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Principia an international journal of epistemology

Hypotheses on the a priori rational necessity of quantum mechanics DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p393

G. Gouesbet

Published Aug 27, 2011• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

There is a huge number of laments concerning the lack of intelligibility of quantum mechanics. Some ingredients of quantum mechanics may however be possibly understood by referring to first principles, that is to say to basic principles (or postulates) which are clear and distinct to the intuition. In particular, if we rely on a first principle called non-singularity principle, which may be viewed as a hypothesis, we claim that quantum mechanics can be viewed as the a priori consequence of a rational demand. The status of the non-singularity principle, obvious to most physicists, may however be criticized, on the basis that there is no universal intuition and that any statement is in principle revisable.

DOI
10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p393

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There is a huge number of laments concerning the lack of intelligibility of quantum mechanics. Some ingredients of quantum mechanics may however be possibly understood by referring to first principles, that is to say to basic principles (or postulates) which are clear and distinct to the intuition. In particular, if we rely on a first principle called non-singularity principle, which may be viewed as a hypothesis, we claim that quantum mechanics can be viewed as the a priori consequence of a rational demand. The status of the non-singularity principle, obvious to most physicists, may however be criticized, on the basis that there is no universal intuition and that any statement is in principle revisable.
In the non-reflexive formulation of quantum physics, attention is given to a metaphysical view of quantum objects (q-objects) as non-individuals, characterised as entities to which the standard notion of identity lacks sense. The reference to the nature of q-objects is usually omitted in other interpretations and the most we can find is some vague reference to “to each [quantum] system we associate a Hilbert space”, and nothing more is said about them; we need to infer from the theory their characteristics, and it gives us several alternatives. One of them, to be justified here in broad aspects, is the non-individual view. It is important to enlighten that we are not trying to just find a way to deal with quantum entities but to defend a possible ontology of non-individuals, which can be applied also to ‘particles’ arising from quantum fields. Our account is based on two assumptions: (i) the ‘classical theory of identity’ does not apply to q-objects, and (ii) their non-individuality must be attributed from the start, that is, as a primitive notion and not ‘made a posteriori’ say by assuming symmetry principles. The underlying logic is called non-reflexive because the reflexive law of identity ∀x(x=x)\forall{x{({x = x})}}∀x(x=x) is supposed not to hold for q-objects. Since all the details demand a lot of space, here we only sketch and justify our view. The references provide a more detailed account.
Our main claim is that Bohr adopted a principle-theoretic approach to quantum mechanics in order to reconcile two principles: the distinction principle, which asserts the necessity of a clear epistemic distinction between a classical apparatus and a quantum system, and the non-separability principle, which asserts that the two systems are ontologically non-separable in any measurement process. The latter principle is a consequence of Bohr's argument that, during a measurement interaction, the quantum system and the measurement apparatus form a 'new kind of individuality'. To support our argument, we first demonstrate the overlooked fact that, according to Bohr, the measurement interaction is a physical, irreversible process and not merely an epistemic acquisition of new information. In this respect, quantum mechanics must be regarded not only as a universal theory, but also as revealing no non-arbitrary difference between a quantum realm and a classical realm; the distinction is purely pragmatic. The tension between the epistemic necessity to rely on a neatly distinguishable classical realm and the ontic non-separability of the quantum system and the classical apparatus inclined Bohr to refuse to provide a constructive account of the measurement process, such as that later proposed, for instance, by spontaneous dynamical reduction models.
Richard Feynman famously declared, "I think that I can safely say that nobody really understands quantum mechanics." Sean Carroll lamented the persistence of this sentiment in a recent opinion piece entitled, "Even Physicists Don't Understand Quantum Mechanics. Worse, they don't seem to want to understand it." Quantum mechanics is arguably the greatest achievement of modern science and by and large we absolutely understand quantum theory. Rather, the "understanding" to which these two statements evidently refer concerns the ontological status of theoretical constructs. For example, "Do quantum wave functions accurately depict physical reality?" The quantum measurement problems represents a collection of such queries and the conundrums to which they lead. Most physicists are content with foregoing such metaphysical issues, falling back on Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation, and then get on with the business of doing physics. I suspect that Carroll would criticize these physicists as being too dismissive of the wonderful mysteries of quantum mechanics by relegating its role to that of an algorithm for making predictions. Quite to the contrary, I maintain that those who still pursue a resolution to the measurement problem are burdened with a classical view of reality and fail to truly embrace the fundamental quantum aspects of nature.
We still lack any consensus about what one is actually talking about as one uses quantum mechanics. There is a gap between the abstract terms in which the theory is couched and the phenomena the theory enables each of us to account for so well. Because it has no practical consequences for how we each use quantum mechanics to deal with physical problems, this cognitive dissonance has managed to coexist with the quantum theory from the very beginning. The absence of conceptual clarity for almost a century suggests that the problem might lie in some implicit misconceptions about the nature of scientific explanation that are deeply held by virtually all physicists, but are rarely explicitly acknowledged. I describe here such unvoiced but widely shared assumptions. Rejecting them clarifies and unifies a range of obscure remarks about quantum mechanics made almost from the beginning by some of the giants of physics, many of whom are held to be in deep disagreement. This new view of physics requires physicists to think about science in an unfamiliar way. My primary purpose is to explain the new perspective and urge that it be taken seriously. My secondary aims are to explain why this perspective differs significantly from what Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli had been saying from the very beginning, and why it is not solipsism, as some have maintained. To emphasize that this is a general view of science, and not just of quantum mechanics, I apply it to a long-standing puzzle in classical physics: the apparent inability of physics to give any meaning to 'Now'-the present moment.
This paper proposes a conceptual framework in which the universe is posited as a continuum composed solely of waves, while the experienced world—objects, space, distance, and scale—is understood as a rendered result produced through the observer’s processes of sensory gating, decoding, and presentation. The central claim is that differences between what appears and what does not appear in experience are determined less by an absolute boundary of existence on the side of the universe than by whether a given component can couple to the observer’s sensory channels and thus become reproducible within the observer’s apparatus. Here, “wave” does not denote a signal emitted from an external transmitter, but rather an omnipresent fluctuation constituting the ground state of the universe itself. Within this view, distinctions such as micro/macro scale and so-called dimensional differences may be provisionally interpreted as differences in extraction conditions and in the degree of coupling to sensory channels. The paper further examines the auxiliary hypothesis that consciousness and what is conventionally called the soul may not be strictly localized within the observer, but may instead be treated as non-rendered components or states within the same wave continuum, appearing as if internal only when certain coupling conditions are met. This v2.3 revised version recenters the framework around its core hypothesis: the experienced world is not treated as a direct copy of external reality, but as a world generated through the observer’s sensory gate, decoding rules, and rendering process. Concepts added in previous versions—such as sensory-gate extension, AI and quantum-computing-assisted translation, the structural program hypothesis, holographic principle references, positronium diffraction, coupled units, and observability—are reorganized as auxiliary hypotheses or methodological references rather than independent proof of the central claim. The purpose of this paper is not to replace established physical theories, nor to prove paranormal claims, but to articulate an exploratory working hypothesis at the intersection of ontology, epistemology, perception, and future technological interface design. This version clarifies the hierarchy of terms, distinguishes core concepts from auxiliary references, and strengthens the operational questions concerning sensory gates, decoding, rendering, and human-readable presentation. This v2.3 version keeps the core hypothesis unchanged while improving the structure, readability, and theoretical focus of the paper. It is a core re-centering revision rather than a new expansion of the theory.