for any application that desires to set-up secret keys between pairs of parties. We also provide new definitions of secure-channels protocols with similarly strong com- posability properties, and show that SK-security suffices for obtaining these definitions. To obtain these results we use the recently proposed framework of uni- versally composable (UC) security. We also use a new tool, called non- information oracles, which will probably find applications beyond the present case. These tools allow us to bridge between seemingly limited indistinguishability-based definitions such as SK-security and more pow- erful, simulation-based definitions, such as UC security, where general composition theorems can be proven. Furthermore, based on such compo- sition theorems we reduce the analysis of a full-fledged multi-session key- exchange protocol to the (simpler) analysis of individual, stand-alone, key-exchange sessions.

•Jan 1, 2002•19 citations
Recently, Canetti and Krawczyk (Eurocrypt'2001) formu- lated a notion of security for key-exchange (ke) protocols, called SK- security, and showed that this notion suffices for constructing secure channels. However, their model and proofs do not suffice for proving more general composability properties of SK-secure ke protocols. We show that while the notion of SK-security is strictly weaker than a fully-idealized notion of key exchange security, it is sufficiently robust for providing secure composition with arbitrary protocols. In particular, SK-security guarantees the security of the key for any application that desires to set-up secret keys between pairs of parties. We also provide new definitions of secure-channels protocols with similarly strong com- posability properties, and show that SK-security suffices for obtaining these definitions. To obtain these results we use the recently proposed framework of uni- versally composable (UC) security. We also use a new tool, called non- information oracles, which will probably find applications beyond the present case. These tools allow us to bridge between seemingly limited indistinguishability-based definitions such as SK-security and more pow- erful, simulation-based definitions, such as UC security, where general composition theorems can be proven. Furthermore, based on such compo- sition theorems we reduce the analysis of a full-fledged multi-session key- exchange protocol to the (simpler) analysis of individual, stand-alone, key-exchange sessions.