In quantum mechanics, the wave function of a N-body system is a mathematical function defined in a 3N-dimensional configuration space. We argue that wave function realism implies particle ontology when assuming: (1) the wave function of a N-body system describes N physical entities; (2) each triple of the 3N coordinates of a point in configuration space that relates to one physical entity represents a point in ordinary three-dimensional space. Moreover, the motion of particles is random and discontinuous.
In quantum mechanics, the wave function of a N-body system is a mathematical function defined in a 3N-dimensional configuration space. We argue that wave function realism implies particle ontology when assuming: (1) the wave function of a N-body system describes N physical entities; (2) each triple of the 3N coordinates of a point in configuration space that relates to one physical entity represents a point in ordinary three-dimensional space. Moreover, the motion of particles is random and discontinuous.
The ontological meaning of the wave function is an important problem in the metaphysics of quantum mechanics. The conventional view is wave function realism, according to which the wave function represents a real physical field in a fundamental high-dimensional space. In this chapter, I present a new analysis of the meaning of the wave function, and the analysis suggests a particle ontological interpretation of the wave function. According to this interpretation, the wave function of a quantum system describes the state of random discontinuous motion of particles in three-dimensional space, and in particular, the modulus squared of the wave function gives the probability density that the particles appear in every possible group of positions in space. Moreover, I argue that the difference between particle ontology and field ontology may result in different predictions under certain reasonable assumption, and it is the former, not the latter, that is consistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics. Finally, I discuss similar pictures of motion of particles suggested by others. It is argued that Bell’s Everett (?) theory also implies the picture of random discontinuous motion of particles.
Abstract The three major interpretations of quantum mechanics—Bohm, GRW, and many worlds—all treat the wave function as a physical entity. But this entity apparently resides in a high-dimensional configuration space, with three coordinates for each particle in the universe. Some conclude on this basis that the three-dimensionality of the world of experience is an illusion. Others respond by adding three-dimensional ontology to the theory or by reinterpreting the wave function either as a law or as an indirect representation of properties in three-dimensional space. It is argued that the latter possibility makes it unnecessary to postulate either additional ontology or a fundamentally high-dimensional world.
The quantum wave-function is at the heart of quantum mechanics. It is the physical state of a quantum system before a measurement is taken. This wave-function is described mathematically by the formulation of matrix mechanics and represents the evolution of the quantum wave-function. In contemporary philosophy of physics, the wave-function’s nature of space is hotly debated. Contemporaries such as David Albert, who posits an ontology which is based off the mathematical features of the wave-function, claim that the dimensionality of our physical space is proportional to 3N, where N is equal to the number of particles in the universe. Others such as Bradley Monton claim quantum mechanics to be a false theory from the outset due to its incompatibility with general relativity and posit a much more realist property-based-physics ontology. However, these ontologies have their problems. Albert’s ontology takes the mathematics of the quantum wave-function at face value and disregards the distance properties of metric space to misconstrue the phase space nature of the 3N-configuration space as a metric space. Monton, on the other hand, questionably grounds his thesis on the incompatibility of quantum mechanics with general relativity and on common sense rather than on observation and experimentation, as required by the scientific method. In this thesis, I discuss the viewpoints of Albert and Monton in detail and explore the nature of space in the quantum wave-function in an attempt to reach a better understanding of the fundamental nature of space in the quantum wave-function.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
One of the major concerns of Schr\"odinger, Lorentz, Einstein, and many others about the wave function is that it is defined on the 3N-dimensional configuration space, rather than on the three-dimensional (3D) physical space. This gives the impression that quantum mechanics cannot have a 3D space or space-time ontology, even in the absence of quantum measurements. In particular, this seems to affect interpretations which take the wave function as a physical entity, in particular, the many-worlds and the spontaneous collapse interpretations, and some versions of the pilot wave theory. Here, a representation of the many-particle states is given, as multilayered fields defined on the three-dimensional physical space. This representation is equivalent to the usual representation on the configuration space, but it makes it explicit that it is possible to interpret the wave functions as defined on the physical space. As long as only unitary evolution is involved, the interactions are local. I intended this representation to capture and formalize the nonexplicit and informal intuition of many working quantum physicists, who, by considering the wave function sometimes to be defined on the configuration space and sometimes on the physical space, may seem to researchers in the foundations of quantum theory as adopting an inconsistent view about its ontology. This representation does not aim to solve the measurement problem, and it allows for Schr\"odinger cats just like the usual one. But, it may help various interpretations to solve these problems, through inclusion of the wave function as (part of) their primitive ontology. In appendices, it is shown how the multilayered field representation can be extended to quantum field theory.
Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories can be regarded as (approximately) true. This is connected with the view that science, physics in particular, and metaphysics could (and should) inform one another: on the one hand, science tells us what the world is like, and on the other hand, metaphysical principles allow us to select between the various possible theories which are underdetermined by the data. Nonetheless, quantum mechanics has always been regarded as, at best, puzzling, if not contradictory. As such, it has been considered for a long time at odds with scientific realism, and thus a naturalized quantum metaphysics was deemed impossible. Luckily, now we have many quantum theories compatible with a realist interpretation. However, scientific realists assumed that the wave-function, regarded as the principal ingredient of quantum theories, had to represent a physical entity, and because of this they struggled with quantum superpositions. In this paper I discuss a particular approach which makes quantum mechanics compatible with scientific realism without doing that. In this approach, the wave-function does not represent matter which is instead represented by some spatio-temporal entity dubbed the primitive ontology: point-particles, continuous matter fields, space-time events. I argue how within this framework one develops a distinctive theory-construction schema, which allows to perform a more informed theory evaluation by analyzing the various ingredients of the approach and their inter-relations.