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Quantum objects are vague objects

Steven French, Décio Krause

Published Aug 1, 1996• 11 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

[FIRST PARAGRAPHS] \n \nIs vagueness a feature of the world or merely of our representations \nof the world? Of course, one might respond to this question by asserting \nthat insofar as our knowledge of the world is mediated by our \nrepresentations of it, any attribution of vagueness must attach to the latter. \nHowever, this is to trivialize the issue: even granted the point that all \nknowledge is representational, the question can be re-posed by asking \nwhether vague features of our representations are ultimately eliminable or \nnot. It is the answer to this question which distinguishes those who believe \nthat vagueness is essentially epistemic from those who believe that it is, \nequally essentially, ontic. The eliminability of vague features according to \nthe epistemic view can be expressed in terms of the supervenience of \n‘vaguely described facts’ on ‘precisely describable facts’: \n \nIf two possible situations are alike as precisely described in terms of \nphysical measurements, for example, then they are alike as vaguely \ndescribed with words like ‘thin’. It may therefore be concluded that the facts \nthemselves are not vague, for all the facts supervene on precisely \ndescribable facts. (Williamson 1994, p. 248; see also pp. 201- \n204) \n \n \nIt is the putative vagueness of certain identity statements in \nparticular that has been the central focus of claims that there is vagueness \n‘in’ the world (Parfit 1984, pp. 238-241; Kripke 1972, p. 345 n. 18). Thus, \nit may be vague as to who is identical to whom after a brain-swap, to give \na much discussed example. Such claims have been dealt a forceful blow \nby the famous Evans-Salmon argument which runs as follows: suppose for \nreductio that it is indeterminate whether a = b. Then b definitely possesses \nthe property that it is indeterminate whether it is identical with a, but a \ndefinitely does not possess this property since it is surely not \nindeterminate whether a=a. Therefore, by Leibniz’s Law, it cannot be the \ncase that a=b and so the identity cannot be indeterminate (Evans 1978; \nSalmon 1982).

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[FIRST PARAGRAPHS] \n \nIs vagueness a feature of the world or merely of our representations \nof the world? Of course, one might respond to this question by asserting \nthat insofar as our knowledge of the world is mediated by our \nrepresentations of it, any attribution of vagueness must attach to the latter. \nHowever, this is to trivialize the issue: even granted the point that all \nknowledge is representational, the question can be re-posed by asking \nwhether vague features of our representations are ultimately eliminable or \nnot. It is the answer to this question which distinguishes those who believe \nthat vagueness is essentially epistemic from those who believe that it is, \nequally essentially, ontic. The eliminability of vague features according to \nthe epistemic view can be expressed in terms of the supervenience of \n‘vaguely described facts’ on ‘precisely describable facts’: \n \nIf two possible situations are alike as precisely described in terms of \nphysical measurements, for example, then they are alike as vaguely \ndescribed with words like ‘thin’. It may therefore be concluded that the facts \nthemselves are not vague, for all the facts supervene on precisely \ndescribable facts. (Williamson 1994, p. 248; see also pp. 201- \n204) \n \n \nIt is the putative vagueness of certain identity statements in \nparticular that has been the central focus of claims that there is vagueness \n‘in’ the world (Parfit 1984, pp. 238-241; Kripke 1972, p. 345 n. 18). Thus, \nit may be vague as to who is identical to whom after a brain-swap, to give \na much discussed example. Such claims have been dealt a forceful blow \nby the famous Evans-Salmon argument which runs as follows: suppose for \nreductio that it is indeterminate whether a = b. Then b definitely possesses \nthe property that it is indeterminate whether it is identical with a, but a \ndefinitely does not possess this property since it is surely not \nindeterminate whether a=a. Therefore, by Leibniz’s Law, it cannot be the \ncase that a=b and so the identity cannot be indeterminate (Evans 1978; \nSalmon 1982).
There has been recent interest in formulating theories of non-representational indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to clarify the relevance of quantum mechanics to this project. Quantum-mechanical examples of vague objects have been offered by various authors, displaying indeterminate identity, in the face of the famous Evans argument that such an idea is incoherent. It has also been suggested that the quantum-mechanical treatment of state-dependent properties exhibits metaphysical indeterminacy. In both cases it is important to consider the details of the metaphysical account and the way in which the quantum phenomenon is captured within it. Indeed if we adopt a familiar way of thinking about indeterminacy and apply it in a natural way to quantum mechanics, we run into illuminating difficulties and see that the case is far less straightforward than might be hoped.
This thesis examines the concepts of identity and individuality via scientifically-informed philosophical analysis. It has two parts. The first part deals with metaphysical claims that turn out to be, in effect, very general empirical claims extracted from our (supposed, but rationally-accredited) knowledge of the world. I here compare two approaches: a) the Leibniz-Quine view of identity as a derivative relation, and, relatedly, of individuality as dependent on the qualities of things; and b) the view that identity is a non-analysable primitive, and, relatedly, that the individuality of things is not reducible to anything else. The former position, based on the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles as a criterion of individuation, might appear prima facie more plausible. However, I argue that it runs into difficulties both at the level of a priori analysis and in terms of 'fit' with the evidence described by our best science. It is, in fact, not even as compelling from the empiricist point of view as is commonly believed. I therefore argue that the position that identity and individuality are primitive may be preferred. In the second part of the thesis - under the assumption that the proper role of metaphysics is to characterise the best solutions to issues that are left open by current science - I deal with the question regarding whether and how the ultimate constituents of reality can actually be conceived of as primitive individuals. I argue in favour of an ontology of tropes, develop the view in detail and defend it against various criticisms. The fundamental tropes that constitute the basic 'building blocks' of reality are identified with the state-independent properties of elementary particles. The way in which these constitute complex particulars is described, and certain peculiarities having to do with quantum statistics are accounted for. I conclude by suggesting possible avenues for further research.
In a deterministic theory, one can deduce the state of the universe at any one time from the dynamical laws that govern its evolution and its state at any other time.In particular, one can deduce from the conditions that obtained at some early boundary condition for the universe, its state at all subsequent times.It is a piece of well-received philosophical common sense that there is no room in a deterministic theory for objective probabilities.Arguments will be given below that this piece of philosophical common sense is mistaken, and that a probability measure over the space of physically possible trajectories is an indispensable component of any theory -deterministic or otherwise -that can be used as a basis for prediction or receive confirmation from the evidence.Phase space is the central representational space in physics.It is the space within which all of the states pertaining to a system are represented, and it encodes all of the general information that we have about those states.To take an obvious example (less obvious examples will be given below) the fact that a pair of quantities are represented by different dimensions in phase space encodes the fact that they represent separate degrees of freedom.Physically possible histories are represented by trajectories through phase space and in a deterministic theory, when dealing with a closed system, there is (no more than) one trajectory through each point.Since the universe as a whole is the only truly closed system, this means there is one trajectory through each point in the phase space of the universe.Probabilities may be invoked in applications of theory, when the state of a system or the values of external variables are not known with full precision, but they are eliminable given complete knowledge.And they don't appear in the statement of the laws.The laws serve simply to identify the physically allowable trajectories.About Newtonian dynamics, Laplace famously said "given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it -an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis -it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, and the past, would be present to its eyes."ii It is a short step from this to the idea that probabilities invoked in classical contexts are subjective rather than objective.If they represent anything, it is facts about our epistemic states, not facts about the world.iii Popper, and Lewis, and other influential figures have endorsed this view, categorically rejecting any role for objective probabilities indeterministic contexts.In Popper's words: