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Lecture notes in computer science

Quantum Cryptography, Eavesdropping, and Unsharp Spin Measurement

S. Roy, Guruprasad Kar

Published Jan 1, 1999• 2 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/3-540-49208-9_18

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The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) reality criterion is generalized to fit with the notion of positive-operator-valued observables occurring in quantum optics, stochastic quantum mechanics, and other fields of quantum physics. The resulting concept of unsharp reality for quantum systems is illustrated within stochastic spin space where it leads to a notion of unsharp spin property. Finally we investigate the possibility of joint spin measurements and give a brief discussion of the EPR-Bell argument for unsharp spin properties.
Entanglement-measurement attack is one of the most famous attacks against quantum cryptography. In quantum cryptography protocols, eavesdropping checking is an effective means to resist this attack. There are currently two commonly used eavesdropping checking methods: one is to prepare two sets of non-orthogonal single-particle states as decoy states, and determine whether there are eavesdroppers in the quantum channel by comparing the states obtained by measurements with the original states; The other is to prepare two sets of non-orthogonal entangled states and use their entanglement correlations to judge whether there are eavesdroppers in the quantum channel. In this paper, we theoretically demonstrate how quantum cryptography can utilize these two eavesdropping checking methods to resist entanglement-measurement attacks. We take the quantum cryptography protocols based on maximally entangled states as examples to demonstrate the proof process, transitioning from qubit-based protocols to qudit-based ones.