The Margenau and Wigner ‘Comments’ (1962) on my ‘Comments on the Paper of David Sharp’ (Putnam, 1961; Sharp, 1961) is a strange document. First the authors say, in effect, ‘had anything been wrong (with the fundamentals of quantum mechanics) we should certainly have heard’. Then they issue various obiter dicta (e.g. the ‘cut between observer and object’ is unavoidable in quantum mechanics; the – highly subjectivistic – London-Bauer treatment of quantum mechanics is described, along with von Neumann's book, as ‘the most compact and explicit formulation of the conceptual structure of quantum mechanics’). My assumption 2 (that the whole universe is a system) is described as ‘not supportable’, because ‘the measurement is an interaction between the object and the observer’. The ‘object’ (the closed system) cannot include the observer.
The Margenau and Wigner ‘Comments’ (1962) on my ‘Comments on the Paper of David Sharp’ (Putnam, 1961; Sharp, 1961) is a strange document. First the authors say, in effect, ‘had anything been wrong (with the fundamentals of quantum mechanics) we should certainly have heard’. Then they issue various obiter dicta (e.g. the ‘cut between observer and object’ is unavoidable in quantum mechanics; the – highly subjectivistic – London-Bauer treatment of quantum mechanics is described, along with von Neumann's book, as ‘the most compact and explicit formulation of the conceptual structure of quantum mechanics’). My assumption 2 (that the whole universe is a system) is described as ‘not supportable’, because ‘the measurement is an interaction between the object and the observer’. The ‘object’ (the closed system) cannot include the observer.
Mr. Sharp's resolution of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is, in my opinion, the right one. However, the resolution does not in my opinion show that “God's in his heaven; all's right with the world (quantum mechanics).” This is in no way a criticism of Sharp; rather, it is inevitable that any resolution of this paradox, dealing as it does with the quantum mechanical concept of “measurement”, must tangle with some of the real difficulties which are lurking in the notion. The purpose of these comments is to use Mr. Sharp's remarks as a basis for bringing out one of the serious conceptual difficulties connected with measurement.
The newly revised edition of this well-known book categorizes prevalent views on measurement as described by quantum mechanics, discusses basics agreed to by many who on other issues disagree, and describes some of the problems. Although many paragraphs rest unchanged from the first (1991) edition, results found since 1991 are used to reorganize and sharpen the focus of the book, so that even the old paragraphs are now understood differently and more clearly. One advance in the second edition is a new and more general no-go theorem; another is separation of formal derivations from interpretation. The dozen or so definitions essential to following the book even casually are stated clearly. By this means the authors succeed pretty well in achieving their stated desire to make the book comprehensible to those who do not share their philosophic predispositions. While I differ in philosophy from the authors, attending to their discussion uncovered weaknesses in my own thinking and improved it. The mathematical language of quantum mechanics expresses a system under measurement by states (as rays in a Hilbert space) and a hamiltonian operator, distinct from the apparatus that produces outcomes, which is expressed by a positive operator-valued (POV) measure. In this way quantum language separates state preparation from state measurement. Often the Hilbert space is viewed as a tensor product of subspaces, allowing further conceptual separations. The authors take the stance that quantum mechanics calls for splitting the empirical world into parts, the most essential being (1) objective systems S (to be observed) and (2) apparatus A (preparation and registration devices that produces outcomes (or, as the authors write, definite pointer values) of the observed system). In some interpretations, one or both of an observer and an environment appear as additional parts. What is to be included in the system S versus the apparatus A is not specified by the language, but is open to the theoretician; a probe, for example, can be analysed as either part of the apparatus or as part of the system, as was discussed by von Neumann in work cited by the authors. With what should a theory of measurement be concerned? A broad division of approaches is defined by how one answers the question: should one try to do away with the cut between measuring apparatus and system? The authors phrase this as a choice of REFERENT, a term which in my mind puts them on shaky semantic ground; anyway The Quantum Theory of Measurement is concerned with implications of the `yes'. The book unfolds with the power of a tragedy, in which the logical consequences lead, step-by-step, to the statement and proof of theorem 6.2.1, which, roughly speaking, asserts the non-existence of a solution to the problem of getting definite pointer values from measuring apparatus that exhibits the superposition demanded by its description as a quantum system. Possible responses to this theorem are discussed, among them the many-worlds interpretation and a modification of quantum mechanics that elevates decoherence to a principle. Citations of the literature are thorough, and many points of view are crisply summarized. The book is indispensable to both those who work in the broad direction chosen by the authors and to those who wish to set any other direction in context.
