Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Efficient lont-term Secure Universally Composable Commitments

Oana Ciobotaru, Dominique Unruh, Michael Backes A

Published Jan 1, 2008• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Long-term security ensures that a protocol remains secure even in the future, when the adversarial computational power could, potentially, become unlimited. The notion of universal composability preserves the security of a cryptographic protocol when it is used in combination with any other protocols, in possibly complex systems. The area of long-term universally composable secure protocols has been developed mostly by Müller-Quade and Unruh. Their research conducted so far has shown the existence of secure long-term UC commitments under general cryptographic assumptions, thus without having an emphasis on the efficiency of the protocols designed. Building on their work and using very efficient zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge from [CL02], this thesis presents a new long-term universally composable secure commitment protocol that is both efficient and plausible to use in practice.

Related papers

Highly-Efficient Universally-Composable Commitments based on the DDH Assumption.

Yehuda Lindell

Universal composability (or UC security) provides very strong security guarantees for protocols that run in complex real-world environments. In particular, security is guaranteed to hold when the protocol is run concurrently many times with other secure and possibly insecure protocols. Commitment schemes are a basic building block in many cryptographic constructions, and as such universally composable commitments are of great importance in constructing UC-secure protocols. In this paper, we construct highly efficient UC-secure commitments from the standard DDH assumption, in the common reference string model. Our commitment stage is non-interactive, has a common reference string with O(1) group elements, and has complexity of O(1) exponentiations for committing to a group element (to be more exact, the effective cost is that of 23 1 exponentiations overall, for both the commit and decommit stages). We present 3 a construction that is secure in the presence of static adversaries, and a construction that is secure in the presence of adaptive adversaries with erasures, where the latter construction has an effective additional cost of just 5 1 3 exponentiations. 1

•Jan 1, 2011•0 citations

Universally composable security: a new paradigm for cryptographic protocols

Ran Canetti

We propose a novel paradigm for defining security of cryptographic protocols, called universally composable security. The salient property of universally composable definitions of security is that they guarantee security even when a secure protocol is composed of an arbitrary set of protocols, or more generally when the protocol is used as a component of an arbitrary system. This is an essential property for maintaining security of cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments such as the Internet. In particular, universally composable definitions guarantee security even when an unbounded number of protocol instances are executed concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner, they guarantee non-malleability with respect to arbitrary protocols, and more. We show how to formulate universally composable definitions of security for practically any cryptographic task. Furthermore, we demonstrate that practically any such definition can be realized using known techniques, as long as only a minority of the participants are corrupted. We then proceed to formulate universally composable definitions of a wide array of cryptographic tasks, including authenticated and secure communication, key-exchange, public-key encryption, signature, commitment, oblivious transfer, zero knowledge and more. We also make initial steps towards studying the realizability of the proposed definitions in various settings.

Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science•Jan 1, 2001•3,416 citations

Everlasting UC Commitments from Fully Malicious PUFs

Bernardo Magri, Giulio Malavolta, Dominique Schröder +1 more

Abstract Everlasting security models the setting where hardness assumptions hold during the execution of a protocol but may get broken in the future. Due to the strength of this adversarial model, achieving any meaningful security guarantees for composable protocols is impossible without relying on hardware assumptions (Müller-Quade and Unruh, JoC’10). For this reason, a rich line of research has tried to leverage physical assumptions to construct well-known everlasting cryptographic primitives, such as commitment schemes. The only known everlastingly UC secure commitment scheme, due to Müller-Quade and Unruh (JoC’10), assumes honestly generated hardware tokens. The authors leave the possibility of constructing everlastingly UC secure commitments from malicious hardware tokens as an open problem. Goyal et al. (Crypto’10) constructs unconditionally UC-secure commitments and secure computation from malicious hardware tokens, with the caveat that the honest tokens must encapsulate other tokens. This extra restriction rules out interesting classes of hardware tokens, such as physically uncloneable functions (PUFs). In this work, we present the first construction of an everlastingly UC-secure commitment scheme in the fully malicious token modelwithout requiringhonest token encapsulation. Our scheme assumes the existence of PUFs and is secure in the common reference string model. We also show that our results are tight by giving an impossibility proof for everlasting UC-securecomputationfrom non-erasable tokens (such as PUFs), even with trusted setup.

Journal of Cryptology•Jul 1, 2022•6 citations

A Framework for Practical Universally Composable Zero-Knowledge Protocols.

