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arXiv:2611.16372

No Convergence in Learned Eavesdropping-Detection Dynamics for BB84 Quantum Key Distribution

Ramon Jose C. Bagunu

Published Nov 12, 2026• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In prior work we showed that a reinforcement-learning eavesdropper can intercept BB84 quantum key distribution while holding the quantum bit error rate below the abort threshold and keeping a usable distillable key. In this paper we ask whether an equally adaptive learning detector can close this stealth window. We cast the interaction as an alternating best-response game between a tabular eavesdropper and a tabular threshold-adapting detector. We measure exploitability, which is the detection rate and distillable key fraction achieved by a fresh attacker best-responding to the final detector. Across three learning rules (Q-Learning, SARSA, Double Q-Learning), three channel-noise levels, and a uniform false-alarm discipline, the dynamics do not settle out to twenty rounds. The exploitability does not approach a fixed point, and its round-to-round swings do not decay. Two controls, one retraining the attacker against a frozen defender and one retraining the defender against a frozen attacker, show that the swings on each side match the variance of the best-response procedure itself. The dynamics fluctuate at the scale of best-response variance rather than converging, with neither player settling to a fixed response. The behavior is noise-dependent, and the stealth window stays open at the low noise where practical QKD operates. The defender contains the attacker on average at intermediate noise without the contest settling, and at high noise the channel rather than the learned policy suppresses the attack. As a candidate mechanism we examine a last-mover information asymmetry, supported by significant anti-persistence at intermediate noise and consistent with best-response noise at low noise. The results suggest that a learned detector cannot be certified from any single round, and that closing the window calls for breaking the information structure rather than out-adapting the attacker.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2611.16372

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Standard BB84 QKD detects eavesdropping via a fixed 11% error rate threshold, which does not distinguish legitimate channel noise from eavesdropper-induced errors. We present an enhanced method that decomposes the observed error rate into expected noise contributions (channel transmission, detector dark counts, optical misalignment, timing jitter) and applies statistical significance testing to the anomalous residual. The method provides a four-level detection verdict with calibrated confidence. We demonstrate catching an eavesdropper intercepting 30% of qubits at 9.8 sigma significance when standard BB84 reported "secure" (6.88% < 11%). The method reduces false positives by a factor of 80,000 in noisy channels while eliminating false negatives from low-intercept-rate attacks.
Abstract We present a game-theoretic reinforcement learning framework for analyzing adversarial behavior in BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD). Unlike traditional security proofs that assume a worst-case eavesdropper, our approach models an adaptive attacker and corresponding defensive strategies. We develop a fast analytical QKD simulator capturing key metrics such as gain, Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), decoy-state statistics, and multiple attack types including intercept-resend, photon-number splitting, time-shift, and dark-count attacks. The interaction between Bob and an adaptive eavesdropper Eve is formulated as a repeated zero-sum game and trained using deep reinforcement learning. Eve learns to maximize information gain while remaining stealthy, whereas Bob learns counter- measures that minimize information leakage while preserving secret key rate (SKR). Experimental results show an emergent arms race, where Bob reduces Eve’s achievable information by nearly 50% while maintaining practical SKR, leading to a stable equilibrium. This work demonstrates that reinforcement learning is a pow- erful tool for exploring adaptive security in QKD and provides a foundation for studying more realistic adversarial scenarios in quantum communication systems.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security grounded in the laws of quantum mechanics, with the BB84 protocol serving as the canonical reference due to its operational simplicity and provable security. However, practical deployments face two concurrent — threats channel decoherence and active eavesdropping whose combined impact on protocol viability has been characterized only in isolation by prior literature. This paper presents a joint circuitlevel analysis of BB84 under composite channel noise and partial intercept-resend attacks, implemented on the Qiskit Aer simulator across five qubit configurations (9, 12, 16, 20, and 50 qubits) with 1024 measurement shots per experiment. A composite noise model combining depolarizing noise, amplitude damping, and readout errors is coupled with a probabilistic eavesdropper whose interception fraction (α\alphaα) is systematically varied. We derive a closed-form joint QBER expression, whose non-additive coupling term quantifies how channel corruption partially masks eavesdropping signatures, and we analytically recover the 11% security threshold from the Devetak–Winter bound. Parameter sweeps across noise strength and interception fraction reveal that even modest eavesdropping under realistic noise breaches the threshold. Atα=0.25\alpha=0. 2 5α=0.25and505050qubits, the observed QBER reaches 19.05%, producing a negative secure key rate and Cascade reconciliation failure. These findings establish concrete design constraints on channel quality, transmission scale, and post-processing primitives for practical BB84 deployments.
Conventional BB84 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems rely on a fixed 11% Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) threshold to detect eavesdropping. However, stealthy attacks can remain below this threshold while still compromising channel security. This paper proposes a temporal QBER based machine learning framework for detecting and classifying eavesdropping attacks in BB84 QKD systems. Rather than relying on average session level QBER, the framework extracts 63 physics-informed temporal features capturing burst behavior, temporal instability, basis dependent asymmetry, and QBER loss interactions. Random Forest, XGBoost, and Support Vector Machine with a Radial Basis Function kernel (SVM-RBF) classifiers are evaluated on seven eavesdropping attacks and a normal channel scenario under noisy and lossy conditions. Averaged over ten independent runs, XGBoost achieves the best performance with 88.01% (0.47%) accuracy and a macro F1 score of 0.8803, while SVM-RBF performs comparably, confirming the robustness of the proposed features. Evaluated as a binary attack-versus-normal detector for comparison with conventional monitoring, a fixed 11% QBER threshold achieves only 25.82% accuracy with a False Negative Rate (FNR) of 0.8477, whereas the proposed framework reduces the FNR to 0.0198, substantially improving detection of stealthy attacks that evade threshold-based monitoring. SHapley Additive exPlanations based (SHAP) explainability shows that physics-informed temporal and channel derived features are highly discriminative for identifying eavesdropping strategies. These results demonstrate that temporal QBER driven machine learning provides an accurate, explainable, and practical framework for multi attack security monitoring in BB84 QKD systems.