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Electronic colloquium on computational complexity

Round-Efficient One-Way Permutation Based Perfectly Concealing Bit Commitment Scheme

Takeshi Koshiba, Yoshiharu Seri

Published Jan 1, 2006• 9 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We explicitly show the upper bound on the round complexity for perfectly concealing bit commitment schemes based on the general computational assumption. The best known scheme in the literature is the one-way permutation based scheme due to Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung and its round complexity is O(n). We consider a naive parallel version of their scheme of the multiplicity logn and obtain an O(n/logn)-round scheme. In their conference paper (at CRYPTO’92), they claimed that such a round reduction of any logarithmic factor is achievable. We work out the details of their claim. Namely, we give an explicit justification of the folklore that such a parallelization would not lose the security proof. Though the parallelization raises an analytic difficulty, we introduce a new analysis technique and then overcome the difficulty. Our technique copes with expected almost pairwise independent random variables instead of the pairwise independence, which is a key property in their analysis. While the expected almost pairwise independence plays an important role in our security proof, it also provides alternative security proof for the original scheme.

Related papers

Improvement of the Round Complexity of Perfectly Concealing Bit Commitment Schemes

Yoshiharu Seri, Koshiba Takeshi

We improve the upper bound on the round complexity for perfectly concealing bit commitment schemes based on the general computational assumption. The best known scheme is the one-way permutation based scheme due to Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung and its round complexity is O(n). We consider a naive parallel version of their scheme of the multiplicity log n and obtain an O(n/ log n)-round scheme. Our improvement answers a question, raised by them, whether their O(n)-round scheme is essential with respect to the round complexity. Though such a parallelization raises an analytic difficulty, we introduce a new analysis technique and then overcome the difficulty. Our technique copes with expected almost pairwise independent random variables instead of the pairwise independence, which is a key property in their analysis. While the expected almost pairwise independence plays an important role in our security proof, it also provides alternative security proof for the original scheme.

IEICE Technical Report; IEICE Tech. Rep.•Mar 16, 2006•0 citations

Improvement of the Round Complexity of Perfectly Concealing Bit Commitment Schemes<論文>

健史 小柴, Yoshiharu Seri

We improve the upper bound on the round complexity for perfectly concealing bit commitment schemes based on the general computational assumption. The best known scheme is the one-way permutation based scheme due to Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung and its round complexity is O(n). We consider a naive parallel version of their scheme of the multiplicity log n and obtain an O(n/ log n)-round scheme. Our improvement answers a question, raised by them, whether their O(n)-round scheme is essential with respect to the round complexity. Though such a parallelization raises an analytic difficulty, we introduce a new analysis technique and then overcome the difficulty. Our technique copes with expected almost pairwise independent random variables instead of the pairwise independence, which is a key property in their analysis. While the expected almost pairwise independence plays an important role in our security proof, it also provides alternative security proof for the original scheme.

•Jan 1, 2006•0 citations

Finding Collisions in Interactive Protocols - A Tight Lower Bound on the Round Complexity of Statistically-Hiding Commitments.

Iftach Haitner, Jonathan J. Hoch, Omer Reingold +1 more

Abstract We study the round complexity of various cryptographic protocols. Our main result is a tightlower bound on the round complexity of any fully-black-box construction of a statistically-hiding commitment scheme from one-way permutations, and even from trapdoor permutations. Thislower bound matches the round complexity of the statistically-hiding commitment scheme due to Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung (CRYPTO '92). As a corollary, we derive similar tightlower bounds for several other cryptographic protocols, such as single-server private information retrieval, interactive hashing, and oblivious transfer that guarantees statistical security for oneof the parties.

•Jan 1, 2007•0 citations

Finding Collisions in Interactive Protocols - A Tight Lower Bound on the Round Complexity of Statistically-Hiding Commitments

Iftach Haitner, Jonathan J. Hoch, Omer Reingold +1 more

We study the round complexity of various cryptographic protocols. Our main result is a tight lower bound on the round complexity of any fully-black-box construction of a statistically-hiding commitment scheme from oneway permutations, and even front trapdoor permutations. This lower bound matches the round complexity of the statistically-hiding commitment scheme due to Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung (CRYPTO '92). As a corollary, we derive similar tight lower bounds for several other ctyptographicprotocols, such as single-server private information retrieval, interactive hashing, and oblivious transfer that guarantees statistical security for one of the parties. Our techniques extend the collision-finding oracle due to Simon (EUROCRYPT '98) to the setting of interactive protocols (our extension also implies an alternative proof for the main property of the original oracle). In addition, we substantially extend the reconstruction paradigm of Gennaro and Trevisan (FOCS '00). In both cases, our extensions are quite delicate and may be found useful in proving additional black-box separation results.

Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science•Oct 1, 2007•101 citations

Non-Interactive Statistically-Hiding Quantum Bit Commitment from Any Quantum One-Way Function

Takeshi Koshiba, Takanori Odaira

We provide a non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme which has statistically-hiding and computationally-binding properties from any quantum one-way function. Our protocol is basically a parallel composition of the previous non-interactive quantum bit commitment schemes (based on quantum one-way permutations, due to Dumais, Mayers and Salvail (EUROCRYPT 2000)) with pairwise independent hash functions. To construct our non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme from any quantum one-way function, we follow the procedure below: (i) from Dumais-Mayers-Salvail scheme to a weakly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment (of a parallel variant); (ii) from the weakly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment to a strongly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment; (iii) from the strongly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment to a normal statistically-hiding commitment. In the classical case, statistically-hiding bit commitment scheme (by Haitner, Nguyen, Ong, Reingold and Vadhan (SIAM J. Comput., Vol.39, 2009)) is also constructible from any one-way function. While the classical statistically-hiding bit commitment has large round complexity, our quantum scheme is non-interactive, which is advantageous over the classical schemes. A main technical contribution is to provide a quantum analogue of the new interactive hashing theorem, due to Haitner and Reingold (CCC 2007). Moreover, the parallel composition enables us to simplify the security analysis drastically.

arXiv:1102.3441•Feb 16, 2011•17 citations

The Exact Round Complexity of Secure Computation.

Sanjam Garg, Pratyay Mukherjee, Omkant Pandey +1 more

We revisit the exact round complexity of secure computation in the multi-party and two-party settings. For the special case of two-parties without a simultaneous message exchange channel, this question has been extensively studied and resolved. In particular, Katz and Ostrovsky CRYPTO '04 proved that 5 rounds are necessary and sufficient for securely realizing every two-party functionality where both parties receive the output. However, the exact round complexity of general multi-party computation, as well as two-party computation with a simultaneous message exchange channel, is not very well understood. These questions are intimately connected to the round complexity of non-malleable commitments. Indeed, the exact relationship between the round complexities of non-malleable commitments and secure multi-party computation has also not been explored. In this work, we revisit these questions and obtain several new results. First, we establish the following main results. Suppose that there exists a k-round non-malleable commitment scheme, and let $$k'=\max 4,k+1$$k'=max4,k+1; then,Two-party setting with simultaneous message transmission: there exists a $$k'$$k'-round protocol for securely realizing every two-party functionality;Multi-party setting: there exists a $$k'$$k'-round protocol for securely realizing the multi-party coin-flipping functionality. As a corollary of the above results, by instantiating them with existing non-malleable commitment protocols from the literature, we establish that four rounds are both necessary and sufficient for both the results above. Furthermore, we establish that, for every multi-party functionalityfive rounds are sufficient. We actually obtain a variety of results offering trade-offs between rounds and the cryptographic assumptions used, depending upon the particular instantiations of underlying protocols.