Jan L. Camenisch, Stephan Krenn, Victor Shoup

Abstract. Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (ZK-PoK) for discrete logarithms and related problems are indispensable for practical cryptographic protocols. At Eurocrypt 2009, Camenisch, Kiayias, and Yung provided a specification language (the CKY-language) for such protocols, which allows one to modularly design and analyze cryptographic protocols: protocol designers just need to specify the statement they want to prove in zero-knowledge and are ensured that an efficient proof protocol exists and indeed proves the specified statement, provided that the specification was in the CKY-language. However, as specifications in the CKY-language are realized by so-called Σ-protocols, the resulting protocols only satisfy the classical notion of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, which not retained if they are composed with themselves or with other protocols, e.g., when used as building blocks for higher-level applications. This problem can be tackled by moving to the Universal Composability (UC) framework, which guarantees retention of security when composing protocols and, in particular, when using them as building blocks in arbitrary contexts. While there exists generic transformations from Σ-protocols to protocols that are secure under this stronger security notion, these transformation are often not efficient enough for the design of practical protocols. In this paper we are aiming for practically efficient ZK-PoK in the UC-framework by introducing

•Jan 1, 2011•0 citations

New Notions of Security: Achieving Universal Composability without Trusted Setup.

Manoj Prabhakaran, Amit Sahai

We propose a modification to the framework of Universally Composable (UC) security [3]. Our new notion, involves comparing the protocol executions with an ideal execution involving ideal functionalities (just as in UC-security), but allowing the environment and adversary access to some super-polynomial computational power. We argue the meaningfulness of the new notion, which in particular subsumes many of the traditional notions of security. We generalize the Universal Composition theorem of [3] to the new setting. Then under new computational assumptions, we realize secure multi-party computation (for static adversaries) without a common reference string or any other set-up assumptions, in the new framework. This is known to be impossible under the UC framework. 1

•Jan 1, 2004•8 citations

Universally composable zero-knowledge protocol using trusted platform modules

Vivek Reddy Sama

Cryptographic protocols that are established as secure in the Universally Composable (UC) model of security provide strong security assurances even when run in complex environments. Unfortunately, in order to achieve such strong security properties, UC protocols are often impractical, and most non-trivial two-party protocols cannot be secure in the UC model without some sort of external capability (or "setup assumption") being introduced. Recent work by Hofheinz et al provided an important breakthrough in designing realistic universally composable two party protocols, in which they use trusted, tamper proof hardware as a special type of helping functionality which they call a catalyst. Hofheinz et al. use government issued signature cards as a catalyst to design universally composable protocols for zero-knowledge proofs and commitments, but did not give a complete security proof for either protocol. In this thesis, we consider another form of security hardware, Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs), which are more widespread than signature cards and are currently shipped as a part of almost every business laptop or desktop. Trusted Module Platforms are tamper evident devices which support cryptographic functionalities including digital signatures, but have a different key management model from signature cards. In this thesis we consider TPMs as catalysts and describe a universally composable zero knowledge protocol using Trusted Platform Modules. We also present a complete security proof for both the Hofheinz's universally composable zero knowledge protocol from signature cards and our universally composable zero knowledge protocol using TPMs as a catalyst.

