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arXiv:2611.14147

Secure Information Flow in Quantum Programs

Zhicheng Zhang, Mingsheng Ying, Lirong Xia

Published Nov 10, 2026• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Information-flow security aims to prevent the leakage of confidential information through program execution. This problem becomes fundamentally subtler for quantum programs, because their states may involve superposition and entanglement, and their executions may involve intricate interactions between classical and quantum variables. This paper develops semantic foundations and verification methods for secure information flow in quantum programs. We formulate two notions of information-flow security. The first is a noninterference-based definition that naturally generalizes its classical counterpart. The second is a simulation-based definition that explicitly models an attacker, providing a clear operational interpretation of security. We prove that these two notions are equivalent. To verify the information-flow security of quantum programs, we develop a proof framework based on quantum Hoare logic. A key challenge is that the standard self-composition technique, which expresses information-flow security in Hoare logic by composing a program with a renamed copy of itself, fails in the quantum setting due to an obstruction analogous to the no-cloning theorem. To overcome this challenge, we introduce self-conjugation, a novel technique that leverages the deferred measurement principle and properties of unitary operations. We demonstrate our framework on examples drawn from the quantum one-time pad, quantum error correction, and anonymous entanglement generation.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2611.14147

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Information-flow security aims to prevent the leakage of confidential information through program execution. This problem becomes fundamentally subtler for quantum programs, because their states may involve superposition and entanglement, and their executions may involve intricate interactions between classical and quantum variables. This paper develops semantic foundations and verification methods for secure information flow in quantum programs. We formulate two notions of information-flow security. The first is a noninterference-based definition that naturally generalizes its classical counterpart. The second is a simulation-based definition that explicitly models an attacker, providing a clear operational interpretation of security. We prove that these two notions are equivalent. To verify the information-flow security of quantum programs, we develop a proof framework based on quantum Hoare logic. A key challenge is that the standard self-composition technique, which expresses information-flow security in Hoare logic by composing a program with a renamed copy of itself, fails in the quantum setting due to an obstruction analogous to the no-cloning theorem. To overcome this challenge, we introduce self-conjugation, a novel technique that leverages the deferred measurement principle and properties of unitary operations. We demonstrate our framework on examples drawn from the quantum one-time pad, quantum error correction, and anonymous entanglement generation.
Quantum Hoare logic allows us to reason about quantum programs. We present an extension of quantum Hoare logic that introduces “ghost variables” to extend the expressive power of pre-/postconditions. Ghost variables are variables that do not actually occur in the program and are allowed to have arbitrary quantum states (in a sense, they are existentially quantified), and be entangled with program variables. Ghost variables allow us to express properties such as the distribution of a program variable or the fact that a variable has classical content. And as a case study, we show how quantum Hoare logic with ghost variables can be used to prove the security of the quantum one-time pad.
Quantum cryptography has been extensively studied in the last twenty years, but information-flow security of quantum computing and communication systems has been almost untouched in the previous research. Due to the essential difference between classical and quantum systems, formal methods developed for classical systems, including probabilistic systems, cannot be directly applied to quantum systems. This paper defines an automata model in which we can rigorously reason about information-flow security of quantum systems. The model is a quantum generalisation of Goguen and Meseguer's noninterference. The unwinding proof technique for quantum noninterference is developed, and a certain compositionality of security for quantum systems is established. The proposed formalism is then used to prove security of access control in quantum systems.
This thesis presents a formal model for quantum protocols, that is, cryptographic protocols based on quantum mechanics. It also develops a definition of security (which includes notions such as privacy and correctness) for quantum protocols. First, existing classical (non-quantum) definitions of security are studied. There are essentially two approaches: one based on Turing Machines and simulation, the other using information theory. Both approaches are explored in detail and compared, then a particular variation of the first approach is chosen. Security is defined by introducing an interface (also called a simulator) which is capable of translating an attack on protocol 1 into an attack on protocol 2. The profile of a protocol is a stochastic variable, defined as the output of the participants and the view of the adversary who performs the attack. If an interface exists such that the profile of protocol 1 is indistinguishable from the profile of protocol 2 with the help of this interface, then protocol 1 is at least as secure as protocol 2. An