Review of "The Collected Works of Eugene Paul Wigner", Volume I, III, and VI. Excerpt from the Conclusions: Many of Wigner’s papers on mathematical physics are great classics. Most famous is his work on group representations which is of lasting value for a proper mathematical foundation of quantum theory. The modern development of quantum theory (which is not reflected in Wigner’s work) is in an essential way a representation theory (e.g. representations of kinematical groups, or representations of C*-algebras). This view owes very much to Wigner’s seminal papers on the unitary representations of compact and noncompact groups. Wigner showed much courage in relating the then unresolved questions of the measurement problem to the much deeper problem of consciousness. In view of this very unorthodox proposal it is astonishing that Wigner was very reactionary with respect of the dogmas of orthodox quantum mechanics. In contrast to von Neumann himself, he took the old von-Neumann codification of quantum mechanics as authoritative and not to be questioned. Much of the efforts to interpret the meaning of this codification and to prove no-go theorems, such as the insolubility of the measurement problem or the impossibility of a quantum theory of individual objects, are physically irrelevant since they are based on a codification of quantum mechanics that is valid only for strictly closed systems with finitely many degrees of freedom. However, in nature there are no such systems. Every material system is coupled to the gravitational and to the electromagnetic field – systems which require in a Hamiltonian description infinitely many degrees of freedom. A deeper insight into the conceptual problems of quantum theory is possible only if the modern development of a quantum theory of infinite systems is taken into account.
The fourth part handles the first thematic area of the book and probably the most important part of the theory: the measurement problem. • First we examine some basic concepts [ chapter 13 ]. • Then we reconstruct von Neumann's original proposal and its refinements [ chapter 14 ]. Von Neumann was the first to assume a dichotomy between two different types of evolutions: the unitary one and the measurement process. On this matter, different positions have been developed: • there are those who have accepted such a dichotomy and tried to assign a fundamental function to the consciousness (after von Neumann: London, Bauer, Wigner): this is the content of chapter 14 ; • some have tried to eliminate the jump-like features of the measurement by rejecting the projection postulate (Margenau, Ballentine, Everett, deWitt); this is the content of chapter 15 ; • others have tried to explain measurement in terms of intervention of macrosystems: either as a limiting case of a thermodynamical evolution (Green, van Hove and others) or using SSRs for obtaining the required classical behaviour of the pointer: this is the issue in chapter 16 ; • there are those who have tried to find some ad hoc parameters in order to explain the reduction (Ghirardi/Rimini/Weber): this will be treated later in chapter 23 , because the proposal will account more generally for spontaneous transitions to localisation, and hence it is more like a theory of the relation between microphysics and macrophysics; • others have developed a form of non-unitary evolution by using the specific nature of open systems: this is the theory of decoherence (Zurek, Cini, Machida/Namiki, among others), which is treated in chapter 17 . It is quit astonishing that measurement theory has led to so many different positions and that, consequently, for fifty years has been a problematic area of QM. The reasons will be briefly discussed in subsection 14.1.1. The last three chapters of this part are devoted to new developments which partly extend and integrate the theory of decoherence. • The operational approach [ chapter 18 ] represents a formal generalization of the quantum theory of open systems. • Chapter 19 is dedicated to the Quantum Non-demolition Measurement. The last two chapters contain results which are generally valid and neutral with respect to a particular interpretation. Anyway, their importance for QM (and partly also for some interpretational problems) justifies the place they occupy here. • Finally we investigate a new field of research which has very interesting interpretational implications and a lot of technological consequences: the so-called interaction-free measurements [ chapter 20 ]. In the following we shall use the word ‘Measurement’ to mean the measurement process in general, while the word ‘measurement’ always indicates a particular measurement process.
Abstract Here a ‘blow-by-blow’ account of London and Bauer’s ‘little book’ is presented, beginning with their central claim that quantum mechanics should itself be understood as a theory of knowledge. It counts as such precisely because it sets at its very core the aforementioned relationship between mind and the world. This is revealed through a careful analysis of the measurement situation, presented in detail by London and Bauer. In particular, they insist that the observer is able to know her own state because she has with herself a relationship of a special character, as manifested through the faculty of introspection. By virtue of this immanent knowledge she is then able to separate herself from the quantum superposition and establish her own objectivity. However, this is not to be equated with her consciousness mysteriously ‘causing’ the wave-function to collapse; rather, her ego thereby emerges as one pole of the relationship, with the system, now also in a definite state, as the ‘object-pole’. The terms used in the text are redolent of phenomenological language and with that understanding we can see just how wide of the mark Putnam and Shimony’s criticisms are (and also Margenau and Wigner’s interpretation, to be fair!). It is then suggested that this ‘little book’ may serve as the basis for a novel phenomenological understanding of quantum physics.