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arXiv:2611.16113

Testing Quantum Advantage in High-Frequency Trading with Market-Derived Nonlocal Games

Daiwei Zhu, Brendan Pankovich, Alireza Marefat Khah, Haakam Aujla, Ramis Movassagh, Martin Roetteler, Johannes Borregaard

Published Nov 11, 2026• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Non-classical correlations enabled by entanglement could be exploited for distributed coordination tasks with communication constraints such as high-frequency trading in fragmented markets. However, previous studies have largely specified the game and its payoff structure theoretically, using toy market models without testing how well these models reflect observed market behavior. Here, we introduce market-derived nonlocal games, in which historical order-book data and backtests of joint actions determine the game's inputs and payoffs, rather than a prespecified idealized model. We start from classical trading strategies based on market considerations, using quantum correlations only to coordinate the agents' decisions. We compute exact classical optima and quantum upper bounds for the payoff. For games with a possible quantum advantage, we introduce an optimization algorithm to find explicit entangled strategies and end-to-end backtest them on historical data. We demonstrate the approach in a two-agent, three-stock cross-venue arbitrage setting. The game derived from the observed market data shows no resolved quantum-classical gap at the measured interaction scales. Controlled variations in liquidity competition and cross-stock repricing then show how the approach identifies regimes supporting quantum advantage, constructs explicit strategies, and tests whether their advantage survives end-to-end backtesting on modified historical market data.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2611.16113