•Jan 1, 2016•0 citations
We explicitly show the upper bound on the round complexity for perfectly concealing bit commitment schemes based on the general computational assumption. The best known scheme in the literature is the one-way permutation based scheme due to Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung and its round complexity is O(n). We consider a naive parallel version of their scheme of the multiplicity logn and obtain an O(n/logn)-round scheme. In their conference paper (at CRYPTO’92), they claimed that such a round reduction of any logarithmic factor is achievable. We work out the details of their claim. Namely, we give an explicit justification of the folklore that such a parallelization would not lose the security proof. Though the parallelization raises an analytic difficulty, we introduce a new analysis technique and then overcome the difficulty. Our technique copes with expected almost pairwise independent random variables instead of the pairwise independence, which is a key property in their analysis. While the expected almost pairwise independence plays an important role in our security proof, it also provides alternative security proof for the original scheme.
We improve the upper bound on the round complexity for perfectly concealing bit commitment schemes based on the general computational assumption. The best known scheme is the one-way permutation based scheme due to Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung and its round complexity is O(n). We consider a naive parallel version of their scheme of the multiplicity log n and obtain an O(n/ log n)-round scheme. Our improvement answers a question, raised by them, whether their O(n)-round scheme is essential with respect to the round complexity. Though such a parallelization raises an analytic difficulty, we introduce a new analysis technique and then overcome the difficulty. Our technique copes with expected almost pairwise independent random variables instead of the pairwise independence, which is a key property in their analysis. While the expected almost pairwise independence plays an important role in our security proof, it also provides alternative security proof for the original scheme.
We improve the upper bound on the round complexity for perfectly concealing bit commitment schemes based on the general computational assumption. The best known scheme is the one-way permutation based scheme due to Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung and its round complexity is O(n). We consider a naive parallel version of their scheme of the multiplicity log n and obtain an O(n/ log n)-round scheme. Our improvement answers a question, raised by them, whether their O(n)-round scheme is essential with respect to the round complexity. Though such a parallelization raises an analytic difficulty, we introduce a new analysis technique and then overcome the difficulty. Our technique copes with expected almost pairwise independent random variables instead of the pairwise independence, which is a key property in their analysis. While the expected almost pairwise independence plays an important role in our security proof, it also provides alternative security proof for the original scheme.
Abstract We study the round complexity of various cryptographic protocols. Our main result is a tightlower bound on the round complexity of any fully-black-box construction of a statistically-hiding commitment scheme from one-way permutations, and even from trapdoor permutations. Thislower bound matches the round complexity of the statistically-hiding commitment scheme due to Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung (CRYPTO '92). As a corollary, we derive similar tightlower bounds for several other cryptographic protocols, such as single-server private information retrieval, interactive hashing, and oblivious transfer that guarantees statistical security for oneof the parties.
We study the round complexity of various cryptographic protocols. Our main result is a tight lower bound on the round complexity of any fully-black-box construction of a statistically-hiding commitment scheme from oneway permutations, and even front trapdoor permutations. This lower bound matches the round complexity of the statistically-hiding commitment scheme due to Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung (CRYPTO '92). As a corollary, we derive similar tight lower bounds for several other ctyptographicprotocols, such as single-server private information retrieval, interactive hashing, and oblivious transfer that guarantees statistical security for one of the parties. Our techniques extend the collision-finding oracle due to Simon (EUROCRYPT '98) to the setting of interactive protocols (our extension also implies an alternative proof for the main property of the original oracle). In addition, we substantially extend the reconstruction paradigm of Gennaro and Trevisan (FOCS '00). In both cases, our extensions are quite delicate and may be found useful in proving additional black-box separation results.
We provide a non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme which has statistically-hiding and computationally-binding properties from any quantum one-way function. Our protocol is basically a parallel composition of the previous non-interactive quantum bit commitment schemes (based on quantum one-way permutations, due to Dumais, Mayers and Salvail (EUROCRYPT 2000)) with pairwise independent hash functions. To construct our non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme from any quantum one-way function, we follow the procedure below: (i) from Dumais-Mayers-Salvail scheme to a weakly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment (of a parallel variant); (ii) from the weakly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment to a strongly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment; (iii) from the strongly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment to a normal statistically-hiding commitment. In the classical case, statistically-hiding bit commitment scheme (by Haitner, Nguyen, Ong, Reingold and Vadhan (SIAM J. Comput., Vol.39, 2009)) is also constructible from any one-way function. While the classical statistically-hiding bit commitment has large round complexity, our quantum scheme is non-interactive, which is advantageous over the classical schemes. A main technical contribution is to provide a quantum analogue of the new interactive hashing theorem, due to Haitner and Reingold (CCC 2007). Moreover, the parallel composition enables us to simplify the security analysis drastically.
We revisit the exact round complexity of secure computation in the multi-party and two-party settings. For the special case of two-parties without a simultaneous message exchange channel, this question has been extensively studied and resolved. In particular, Katz and Ostrovsky CRYPTO '04 proved that 5 rounds are necessary and sufficient for securely realizing every two-party functionality where both parties receive the output. However, the exact round complexity of general multi-party computation, as well as two-party computation with a simultaneous message exchange channel, is not very well understood. These questions are intimately connected to the round complexity of non-malleable commitments. Indeed, the exact relationship between the round complexities of non-malleable commitments and secure multi-party computation has also not been explored. In this work, we revisit these questions and obtain several new results. First, we establish the following main results. Suppose that there exists a k-round non-malleable commitment scheme, and let k′=max⁡4,k+1k'=\max 4,k+1k′=max4,k+1k'=max4,k+1; then,Two-party setting with simultaneous message transmission: there exists a k′k'k′k'-round protocol for securely realizing every two-party functionality;Multi-party setting: there exists a k′k'k′k'-round protocol for securely realizing the multi-party coin-flipping functionality. As a corollary of the above results, by instantiating them with existing non-malleable commitment protocols from the literature, we establish that four rounds are both necessary and sufficient for both the results above. Furthermore, we establish that, for every multi-party functionalityfive rounds are sufficient. We actually obtain a variety of results offering trade-offs between rounds and the cryptographic assumptions used, depending upon the particular instantiations of underlying protocols.