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Physical Review A

Coherent eavesdropping attacks in tomographic quantum cryptography: Nonequivalence of quantum and classical key distillation (5 pages)

Dagomir Kaszlikowski

Published Jan 1, 2005• 0 citations
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The security of a cryptographic key that is generated by communication through a noisy quantum channel relies on the ability to distill a shorter secure key sequence from a longer insecure one. We show that---for protocols that use quantum channels of any dimension and completely characterize them by state tomography---the noise threshold for classical advantage distillation of a specific kind is substantially lower than the threshold for quantum entanglement distillation if the eavesdropper can perform powerful coherent attacks. In marked contrast, earlier investigations had shown that the thresholds are identical for incoherent attacks on the same classical distillation scheme. It remains an open question whether other schemes for classical advantage distillation have higher thresholds for coherent eavesdropping attacks.
We analyze the security of quantum cryptography schemes for d-level systems using 2 or d+1 maximally conjugated bases, under individual eavesdropping attacks based on cloning machines and measurement after the basis reconciliation. We consider classical advantage distillation protocols, that allow to extract a key even in situations where the mutual information between the honest parties is smaller than the eavesdropper's information. In this scenario, advantage distillation protocols are shown to be as powerful as quantum distillation: key distillation is possible using classical techniques if and only if the corresponding state in the entanglement based protocol is distillable.