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Journal of Statistical Physics

Consistent Quantum Realism: A Reply to Griffiths

Angelo Bassi, G. C. Ghirardi

Published Jun 1, 2000• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1023/a:1018653209350

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A reply to the objections asserting that an interpretation based on quantum trajectories and consistent histories is unacceptable on physical grounds is made. (AIP)Received 23 December 1993DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.72.1771©1994 American Physical Society

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Robert Griffiths claims that the consistent histories approach to quantum theory recovers all of the predictions of standard quantum theory and retains the principle of locality, contrary to Bell’s theorem. Griffiths locates the flaw in Bell’s reasoning in his use of standard logic. According to Griffiths, quantum theory requires us to adopt new rules for reasoning, which he calls quantum reasoning. I review the structure of the standard logical connectives and the proof that reasoning by standard logic is always valid. Griffiths’s novel logical “rule,” which is claimed to expose Bell’s error, serves rather only to obscure the fact that the theory Griffiths proposes is inconsistent and hence cannot be correct.