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Designs Codes and Cryptography

Providing Anonymity in Unconditionally Secure Secret Sharing Schemes

Mida Guillermo, Keith M. Martin, Christine M. O’Keefe

Published Apr 1, 2003• 13 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1023/a:1024198519111

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ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC)•Jul 15, 2014•2 citations
In this paper we focus on sender-anonymous channels (a.k.a. Dining Cryptographers networks) and present a construction requiring a very low (constant) number of rounds of interaction while tolerating actively malicious behavior by some of the participants (up to less than half of them). Our construction is unconditionally secure (meaning that no bounds are placed on the computational power of the adversary), makes black-box use of a verifiable secret sharing (VSS) protocol, and is based on a special-purpose secure multiparty computation protocol implementing the method of "throwing darts;" its round complexity is essentially equal to that of the VSS protocol.