The central aim of this thesis is to present a new kind of realism that is driven not from the traditional realism/anti-realism debate but from the practice of physicists. The usual debate focuses on discussions about the truth of theories and their fit with nature, while the real practices of the scientists are forgotten. The position I shall defend is called 'phenomenological realism': theories are merely tools to construct other theories and models, including phenomenological models; phenomenological models are the vehicles of representation. The realist doctrine was recently undermined by the argument from the pessimistic meta-induction, also known as the argument from scientific revolutions. I argue that phenomenological realism is a new kind of scientific realism which can overcome the problem generated by the argument from scientific revolutions, and which depend on the scientific practice. The realist tried to overcome this problem by suggesting various types of theory dichotomy. I claim that different types of dichotomy presented by realists did not overcome the problem, these dichotomies cut through theory vertically. I argue for a different kind of dichotomy between high level theoretical abstractions and low-level theoretical representations. I claim that theoretical work in physics have two distinct types depending on the way they are built these are: theoretical models which built depending on a top-down approach and phenomenological models which are built depending on a bottom-up approach, this dichotomy cuts the division along a horizontal line between low and high level theory. I present two case studies. One from superconductivity where I contrast the BCS theory of superconductivity with the phenomenological model of Landau and Ginzburg. I show how in that field of physics the historical developments favoured phenomenological models over high-level theoretical abstraction. I show how the BCS theory of superconductivity was constructed, and why it was accepted as the fundamental theory of superconductivity, and how later failed to account for new kinds of superconductors. I contrast that with the building of the widely accepted phenomenological model of superconductivity. The other case study is a fresh look at the Bohr-Einstein debate. I think that the main difference between Bohr and Einstein was their position from how theoretical work ought to be conducted in physics. Einstein always sought the mathematical clarity and simplicity, he adopted a top-down approach toward theoretical work, while Bohr insisted on a bottom-up approach. (author)
The central aim of this thesis is to present a new kind of realism that is driven not from the traditional realism/anti-realism debate but from the practice of physicists. The usual debate focuses on discussions about the truth of theories and their fit with nature, while the real practices of the scientists are forgotten. The position I shall defend is called 'phenomenological realism': theories are merely tools to construct other theories and models, including phenomenological models; phenomenological models are the vehicles of representation. The realist doctrine was recently undermined by the argument from the pessimistic meta-induction, also known as the argument from scientific revolutions. I argue that phenomenological realism is a new kind of scientific realism which can overcome the problem generated by the argument from scientific revolutions, and which depend on the scientific practice. The realist tried to overcome this problem by suggesting various types of theory dichotomy. I claim that different types of dichotomy presented by realists did not overcome the problem, these dichotomies cut through theory vertically. I argue for a different kind of dichotomy between high level theoretical abstractions and low-level theoretical representations. I claim that theoretical work in physics have two distinct types depending on the way they are built these are: theoretical models which built depending on a top-down approach and phenomenological models which are built depending on a bottom-up approach, this dichotomy cuts the division along a horizontal line between low and high level theory. I present two case studies. One from superconductivity where I contrast the BCS theory of superconductivity with the phenomenological model of Landau and Ginzburg. I show how in that field of physics the historical developments favoured phenomenological models over high-level theoretical abstraction. I show how the BCS theory of superconductivity was constructed, and why it was accepted as the fundamental theory of superconductivity, and how later failed to account for new kinds of superconductors. I contrast that with the building of the widely accepted phenomenological model of superconductivity. The other case study is a fresh look at the Bohr-Einstein debate. I think that the main difference between Bohr and Einstein was their position from how theoretical work ought to be conducted in physics. Einstein always sought the mathematical clarity and simplicity, he adopted a top-down approach toward theoretical work, while Bohr insisted on a bottom-up approach. (author)
The aim of the present paper is to sbo» that anti-realism in science, 1vhich has a1;guab/y become more fashionable in recentyears, contrary to tuha: its proponents assert, cannot make use of quantum mechanics and its impressiue achievements as a frump card in justifying its claims. I will argue that scientific anti-realism far from providing scientific communiry with a progressive methodologicalframeuorle is a restrictive approach wbicb would hamper scientific progress. Focusing on the historical evidence of the 1vqys in subicb quantum mechanics was deueloped, I 1vill further argue that the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics due to Bohr and Heisenberg, among others, iuith its in-built anti-realistic elements provides a damning verdict against the claims of anti-realists. Following a critical assessment of a number of alternative interpretations or the calculus of quantum mechanics, I shall present realistic approaches which provide more effective and frudful conceptualframeu;orks for the advancement of research in the quantum
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
Scientific realists often say that there should be belief in the approximate truth of ‘our best scientific theories.’ It is hard to hear the phrase ‘our best scientific theories’ without thinking of quantum mechanics and quantum field theories. But as numerous chapters in this collection make clear, it is unclear that some experts even know how to make sense of being a realist about quantum theories. They provide recipes for calculating incredibly precise predictions for observations, but beyond the recipes, they do not seem to offer a clear-cut or unambiguous picture of what physical reality is like at the fundamental level. After giving an overview of the problems that beset any attempt to believe in the truth or approximate truth of quantum theories, Chapter 2 turns to the question of how to protect scientific realism from the ills of the quantum. The aim is to show that it is possible to quarantine the worst of those ills, freeing us to adopt a robustly realistic attitude toward many other extremely successful areas of contemporary science, such as (parts of) geology, microbiology, and chemistry. The quarantine barrier may be imperfect and permeable in places, but is strong enough (the chapter argues) to help the cause of scientific realism.
Quantum mechanics has always presented a problem for scientific realists. For it does not seem to offer a coherent picture of the world. I think it does, and that there is a viable quantum mechanical model of reality. But it cannot be constructed, given the continuity constraints that we usually place on realistic models. To be a quantum mechanical realist, one has to be willing to accept that there are two fundamentally different kinds of processes occurring in nature: continuous, but quantum mechanically indeterminate, energy transfer processes and discontinuous, but spatially extended, changes of state. The unwillingness of philosophers to accept that there is such a distinction has caused many of them to doubt the reality of Schrödinger waves, and the processes of their generation and collapse. I am fully aware that I am treading on well-trodden territory, and that the technical difficulties that must be faced by anyone who is not a specialist in the field are immense. Nevertheless, I think there is a fairly clear metaphysical position on these issues derivable from the kind of essentialist realism outlined in the previous chapter, and I ask readers to bear with me.
Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the ‘no miracle’ thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete.
Particle physics studies highly complex processes which cannot be directly observed. Scientific realism claims that we are nevertheless warranted in believing that these processes really occur and that the objects involved in them really exist. This book defends a version of scientific realism, called causal realism, in the context of particle physics. The first part of the book introduces the central theses and arguments in the recent philosophical debate on scientific realism and discusses entity realism, which is the most important precursor of causal realism. It also argues against the view that the very debate on scientific realism is not worth pursuing at all. In the second part, causal realism is developed and the key distinction between two kinds of warrant for scientific claims is clarified. This distinction proves its usefulness in a case study analyzing the discovery of the neutrino. It is also shown to be effective against an influential kind of pessimism, according to which even our best present theories are likely to be replaced some day by radically distinct alternatives. The final part discusses some specific challenges posed to realism by quantum physics, such as non-locality, delayed choice and the absence of particles in relativistic quantum theories.