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Lecture notes in computer science

On Combining Privacy with Guaranteed Output Delivery in Secure Multiparty Computation

Yuval Ishai, Eyal Kushilevitz, Yehuda Lindell, Erez Petrank

Published Jan 1, 2006• 48 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/11818175_29

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In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of mutually distrustful parties wish to securely compute some joint function of their private inputs. The computation should be carried out in a secure way, meaning that the properties privacy, correctness, independence of inputs, fairness and guaranteed output delivery should all be preserved. Unfortunately, in the case of no honest majority – and specifically in the important two-party case – it is impossible to achieve fairness and guaranteed output delivery. In this paper, we show how a legal infrastructure that respects digital signatures can be used to enforce fairness in two-party computation. Our protocol has the property that if one party obtains output while the other does not (meaning that fairness is breached), then the party not obtaining output has a digitally signed cheque from the other party. Thus, fairness can be “enforced ” in the sense that any breach results in a loss of money by the adversarial party. 1

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Two settings are traditionally considered for secure multiparty computation, depending on whether or not a majority of the parties are assumed to be honest. Existing protocols that assume an honest majority provide “full security” (and, in particular, guarantee output delivery and fairness) when this assumption holds, but are completely insecure if this assumption is violated. On the other hand, known protocols tolerating an arbitrary number of corruptions do not guarantee fairness or output delivery even if only a single party is dishonest. It is natural to wonder whether it is possible to achieve the “best of both worlds”: namely, a single protocol that simultaneously achieves the best possible security in both the above settings. Here, we rule out this possibility (at least for general functionalities) and show some positive results regarding what can be achieved.

SIAM Journal on Computing•Jan 1, 2011•32 citations
In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of mutually distrustful parties wish to securely compute some joint function of their private inputs. The computation should be carried out in a secure way, meaning that the properties privacy, correctness, independence of inputs, fairness and guaranteed output delivery should all be preserved. Unfortunately, in the case of no honest majority – and specifically in the important two-party case – it is impossible to achieve fairness and guaranteed output delivery. In this paper, we show how a legal infrastructure that respects digital signatures can be used to enforce fairness in two-party computation. Our protocol has the property that if one party obtains output while the other does not (meaning that fairness is breached), then the party not obtaining output has a digitally signed cheque from the other party. Thus, fairness can be “enforced ” in the sense that any breach results in a loss of money by the adversarial party. 1
Two settings are traditionally considered for secure multiparty computation, depending on whether or not a majority of the parties are assumed to be honest. Existing protocols that assume an honest majority provide “full security” (and, in particular, guarantee output delivery and fairness) when this assumption holds, but are completely insecure if this assumption is violated. On the other hand, known protocols tolerating an arbitrary number of corruptions do not guarantee fairness or output delivery even if only a single party is dishonest. It is natural to wonder whether it is possible to achieve the “best of both worlds”: namely, a single protocol that simultaneously achieves the best possible security in both the above settings. Here, we rule out this possibility (at least for general functionalities) and show some positive results regarding what can be achieved.