•Jan 1, 2011•0 citations
Long-term security ensures that a protocol remains secure even in the future, when the adversarial computational power could, potentially, become unlimited. The notion of universal composability preserves the security of a cryptographic protocol when it is used in combination with any other protocols, in possibly complex systems. The area of long-term universally composable secure protocols has been developed mostly by Müller-Quade and Unruh. Their research conducted so far has shown the existence of secure long-term UC commitments under general cryptographic assumptions, thus without having an emphasis on the efficiency of the protocols designed. Building on their work and using very efficient zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge from [CL02], this thesis presents a new long-term universally composable secure commitment protocol that is both efficient and plausible to use in practice.
Universal composability (or UC security) provides very strong security guarantees for protocols that run in complex real-world environments. In particular, security is guaranteed to hold when the protocol is run concurrently many times with other secure and possibly insecure protocols. Commitment schemes are a basic building block in many cryptographic constructions, and as such universally composable commitments are of great importance in constructing UC-secure protocols. In this paper, we construct highly efficient UC-secure commitments from the standard DDH assumption, in the common reference string model. Our commitment stage is non-interactive, has a common reference string with O(1) group elements, and has complexity of O(1) exponentiations for committing to a group element (to be more exact, the effective cost is that of 23 1 exponentiations overall, for both the commit and decommit stages). We present 3 a construction that is secure in the presence of static adversaries, and a construction that is secure in the presence of adaptive adversaries with erasures, where the latter construction has an effective additional cost of just 5 1 3 exponentiations. 1
We propose a novel paradigm for defining security of cryptographic protocols, called universally composable security. The salient property of universally composable definitions of security is that they guarantee security even when a secure protocol is composed of an arbitrary set of protocols, or more generally when the protocol is used as a component of an arbitrary system. This is an essential property for maintaining security of cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments such as the Internet. In particular, universally composable definitions guarantee security even when an unbounded number of protocol instances are executed concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner, they guarantee non-malleability with respect to arbitrary protocols, and more. We show how to formulate universally composable definitions of security for practically any cryptographic task. Furthermore, we demonstrate that practically any such definition can be realized using known techniques, as long as only a minority of the participants are corrupted. We then proceed to formulate universally composable definitions of a wide array of cryptographic tasks, including authenticated and secure communication, key-exchange, public-key encryption, signature, commitment, oblivious transfer, zero knowledge and more. We also make initial steps towards studying the realizability of the proposed definitions in various settings.
Abstract Everlasting security models the setting where hardness assumptions hold during the execution of a protocol but may get broken in the future. Due to the strength of this adversarial model, achieving any meaningful security guarantees for composable protocols is impossible without relying on hardware assumptions (Müller-Quade and Unruh, JoC’10). For this reason, a rich line of research has tried to leverage physical assumptions to construct well-known everlasting cryptographic primitives, such as commitment schemes. The only known everlastingly UC secure commitment scheme, due to Müller-Quade and Unruh (JoC’10), assumes honestly generated hardware tokens. The authors leave the possibility of constructing everlastingly UC secure commitments from malicious hardware tokens as an open problem. Goyal et al. (Crypto’10) constructs unconditionally UC-secure commitments and secure computation from malicious hardware tokens, with the caveat that the honest tokens must encapsulate other tokens. This extra restriction rules out interesting classes of hardware tokens, such as physically uncloneable functions (PUFs). In this work, we present the first construction of an everlastingly UC-secure commitment scheme in the fully malicious token modelwithout requiringhonest token encapsulation. Our scheme assumes the existence of PUFs and is secure in the common reference string model. We also show that our results are tight by giving an impossibility proof for everlasting UC-securecomputationfrom non-erasable tokens (such as PUFs), even with trusted setup.
Abstract. Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (ZK-PoK) for discrete logarithms and related problems are indispensable for practical cryptographic protocols. At Eurocrypt 2009, Camenisch, Kiayias, and Yung provided a specification language (the CKY-language) for such protocols, which allows one to modularly design and analyze cryptographic protocols: protocol designers just need to specify the statement they want to prove in zero-knowledge and are ensured that an efficient proof protocol exists and indeed proves the specified statement, provided that the specification was in the CKY-language. However, as specifications in the CKY-language are realized by so-called Σ-protocols, the resulting protocols only satisfy the classical notion of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, which not retained if they are composed with themselves or with other protocols, e.g., when used as building blocks for higher-level applications. This problem can be tackled by moving to the Universal Composability (UC) framework, which guarantees retention of security when composing protocols and, in particular, when using them as building blocks in arbitrary contexts. While there exists generic transformations from Σ-protocols to protocols that are secure under this stronger security notion, these transformation are often not efficient enough for the design of practical protocols. In this paper we are aiming for practically efficient ZK-PoK in the UC-framework by introducing
We propose a modification to the framework of Universally Composable (UC) security [3]. Our new notion, involves comparing the protocol executions with an ideal execution involving ideal functionalities (just as in UC-security), but allowing the environment and adversary access to some super-polynomial computational power. We argue the meaningfulness of the new notion, which in particular subsumes many of the traditional notions of security. We generalize the Universal Composition theorem of [3] to the new setting. Then under new computational assumptions, we realize secure multi-party computation (for static adversaries) without a common reference string or any other set-up assumptions, in the new framework. This is known to be impossible under the UC framework. 1
Cryptographic protocols that are established as secure in the Universally Composable (UC) model of security provide strong security assurances even when run in complex environments. Unfortunately, in order to achieve such strong security properties, UC protocols are often impractical, and most non-trivial two-party protocols cannot be secure in the UC model without some sort of external capability (or "setup assumption") being introduced. Recent work by Hofheinz et al provided an important breakthrough in designing realistic universally composable two party protocols, in which they use trusted, tamper proof hardware as a special type of helping functionality which they call a catalyst. Hofheinz et al. use government issued signature cards as a catalyst to design universally composable protocols for zero-knowledge proofs and commitments, but did not give a complete security proof for either protocol. In this thesis, we consider another form of security hardware, Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs), which are more widespread than signature cards and are currently shipped as a part of almost every business laptop or desktop. Trusted Module Platforms are tamper evident devices which support cryptographic functionalities including digital signatures, but have a different key management model from signature cards. In this thesis we consider TPMs as catalysts and describe a universally composable zero knowledge protocol using Trusted Platform Modules. We also present a complete security proof for both the Hofheinz's universally composable zero knowledge protocol from signature cards and our universally composable zero knowledge protocol using TPMs as a catalyst.