Quantum objects are vague objects
Steven French, Décio Krause
Abstract
[FIRST PARAGRAPHS] \n \nIs vagueness a feature of the world or merely of our representations \nof the world? Of course, one might respond to this question by asserting \nthat insofar as our knowledge of the world is mediated by our \nrepresentations of it, any attribution of vagueness must attach to the latter. \nHowever, this is to trivialize the issue: even granted the point that all \nknowledge is representational, the question can be re-posed by asking \nwhether vague features of our representations are ultimately eliminable or \nnot. It is the answer to this question which distinguishes those who believe \nthat vagueness is essentially epistemic from those who believe that it is, \nequally essentially, ontic. The eliminability of vague features according to \nthe epistemic view can be expressed in terms of the supervenience of \n‘vaguely described facts’ on ‘precisely describable facts’: \n \nIf two possible situations are alike as precisely described in terms of \nphysical measurements, for example, then they are alike as vaguely \ndescribed with words like ‘thin’. It may therefore be concluded that the facts \nthemselves are not vague, for all the facts supervene on precisely \ndescribable facts. (Williamson 1994, p. 248; see also pp. 201- \n204) \n \n \nIt is the putative vagueness of certain identity statements in \nparticular that has been the central focus of claims that there is vagueness \n‘in’ the world (Parfit 1984, pp. 238-241; Kripke 1972, p. 345 n. 18). Thus, \nit may be vague as to who is identical to whom after a brain-swap, to give \na much discussed example. Such claims have been dealt a forceful blow \nby the famous Evans-Salmon argument which runs as follows: suppose for \nreductio that it is indeterminate whether a = b. Then b definitely possesses \nthe property that it is indeterminate whether it is identical with a, but a \ndefinitely does not possess this property since it is surely not \nindeterminate whether a=a. Therefore, by Leibniz’s Law, it cannot be the \ncase that a=b and so the identity cannot be indeterminate (Evans 1978; \nSalmon 1982).