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Non-classical correlations enabled by entanglement could be exploited for distributed coordination tasks with communication constraints such as high-frequency trading in fragmented markets. However, previous studies have largely specified the game and its payoff structure theoretically, using toy market models without testing how well these models reflect observed market behavior. Here, we introduce market-derived nonlocal games, in which historical order-book data and backtests of joint actions determine the game's inputs and payoffs, rather than a prespecified idealized model. We start from classical trading strategies based on market considerations, using quantum correlations only to coordinate the agents' decisions. We compute exact classical optima and quantum upper bounds for the payoff. For games with a possible quantum advantage, we introduce an optimization algorithm to find explicit entangled strategies and end-to-end backtest them on historical data. We demonstrate the approach in a two-agent, three-stock cross-venue arbitrage setting. The game derived from the observed market data shows no resolved quantum-classical gap at the measured interaction scales. Controlled variations in liquidity competition and cross-stock repricing then show how the approach identifies regimes supporting quantum advantage, constructs explicit strategies, and tests whether their advantage survives end-to-end backtesting on modified historical market data.
Remote entanglement enables coordinated decision making without communication and produces correlations beyond those achievable by any classical strategy, representing a practical quantum advantage in time-critical distributed decision-making problems. However, existing analyses of quantum-classical gaps in such latency-constrained tacit coordination (LCTC) have focused on idealized models that neglect the finite stationary window of the LCTC, finite operation times, and limited entanglement generation rates, leaving fundamental constraints unaccounted for. In this work, we develop a comprehensive framework to quantitatively analyze quantum advantage in LCTC that explicitly incorporates finite-duration and finite-rate operations, as well as generalized utility structures with a limited stationary window. These advances are made possible by adapting statistical certification methods for nonlocal games to the decision-making scenarios of LCTC, identifying operational criteria that must be satisfied by the hardware implementations to realize quantum advantage with sufficient statistical significance. To meet the stringent criteria, we propose time-multiplexed, event-ready operations of cavity-assisted trapped-atom quantum network nodes that provide a continuous stream of entangled qubit pairs, with decision latencies of a microsecond and decision rates of 8×103 s−18\times 10^3~\text{s}^{-1}8×103 s−1 per channel for a representative metropolitan-scale 505050-km fiber network to keep up with the fast-changing environment, such as financial markets and electric grid networks. These results bridge the gap between the theoretical notions of the quantum-classical gap in nonlocal games and concrete implementations that meet the stringent operational criteria for achieving robust quantum advantage in realistic coordination tasks.
Speculative trading can drive pronounced market instabilities, yet existing regulatory and macroprudential tools intervene only after such dynamics emerge. Quantum technologies offer a fundamentally new means of shaping economic behavior by introducing non-classical correlations between decision-makers. Here we demonstrate a prototype quantum stock market in which entanglement between traders' valuations mitigates the runaway devaluation characteristic of speculative busts. Using reinforcement-learning agents trading a single commodity, we show that replacing classical valuations with quantum-correlated qubit-encoded valuations stabilizes prices and increases the AI traders' net worth relative to a classical market, where instead agents rapidly converge to liquidation strategies that collapse the asset value. To explain this behavior, we formulate and analyze a quantized version of the ppp-guessing game, a canonical model of speculative dynamics. Quantum entanglement and phase coherence reshape the strategic landscape, eliminating the pathological pure-strategy Nash equilibrium that drives market collapse in the classical game, while mixed-strategy equilibria remain non-degenerate and avoid bust-type outcomes. These results identify quantum correlations as a novel, endogenous mechanism for market stabilization and, more broadly, demonstrate the utility of multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms for uncovering optimal strategies in complex decision-making frameworks with quantum degrees of freedom.
Quantum games, like quantum algorithms, exploit quantum entanglement to establish strong correlations between strategic player actions. This paper introduces quantum game-theoretic models applied to trading and demonstrates their implementation on an ion-trap quantum computer. The results showcase a quantum advantage, previously known only theoretically, realized as higher-paying market Nash equilibria. This advantage could help uncover alpha in trading strategies, defined as excess returns compared to established benchmarks. These findings suggest that quantum computing could significantly influence the development of financial strategies.
Quantum entanglement is one of the most striking discoveries in all of science. This effect allows, for instance, two spatially separated agents to coordinate their actions, without communication, to an extent that is both counter-intuitive, and provably impossible by any other physical means. A recently discovered example is that of mobile agents (players) performing spatial coordination tasks such as rendezvous, where the agents aim to meet on a network without communication. Until now, demonstrations of this advantage have relied on highly idealized conditions: agents are assumed to have complete knowledge of the topography, and experiments have been restricted to simulations using data generated by qubits within a single quantum processor. Here we address both limitations by developing a theory for graph ensembles that capture topographical uncertainty and by experimentally demonstrating the advantage in rendezvous scenarios between physically separated ion-trap systems with access to remote entanglement. Moreover, we simulate a broader set of problems on superconducting hardware. Surprisingly, when players are given the ability to gather more local information the quantum advantage increases -- a feat impossible by classical means. Our findings establish a concrete route toward practical quantum advantages in motion coordination problems. More broadly, they point to a new way of using portable quantum devices to enhance collective decision-making in uncertain environments.
Quantum telepathy is the phenomenon where two non-communicating parties can exhibit correlated behaviors that are impossible to achieve using classical resources. This is also known as Bell inequality violation and is made possible by quantum entanglement. In this work, we present a conceptual framework for applying quantum telepathy to real-world problems. In general, the problems involve multiple parties making local observations that need to coordinate their decisions but are unable to communicate. We argue this inability is actually quite prevalent in the modern era where the decision-making timescales of computer processors are so short that the speed of light delay is appreciable in comparison. We highlight the example of high-frequency trading (HFT), where trades are made at microsecond timescales, but the speed of light delay between different stock exchanges are on the order of 100 microseconds to 10 milliseconds. Due to the maturity of Bell inequality violation experiments, experimental realization of quantum telepathy schemes that can attain a quantum advantage for real-world problems is already almost immediately possible\textit{is already almost immediately possible}is already almost immediately possible. We demonstrate this by conducting a case study for a concrete HFT scenario that gives rise to a generalization of the CHSH game and evaluate different possible physical implementations for achieving a quantum advantage. It is well known that Bell inequality violation is a rigorous mathematical proof of a quantum advantage over any classical strategy and does not need any complexity-theoretic assumptions such as BQP≠BPP\text{BQP}\neq\text{BPP}BQP=BPP. Moreover, fault tolerance is not necessary to realize a quantum advantage: for example, violating the CHSH inequality only requires single-qubit operations on two entangled physical qubits.
We study decentralized multi-agent coordination where agents must correlate actions against an unobserved field and cannot communicate. To isolate correlation geometry from payoff optimization, we introduce the Hidden-Field Coordination (HFC) model, which enforces identical information access and no-signaling constraints across strategies. Using information-theoretic diagnostics, we compare classical shared-randomness baselines with an entanglement-mediated strategy based on multipartite W states and a strictly local Spontaneous Leader Election rule. Within the restricted symmetric shared-latent baseline studied here, increasing total correlation is achieved primarily by driving actions toward alignment (copying), which also increases pairwise coincidence (collisions). By contrast, the quantum strategy realizes a collision-suppressing coordination regime: it preserves global dependence while reducing pairwise coincidence below the independent (product) baseline induced by the common marginal distribution. This produces a geometric separation in the joint-action distribution. Classical baselines concentrate probability near the diagonal of action equality, whereas the entanglement-mediated mapping occupies an offset-diagonal region associated with relational roles. Accordingly, the entanglement signature in this setting is not higher correlation magnitude; total-correlation differentials can be negative relative to the classical copying optimum. Instead, it reflects a change in dependence geometry that supports robust anti-coordination.