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Physics World

In defence of scientific realism

Mauricio Suárez

Published Mar 1, 1996• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

The philosophy of physics is now an important branch of academic philosophy. Philosophers of physics, who usually have a background in both disciplines, address the kind of questions that any physicist interested in understanding the conceptual foundations of the subject would deem important. These might include: What is four-dimensional Min-kowski space-time, and how did the advent of relativity affect Newtonian views of absolute space and time? Are the standard distributions in statistical physics a measure of objective chance or a lack of information about physical processes? Is there a measurement problem in quantum theory?

DOI
10.1088/2058-7058/9/3/30

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The philosophy of physics is now an important branch of academic philosophy. Philosophers of physics, who usually have a background in both disciplines, address the kind of questions that any physicist interested in understanding the conceptual foundations of the subject would deem important. These might include: What is four-dimensional Min-kowski space-time, and how did the advent of relativity affect Newtonian views of absolute space and time? Are the standard distributions in statistical physics a measure of objective chance or a lack of information about physical processes? Is there a measurement problem in quantum theory?
There are several (general) philosophy of physics textbooks on the market.1 An obvious question to ask at the outset then is: Why another one? In his “Some Philosophical Aspects of Particle Physics”, Michael Redhead bemoans the common practice of philosophers of science of dealing with examples “which are no longer of current research interest in science” ((1980), p. 279). This practice is still common even among many philosophers of physics, and, for the most part, the available textbooks continue to engage in this practice. Generally, one finds a little spacetime, a little statistical mechanics, and a little quantum theory. Now, these are of course the ‘pillars’ of modern physics, so it is what we should expect to be covered in any textbook on the philosophy of physics worth its salt (and, indeed, they are well represented in this book). However, the issues that are dealt with are usually very old fashioned and very limited in scope: ‘spacetime’ means ‘the twins paradox’ (and possibly conventionalism); ‘statistical mechanics’ means ‘time asymmetry’; and ‘quantum theory’ means ‘the measurement problem’. Redhead is surely right that this leads physicists to “regard philosophy of science as somewhat irrelevant”. Rightly so, too, if this were in fact representative of much of what actually goes on in philosophy of physics. However, the state of play as represented in philosophy of physics and (some) philosophy of science journals shows a very different level of engagement, with philosophers of physics investigating the frontiers of scientific research. This disparity (or the impression of such) is the raison d’eˆtre for the book you are now reading. The result is an introductory textbook covering those portions of philosophy of physics research that other textbooks fail to cover, or cover only very briefly or very simplistically. The three pillars of modern physics-relativity, quantum theory and statistical mechanics-are still represented, then, but from a more advanced and contemporary perspective.
The relation between Physics and Philosophy brings to mind the proverbial marriage of high drama; the parties do not approve of each other, but separated they cannot live. Philosophers find physicists shallow, and many physicists claim that they find philosophic speculations useless or worse. Mostly both display a lack of knowledge and understanding of the methods and goals of the other. A few researchers have tried to bridge this gap and explore the worlds of both parties. Michael Redhead has worked in this borderland, and when he retired from his chair in Cambridge, a symposium was arranged to honour him. The talks presented on this occasion are now published in a volume presenting much food for thought to both philosophers and physicists. The essays in this publication do not offer easy reading; not too many readers will have the preparation to penetrate the technical arguments offered. The authors are well acquainted with both philosophical argumentation and mathematical formalism, and, following the lead of Professor Redhead, they combine these in intricate and suggestive ways. Only a close reading can offer understanding of the points of view taken by the various authors. Browsing and mere reading defines the scenery, exploring it demands much more. Many of the nine essays included investigate the meaning of terms used loosely in physics contexts: locality, beables, symmetries and time in relativity. All essays utilize the mathematical structures of physics, but the approach is mainly philosophical; concepts like reality and metaphysics are applied. Some writings are more physical in their treatment of technical questions relating to modern quantum theory. Bohmian mechanics, localized quantum states and gauge symmetries are discussed in detail. It is, however, found that these present interpretational problems that are usually glossed over in purely physical treatments. For an old sceptic like myself, it is quite refreshing to find that many assertions, taken for granted in our textbooks, are indeed doubtful and offer conceptual or technical difficulties. This insight is what a philosophical analysis can offer the working physicist; future progress may well arise from such realizations. However, the results offered by philosophical analysis are usually found unsatisfactory; the hope that philosophy can suggest novel directions for the theory remains unfounded. Philosophers can learn that modern physics rests on a very shaky conceptual foundation. The theory has evolved by a combination of serendipity and opportunism. The beast that finally has emerged is neither well founded nor internally consistent. Its only merit is that it works. That offers the ultimate philosophical problem of modern physics. If the present book can help the philosopher to behold this challenging but overwhelming wilderness, then it serves a useful purpose indeed. But the prospective researcher has to learn to master the difficult language used by the natives, who are not always friendly. I enjoyed reading the book immensely, but the technical difficulty of the text made my understanding remain mostly superficial. I hope to have the time to return some of the essays, and look into the references and issues involved. The work is genuinely what it promises: a guide From Physics to Philosophy .
The philosophy of physics is continuous with physics itself. Just as certain issues in the Foundations of Mathematics have been discussed by both mathematicians and by philosophers of mathematics, so certain issues in the philosophy of physics have been discussed by both physicists and by philosophers of physics. And just as there are issues of a more epistemological kind that tend to concern philosophers of mathematics more than they do working mathematicians, so there are issues that concern philosophers of physics more than they do working physicists. In this brief report I shall try to give an account of the present state of the discussion in America of both kinds of issues, starting with the problems of quantum mechanics, which concern both physicists and philosophers, and ending with general questions about necessary truth and the analytic-synthetic distinction which concern only philosophers.
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I argue that a common philosophical approach to the interpretation of physical theories—particularly quantum field theories—has led philosophers astray. It has driven many to declare the quantum field theories employed by practicing physicists, so-called effective field theories, to be unfit for philosophical interpretation. In particular, such theories have been deemed unable to support a realist interpretation. I argue that these claims are mistaken: attending to the manner in which these theories are employed in physical practice, I show that interpreting effective field theories yields a robust foundation for a more refined approach to scientific realism in the context of quantum field theory. The article concludes by briefly sketching some general morals for interpretive practice in the philosophy of physics. 1 Introduction2 The Standard Account of Theory Interpretation2.1 Vices of the standard account3 A More Effective Realism3.1 Approximate truth3.2 Scales and ontology4 Conclusion
Scientific realism holds that the objects of scientific knowledge exist independently of the minds or activities of scientists and those scientific theories are true of that objective world. This is antithetical to the posits of quantum physics, a body of knowledge taken as the seal of the sciences because of its incredible feat, which emphasizes observer created reality, and to that end subjective and probabilistic understanding of realities. Given this background, we contend that, if the thesis of scientific realism were to be taken as sacrosanct, nature would have remained somewhat unfavourable since nobody would have dared to ‘create’ reality other than those originally imposed by nature. And to the quantum physicist, the resort to probabilistic conception of reality is an obvious indication that nature in its dynamism is uncanny and still has billions of tricks for mankind.