Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Key establishment : proofs and refutations

Kim‐Kwang Raymond Choo

Published Jan 1, 2006• 17 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We study the problem of secure key establishment. We critically examine the security models of Bellare and Rogaway (1993) and Canetti and Krawczyk (2001) in the computational complexity approach, as these models are central in the understanding of the provable security paradigm. We show that the partnership definition used in the three-party key distribution (3PKD) protocol of Bellare and Rogaway (1995) is flawed, which invalidates the proof for the 3PKD protocol. We present an improved protocol with a new proof of security. We identify several variants of the key sharing requirement (i.e., two entities who have completed matching sessions, partners, are required to accept the same session key). We then present a brief discussion about the key sharing requirement. We identify several variants of the Bellare and Rogaway (1993) model. We present a comparative study of the relative strengths of security notions between the several variants of the Bellare-Rogaway model and the Canetti-Krawczyk model. In our comparative study, we reveal a drawback in the Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway (2000) model with the protocol of Abdalla and Pointcheval (2005) as a case study. We prove a revised protocol of Boyd (1996) secure in the Bellare-Rogaway model. We then extend the model in order to allow more realistic adversary capabilities by incorporating the notion of resetting the long-term compromised key of some entity. This allows us to detect a known weakness of the protocol that cannot be captured in the original model. We also present an alternative protocol that is efficient in both messages and rounds. We prove the protocol secure in the extended model. We point out previously unknown flaws in several published protocols and a message authenticator of Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk (1998) by refuting claimed proofs of security. We also point out corresponding flaws in their existing proofs. We propose fixes to these protocols and their proofs. In some cases, we present new protocols with full proofs of security. We examine the role of session key construction in key establishment protocols, and demonstrate that a small change to the way that session keys are constructed can have significant benefits. Protocols that were proven secure in a restricted Bellare-Rogaway model can then be proven secure in the full model. We present a brief discussion on ways to construct session keys in key establishment protocols and also prove the protocol of Chen and Kudla (2003) secure in a less restrictive Bellare-Rogaway model. To complement the computational complexity approach, we provide a formal specification and machine analysis of the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway model using an automated model checker, Simple Homomorphism Verification Tool (SHVT). We demonstrate that structural flaws in protocols can be revealed using our framework. We reveal previously unknown flaws in the unpublished preproceedings version of the protocol due to Jakobsson and Pointcheval (2001) and several published protocols with only heuristic security arguments. We conclude this thesis with a listing of some open problems that were encountered in the study.

Related papers

On Session Identifiers in Provably Secure Protocols

Raymond Choo, Colin Boyd, Yvonne Hitchcock +1 more

We examine the role of session identifiers (SIDs) in security proofs for key establishment protocols. After reviewing the practical importance of SIDs we use as a case study the three-party server-based key distribution (3PKD) protocol of Bellare and Rogaway, proven secure in 1995. We show incidentally that the partnership function used in the existing security proof is flawed. There seems to be no way to define a SID for the 3PKD protocol that will preserve the proof of security. A small change to the protocol allows a natural definition for a SID and we prove that the new protocol is secure using this SID to define partnering.

•Jan 1, 2004•13 citations

A Proof of Revised Yahalom Protocol in the Bellare and Rogaway (1993) Model

Kim‐Kwang Raymond Choo

Although the Yahalom protocol, proposed by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham in 1990, is one of the most prominent key establishment protocols analysed by researchers from the computer security community (using automated proof tools), a simplified version of the protocol is only recently proven secure by Backes and Pfitzmann [(2006) On the Cryptographic Key Secrecy of the Strengthened Yahalom Protocol. Proc. IFIP SEC 2006] in their cryptographic library framework. We present a protocol for key establishment that is closely based on the Yahalom protocol. We then present a security proof in the Bellare, M. and Rogaway, P. [(1993a). Entity Authentication and Key Distribution. Proc. of CRYPTO 1993, Santa Barbara, CA, August 22–26, LNCS, Vol. 773, pp. 110–125. Springer-Verlag, Berlin] model and the random oracle model. We also observe that no partnering mechanism is specified within the Yahalom protocol. We then present a brief discussion on the role and the possible construct of session identifiers (SIDs) as a form of partnering mechanism, which allows the right session key to be identified in concurrent protocol executions. We then recommend that SIDs should be included within protocol specification rather than consider SIDs as artefacts in protocol proof.

The Computer Journal•Jun 15, 2007•21 citations

Correcting the security definition of the Bellare-Rogaway 3PKD model

廖建新

A flaw lied in the security definition of the Bellare-Rogaway 3PKD model,which was proposed by Bellare and Rogaway for three-party key distribution in 1995,was discovered.To reveal it,a new three-party key distribution proto-col P-Flaw was proposed.The protocol was provably secure under the Bellare-Rogaway 3PKD model.However the pro-tocol was not secure enough to withstand the server spoofing attack,known session key attack,and replay attack.The absence of the origin recognition for the distributed session key accounts for the flaw.Accordingly,the security definition of the Bellare-Rogaway 3PKD model was corrected based on matching conversation.

