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Cambridge University Press eBooks

An appraisal of Bohr's philosophy of physics

Dugald R. Murdoch

Published Nov 5, 1987• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Now that my account of Bohr's philosophy of physics has been completed, it remains for me to give a general assessment of it. What value should we assign to Bohr's main ideas – the notions of correspondence and complementarity? How does his interpretation of quantum physics fare in comparison with some of its rivals? What should our assessment of the Bohr–Einstein debate be? I shall take up these questions in the reverse order.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511564307.013

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Now that my account of Bohr's philosophy of physics has been completed, it remains for me to give a general assessment of it. What value should we assign to Bohr's main ideas – the notions of correspondence and complementarity? How does his interpretation of quantum physics fare in comparison with some of its rivals? What should our assessment of the Bohr–Einstein debate be? I shall take up these questions in the reverse order.
This book gives a clear and comprehensive exposition of Niels Bohr's philosophy of physics. Bohr's ideas are of major importance, for they are the source of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics; yet they are obscure, and call for the sort of close analysis that this book provides. The book describes the historical background of the physics from which Bohr's ideas grew. The core of the book is a detailed analysis of Bohr's arguments for complementarity and of the interpretation which he put upon it. Special emphasis is placed throughout on the contrasting views of Einstein, and the great debate between Bohr and Einstein is thoroughly examined. The book traces the philosophical influences on Bohr, and unravels the realist and anti-realist strands in his thinking. Bohr's philosophy is critically assessed in the light of recent developments in the foundations of quantum physics (the work of Bell and others) and in philosophy (the realism-anti-realism debate) and it is revealed as being much more subtle and sophisticated than it is generally taken to be. While the book will be of interest to specialists, it is written in a style that will make it accessible to those who have no specialist knowledge of the relevant physics and philosophy.
Now that Bohr's philosophy of quantum physics has been surveyed in detail, it is time to provide a general description of his philosophy that illuminates the details. The question which I wish to address, then is: what is the general philosophy, or philosophical point of view, that underlies Bohr's philosophy of physics? Can his philosophy be neatly categorised in terms of any well known philosophical position? Apropos his philosophy of physics in particular, the question of primary interest is: to what extent, if any, is Bohr's philosophy of physics realist? No simple answer to this question can be given: indeed, certain realist and non-realist components are subtly interwoven in his philosophy, and to unravel them we shall need a fairly refined conception of what constitutes a realist interpretation of physics.
This paper examines the transformation of Bohr's interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, known as complementarity, from the version presented in his famous Como lecture (1927), which introduced complementarity, to a new version that was developed by Bohr shortly thereafter, in part under the impact of his intervening exchanges with Einstein. While the existence of more than one version of Bohr's complementarity (and of still different versions of the Copenhagen interpretation by others) has been noted, Bohr's rethinking itself of complementarity has rarely been adequately addressed. Apart from refining and indeed correcting the Como argument, the transformation in question was, I argue, defined by a shift from a more philosophical to a more experimental argument. My aim is to explore both this shift and the complexity of the relationships between physics and philosophy in Bohr's thinking in order to understand better the beginnings and the ends, also in the sense of aims, of Bohr's complementarity.
The so-called “orthodox” interpretation of quantum physics attributed to Niels Bohr is commonly regarded as abandoning realism. I have already opposed this view elsewhere (Folse 1985) but partially in response to criticism of my position (Shimony 1985), here I propose to relate Bohr’s realism to recent contributions to the realism debate given by Hacking (1983), Cartwright (1983), and Ellis (1985). Specifically, I argue that Bohr’s complementarity viewpoint requires a causal entity realism. Furthermore, labeling Bohr an anti-realist with respect to theories is misleading because it assumes the correspondence theory of truth that Bohr holds quantum theory forces us to reject. Although there are many realist views, I take the root of realism to be the quest for knowledge about the reality producing the phenomena we experience. It is realism in this sense that Bohr defended and that makes science significant to metaphysics.
Introduction In order to develop the insight that is worked out by Brock (Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, Logos, 2003), that the philosophy of quantum mechanics should parallel Kant's philosophy of natural science, some preliminary analyses of key concepts need to be done. Initiated by Niels Bohr (Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, John Wiley and Sons, 1958), the concept of ‘complementarity’ has played a major role in the interpretation of quantum theory. However, the exact place it occupies in respect of the logical form of the relation of complementarity between descriptive predicates has not been spelled out in detail to my knowledge. Complementary predicates exclude one another as simultaneous attributions to the same subject. Exactly what form does this exclusion take? How is it related to the basic exclusion-of-predicates principle, the logical law of non-contradiction?