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Lecture notes in computer science

Beyond Secret Handshakes: Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Key Exchange

Stanisław Jarecki, Jihye Kim, Gene Tsudik

Published Apr 4, 2008• 49 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-540-79263-5_23

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Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Asymmetric Group Key Agreement (AH-AAGKA) protocol can be utilized by the members of a group to authenticate each other secretly. The participants affiliated to the group can execute the AH-AAGKA protocol to establish a common encryption key. Any legitimate participant can compute its own decryption key corresponding to the encryption key. Particularly, every legitimate player's affiliation information is only revealed to other legitimate players. In this paper, we present a one-round AH-AAGKA protocol. Compared with previous work, in our protocol, Group Authority (GA) does not need to be fully trusted (we call it semi-trusted). Therefore, GA cannot impersonate any honest user to execute the protocol. Meanwhile, GA can trace group members through analyzing the communication flows. Our protocol holds the affiliation-hiding property and detectability. Additionally, our scheme exhibits Perfect Forward Secrecy for both GA and outside attackers.

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Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Asymmetric Group Key Agreement Based on Short Signature

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The notion of Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Group Key Agreement (AH-AGKA) protocols was first introduced by Jarecki et al. in CT-RSA 2007, where they presented two concrete AH-AGKA protocols. In this paper, we show that Jarecki et al.'s second protocol has some drawbacks. We propose a new affiliation-hiding protocol. Differing from Jarecki et al.'s protocol, our protocol is asymmetric. Compared with existing AH-AGKA protocols, our scheme not only exhibits the affiliation-hiding property, but also holds the properties of detectability and perfect forward secrecy.

The Computer Journal•Sep 6, 2013•13 citations
Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Asymmetric Group Key Agreement (AH-AAGKA) protocol can be utilized by the members of a group to authenticate each other secretly. The participants affiliated to the group can execute the AH-AAGKA protocol to establish a common encryption key. Any legitimate participant can compute its own decryption key corresponding to the encryption key. Particularly, every legitimate player's affiliation information is only revealed to other legitimate players. In this paper, we present a one-round AH-AAGKA protocol. Compared with previous work, in our protocol, Group Authority (GA) does not need to be fully trusted (we call it semi-trusted). Therefore, GA cannot impersonate any honest user to execute the protocol. Meanwhile, GA can trace group members through analyzing the communication flows. Our protocol holds the affiliation-hiding property and detectability. Additionally, our scheme exhibits Perfect Forward Secrecy for both GA and outside attackers.
The notion of Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Group Key Agreement (AH-AGKA) protocols was first introduced by Jarecki et al. in CT-RSA 2007, where they presented two concrete AH-AGKA protocols. In this paper, we show that Jarecki et al.'s second protocol has some drawbacks. We propose a new affiliation-hiding protocol. Differing from Jarecki et al.'s protocol, our protocol is asymmetric. Compared with existing AH-AGKA protocols, our scheme not only exhibits the affiliation-hiding property, but also holds the properties of detectability and perfect forward secrecy.