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AIP conference proceedings

Bayesian versus Frequentist Predictions in Quantum Tomography

Rüdiger Schack

Published Jan 1, 2007• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This short paper is a reply to Andrei Khrennikov’s challenge to give a concrete quantum‐mechanical example where the Bayesian and frequentist approaches to probability lead to different predictions. The paper first reviews the difference between the Bayesian and frequentist approaches to hypothesis testing and then presents a simple example in quantum tomography for which Bayesian and frequentist predictions differ.

DOI
10.1063/1.2713461

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This short paper is a reply to Andrei Khrennikov’s challenge to give a concrete quantum‐mechanical example where the Bayesian and frequentist approaches to probability lead to different predictions. The paper first reviews the difference between the Bayesian and frequentist approaches to hypothesis testing and then presents a simple example in quantum tomography for which Bayesian and frequentist predictions differ.
Physicists have, hitherto, mostly adopted a frequentist conception of probability, according to which probability statements apply only to ensembles. It is argued that we should, instead, adopt an epistemic, or Bayesian conception, in which probabilities are conceived as logical constructs rather than physical realities, and in which probability statements do apply directly to individual events. The question is closely related to the disagreement between the orthodox school of statistical thought and the Bayesian school. It has important technical implications (it makes a difference, what statistical methodology one adopts). It may also have important implications for the interpretation of the quantum state. 1 1.
Physicists have, hitherto, mostly adopted a frequentist conception of probability, according to which probability statements apply only to ensembles. It is argued that we should, instead, adopt an epistemic, or Bayesian, conception, in which probabilities are conceived as logical constructs rather than physical realities and in which probability statements do apply directly to individual events. The question is closely related to the disagreement between the orthodox school of statistical thought and the Bayesian school. It has important technical implications (it makes a difference what statistical methodology one adopts). It may also have important implications for the interpretation of the quantum state.
Frequentist and Bayesian phase estimation strategies lead to conceptually different results on the state of knowledge about the true value of an unknown parameter. We compare the two frameworks and their sensitivity bounds to the estimation of an interferometric phase shift limited by quantum noise, considering both the cases of a fixed and a fluctuating parameter. We point out that frequentist precision bounds, such as the Cramér-Rao bound, for instance, do not apply to Bayesian strategies and vice versa. In particular, we show that the Bayesian variance can overcome the frequentist Cramér-Rao bound, which appears to be a paradoxical result if the conceptual difference between the two approaches are overlooked. Similarly, bounds for fluctuating parameters make no statement about the estimation of a fixed parameter.
In the Bayesian approach to probability theory, probability quantifies a degree of belief for a single trial, without any a priori connection to limiting frequencies. Despite being prescribed by a fundamental law, probabilities for individual quantum systems can be understood within the Bayesian approach. We argue that the distinction between classical and quantum probabilities lies not in their definition, but in the nature of the information they encode. In the classical world, maximal information about a physical system is complete in the sense of providing definite predictions for all possible questions that can be asked of the system. In the quantum world, maximal information is not complete and cannot be completed. Using this distinction, we show that any Bayesian probability assignment in quantum mechanics must have the form of the quantum probability rule, that maximal information about a quantum system leads to a unique quantum-state assignment, and that quantum theory provides a stronger connection between probability and measured frequency than can be justified classically. Finally we give a Bayesian formulation of quantum-state tomography. There are excellent reasons for interpreting quantum states as states of knowledge. A classic