通信学报•Jan 1, 2007•0 citations

Security Models and Proofs for Key Establishment Protocols

Eddie M. Ng

In this thesis we study the problem of secure key establishment, motivated by the construction of secure channels protocols to protect information transmitted over an open network. In the past, the purported security of a key establishment protocol was justified if it could be shown to withstand popular attack scenarios by heuristic analysis. Since this approach does not account for all possible attacks, the security guarantees are limited and often insufficient. \nThis thesis examines the provable security approach to the analysis of key establishment protocols. We present the security models and definitions developed in 2001 and 2002 by Canetti and Krawczyk, critique the appropriateness of the models, and provide several security proofs under the definitions. In addition, we consider the importance of the key compromise impersonation resilience property in the context of these models. We list some open problems that were encountered in the study.

•Jan 1, 2005•4 citations

Key exchange security in constructive cryptography

Christian Badertscher

Assessing the security of key exchange protocols is a crucial task and turned out to be highly non-trivial.Many protocols proposed in the past have subsequently been broken.In order to provide a formal framework for security proofs, various security models have been defined.In this thesis, we analyse several such security models for key exchange protocols using the paradigm of constructive cryptography.We examine the exact constructive security guarantees and semantics that these notions provide.In particular, we compare constructive security definitions with a model proposed by Bellare and Rogaway, SK-security by Canetti and Krawczyk and a formal model for secure key exchange proposed by Shoup.i

•Jan 1, 2012•0 citations

Authentication in Key-Exchange: Definitions, Relations and Composition

Cyprien Delpech de Saint Guilhem, Marc Fischlin, Bogdan Warinschi

We present a systematic approach to define and study authentication notions in authenticated key-exchange protocols. We propose and use a flexible and expressive predicate-based definitional framework. Our definitions capture key and entity authentication, in both implicit and explicit variants, as well as key and entity confirmation, for authenticated key-exchange protocols. In particular, we capture critical notions in the authentication space such as key-compromise impersonation resistance and security against unknown key-share attacks. We first discuss these definitions within the Bellare-Rogaway model and then extend them to Canetti-Krawczyk-style models. We then show two useful applications of our framework. First, we look at the authentication guarantees of three representative protocols to draw several useful lessons for protocol design. The core technical contribution of this paper is then to formally establish that composition of secure implicitly authenticated key-exchange with subsequent confirmation protocols yields explicit authentication guarantees. Without a formal separation of implicit and explicit authentication from secrecy, a proof of this folklore result could not have been established.

IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW)•Jun 1, 2020•35 citations
We study the problem of secure key establishment. We critically examine the security models of Bellare and Rogaway (1993) and Canetti and Krawczyk (2001) in the computational complexity approach, as these models are central in the understanding of the provable security paradigm. We show that the partnership definition used in the three-party key distribution (3PKD) protocol of Bellare and Rogaway (1995) is flawed, which invalidates the proof for the 3PKD protocol. We present an improved protocol with a new proof of security. We identify several variants of the key sharing requirement (i.e., two entities who have completed matching sessions, partners, are required to accept the same session key). We then present a brief discussion about the key sharing requirement. We identify several variants of the Bellare and Rogaway (1993) model. We present a comparative study of the relative strengths of security notions between the several variants of the Bellare-Rogaway model and the Canetti-Krawczyk model. In our comparative study, we reveal a drawback in the Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway (2000) model with the protocol of Abdalla and Pointcheval (2005) as a case study.
We prove a revised protocol of Boyd (1996) secure in the Bellare-Rogaway model. We then extend the model in order to allow more realistic adversary capabilities by incorporating the notion of resetting the long-term compromised key of some entity. This allows us to detect a known weakness of the protocol that cannot be captured in the original model. We also present an alternative protocol that is efficient in both messages and rounds. We prove the protocol secure in the extended model. We point out previously unknown flaws in several published protocols and a message authenticator of Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk (1998) by refuting claimed proofs of security. We also point out corresponding flaws in their existing proofs. We propose fixes to these protocols and their proofs. In some cases, we present new protocols with full proofs of security. We examine the role of session key construction in key establishment protocols, and demonstrate that a small change to the way that session keys are constructed can have significant benefits. Protocols that were proven secure in a restricted Bellare-Rogaway model can then be proven secure in the full model. We present a brief discussion on ways to construct session keys in key establishment protocols and also prove the protocol of Chen and Kudla (2003) secure in a less restrictive Bellare-Rogaway model. To complement the computational complexity approach, we provide a formal specification and machine analysis of the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway model using an automated model checker, Simple Homomorphism Verification Tool (SHVT). We demonstrate that structural flaws in protocols can be revealed using our framework. We reveal previously unknown flaws in the unpublished preproceedings version of the protocol due to Jakobsson and Pointcheval (2001) and several published protocols with only heuristic security arguments. We conclude this thesis with a listing of some open problems that were encountered in the study.
We examine the role of session identifiers (SIDs) in security proofs for key establishment protocols. After reviewing the practical importance of SIDs we use as a case study the three-party server-based key distribution (3PKD) protocol of Bellare and Rogaway, proven secure in 1995. We show incidentally that the partnership function used in the existing security proof is flawed. There seems to be no way to define a SID for the 3PKD protocol that will preserve the proof of security. A small change to the protocol allows a natural definition for a SID and we prove that the new protocol is secure using this SID to define partnering.
Although the Yahalom protocol, proposed by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham in 1990, is one of the most prominent key establishment protocols analysed by researchers from the computer security community (using automated proof tools), a simplified version of the protocol is only recently proven secure by Backes and Pfitzmann [(2006) On the Cryptographic Key Secrecy of the Strengthened Yahalom Protocol. Proc. IFIP SEC 2006] in their cryptographic library framework. We present a protocol for key establishment that is closely based on the Yahalom protocol. We then present a security proof in the Bellare, M. and Rogaway, P. [(1993a). Entity Authentication and Key Distribution. Proc. of CRYPTO 1993, Santa Barbara, CA, August 22–26, LNCS, Vol. 773, pp. 110–125. Springer-Verlag, Berlin] model and the random oracle model. We also observe that no partnering mechanism is specified within the Yahalom protocol. We then present a brief discussion on the role and the possible construct of session identifiers (SIDs) as a form of partnering mechanism, which allows the right session key to be identified in concurrent protocol executions. We then recommend that SIDs should be included within protocol specification rather than consider SIDs as artefacts in protocol proof.
A flaw lied in the security definition of the Bellare-Rogaway 3PKD model,which was proposed by Bellare and Rogaway for three-party key distribution in 1995,was discovered.To reveal it,a new three-party key distribution proto-col P-Flaw was proposed.The protocol was provably secure under the Bellare-Rogaway 3PKD model.However the pro-tocol was not secure enough to withstand the server spoofing attack,known session key attack,and replay attack.The absence of the origin recognition for the distributed session key accounts for the flaw.Accordingly,the security definition of the Bellare-Rogaway 3PKD model was corrected based on matching conversation.
In this thesis we study the problem of secure key establishment, motivated by the construction of secure channels protocols to protect information transmitted over an open network. In the past, the purported security of a key establishment protocol was justified if it could be shown to withstand popular attack scenarios by heuristic analysis. Since this approach does not account for all possible attacks, the security guarantees are limited and often insufficient. \nThis thesis examines the provable security approach to the analysis of key establishment protocols. We present the security models and definitions developed in 2001 and 2002 by Canetti and Krawczyk, critique the appropriateness of the models, and provide several security proofs under the definitions. In addition, we consider the importance of the key compromise impersonation resilience property in the context of these models. We list some open problems that were encountered in the study.
Assessing the security of key exchange protocols is a crucial task and turned out to be highly non-trivial.Many protocols proposed in the past have subsequently been broken.In order to provide a formal framework for security proofs, various security models have been defined.In this thesis, we analyse several such security models for key exchange protocols using the paradigm of constructive cryptography.We examine the exact constructive security guarantees and semantics that these notions provide.In particular, we compare constructive security definitions with a model proposed by Bellare and Rogaway, SK-security by Canetti and Krawczyk and a formal model for secure key exchange proposed by Shoup.i
We present a systematic approach to define and study authentication notions in authenticated key-exchange protocols. We propose and use a flexible and expressive predicate-based definitional framework. Our definitions capture key and entity authentication, in both implicit and explicit variants, as well as key and entity confirmation, for authenticated key-exchange protocols. In particular, we capture critical notions in the authentication space such as key-compromise impersonation resistance and security against unknown key-share attacks. We first discuss these definitions within the Bellare-Rogaway model and then extend them to Canetti-Krawczyk-style models. We then show two useful applications of our framework. First, we look at the authentication guarantees of three representative protocols to draw several useful lessons for protocol design. The core technical contribution of this paper is then to formally establish that composition of secure implicitly authenticated key-exchange with subsequent confirmation protocols yields explicit authentication guarantees. Without a formal separation of implicit and explicit authentication from secrecy, a proof of this folklore result could not have been established.