absolute notion of security is obtained by comparing the protocol implementation with its 'ideal' equivalent. In this approach, and in classical cryptography in general, indistinguishability of probability distributions is a crucial tool. The meaning of this notion is explored in the context of density matrices, the mathematical formalism which is used to describe the state of a quantum system. Various measures of distinguishability of quantum states relevant from a cryptographic point of view are investigated: probability of error, trace norm (related to the Kolmogorov distance), overlap (related to the Bhattacharyya coefficient) and Shannon distinguishability (defined through the mutual information). It is shown that if we require that the distinguishability between two families of quantum states vanish exponentially fast, these four distinguishability measures are equivalent. Along the way upper and lower bounds for the Shannon distinguishability are obtained. This is a very useful result, because explicit computation of the Shannon distinguishability between two quantum states is often difficult (it requires solving a transcendental equation), whereas the other distinguishability measures, in particular the trace norm, are usually much easier to compute. In the last chapter the two previous topics are combined. A formal model for quantum protocols is formulated. It uses Quantum Turing Machines to represent the participants, who communicate through a quantum channel. The different nature of quantum information as opposed to classical information is explored in detail, including the implications this has for the definition. As in the classical case, we introduce an interface to compare the security of two protocols for the same task. Subsequently some consequences of the proposed definition are investigated. In particular, strong evidence is given that one classical technique often used in proofs of security for classical protocols, called rewinding, is impossible in the quantum setting.
The verification of quantum programs presents a formidable challenge due to the fundamental properties of quantum mechanics, namely superposition and entanglement. Traditional verification methods struggle to cope with the exponentially growing state space inherent in quantum computation. This paper proposes a novel self-referential formal verification method that leverages quantum computation itself to tackle this problem. The core idea involves representing the verification system as a quantum program, enabling self-execution and verification. We utilize techniques from quantum circuit compilation and formal methods to design and implement this approach. This strategy offers a potential pathway to manage the complexity of quantum verification, though significant theoretical and practical hurdles remain. The primary objective is to establish a framework where the inherent properties of quantum systems are harnessed to address the verification process. This work lays the groundwork for future research into scalable quantum verification techniques.
In this article, we investigate the fundamental laws of quantum programming. We extend a comprehensive set of Hoare et al.’s basic laws of classical programming to the quantum setting. These laws characterise the algebraic properties of quantum programs, such as the distributivity of sequential composition over (quantum) if{\mathbf{if}}if -statements and the unfolding of nested (quantum) if{\mathbf{if}}if -statements. At the same time, we clarify some subtle differences between certain laws of classical programming and their quantum counterparts. Additionally, we derive a fixpoint characterisation of quantum while{\mathbf{while}}while -loops and a loop-based realisation of tail recursion in quantum programming. Furthermore, we establish two normal form theorems: one for quantum circuits and one for finite quantum programs. The theory in which these laws are established is formalised in the Coq proof assistant, and all of these laws are mechanically verified. As an application case of our laws, we present a formal derivation of the principle of deferred measurements in dynamic quantum circuits. We expect that these laws can be utilised in correctness-preserving transformation, compilation and automatic code optimisation in quantum programming. In particular, because these laws are formally verified in Coq, they can be confidently applied in quantum programme development.
We provide a formal framework for Continuous-Variable Quantum Computing (CQC). While CQC is supported by photonic quantum hardware, we are not aware of a formal semantics for continuous-variable quantum programs nor of a unary Hoare logic for their verification. There are several technical obstacles to extending to CQC any of the formal frameworks available for Discrete-Variable Quantum Computing (DQC). Most importantly, continuous-variable quantum programs act on {\em infinite-dimensional} Hilbert spaces; their measurement outcomes are often {\em unbounded} and have expected values that are defined by an improper integral (or an infinite series), which may not converge. We overcome these challenges to give a formal semantics to a universal programming language for CQC and to provide the first Hoare logic for CQC. The assertions of our logic are built from polynomials over canonical observables. Besides proving relative completeness, we implement a symbolic weakest-precondition calculator for CQC based on our logic. Our tool has successfully verified CQC algorithms from textbooks and calculated their approximation errors for physically realizable implementations, proved the correctness (i.e., equivalence) of gate decompositions for CQC hardware, and computed the resource requirements (i.e., number of photon-number states) for achieving a desired accuracy in the classical simulation of continuous-variable quantum programs.