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arXiv:2611.10817

MEAT with source and detector correlations

Devashish Tupkary, Amir Arqand

Published Nov 7, 2026• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We prove variants of the marginal-constrained entropy accumulation theorem (MEAT) that enable finite-size security analysis of quantum key distribution with source and detector correlations. For source correlations, our results allow for the state prepared in a given round to depend on the current setting choice and a finite number of preceding choices. For detector correlations, our results require memory effects to persist for a finite number of rounds after a registered click, and all detectors to be switched off during those rounds. These results can be combined, providing, to the best of our knowledge, the first method to jointly treat correlated source and detector imperfections in quantum key distribution. Moreover, we retain all the benefits of the MEAT, such as (but not limited to) support for on-the-fly announcements and choice of adaptive tradeoff functions. The resulting key rates can be computed via a single-round optimization amenable to existing numerical methods. We demonstrate these results on qubit BB84, and exhibit competitive key rates even in the presence of correlated source and detector imperfections.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2611.10817

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We prove variants of the marginal-constrained entropy accumulation theorem (MEAT) that enable finite-size security analysis of quantum key distribution with source and detector correlations. For source correlations, our results allow for the state prepared in a given round to depend on the current setting choice and a finite number of preceding choices. For detector correlations, our results require memory effects to persist for a finite number of rounds after a registered click, and all detectors to be switched off during those rounds. These results can be combined, providing, to the best of our knowledge, the first method to jointly treat correlated source and detector imperfections in quantum key distribution. Moreover, we retain all the benefits of the MEAT, such as (but not limited to) support for on-the-fly announcements and choice of adaptive tradeoff functions. The resulting key rates can be computed via a single-round optimization amenable to existing numerical methods. We demonstrate these results on qubit BB84, and exhibit competitive key rates even in the presence of correlated source and detector imperfections.
Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems inevitably exhibit imperfections in both the source and detector. At the same time, the behavior of these imperfect devices is never exactly known due to characterization uncertainty, parameter fluctuations, and potential influence by an adversary. In this work, we present a security proof for generic prepare-and-measure QKD protocols, including decoy-state BB84, with imperfect and imperfectly characterized sources and detectors using the marginal-constrained entropy accumulation theorem (MEAT). Our approach uses a sequence of proof technique independent source maps and squashing maps, yielding a very modular framework. We show that practical key rates can be achieved even when multiple imperfections are combined. More broadly, our work provides a unified foundation that avoids the need for dedicated protocol-specific arguments and can be readily extended to other protocols and device imperfections.
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According to the entropy accumulation theorem, proving the unconditional security of a device-independent quantum key distribution protocol reduces to deriving tradeoff functions, i.e., bounds on the single-round von Neumann entropy of the raw key as a function of Bell linear functionals, conditioned on an eavesdropper's quantum side information. In this work, we describe how the conditional entropy can be bounded in the 2-input/2-output setting, where the analysis can be reduced to qubit systems, by combining entropy bounds for variants of the well-known BB84 protocol with quantum constraints on qubit operators on the bipartite system shared by Alice and Bob. The approach gives analytic bounds on the entropy, or semi-analytic ones in reasonable computation time, which are typically close to optimal. We illustrate the approach on a variant of the device-independent CHSH QKD protocol where both bases are used to generate the key as well as on a more refined analysis of the original single-basis variant with respect to losses. We obtain in particular a detection efficiency threshold slightly below 80.26%, within reach of current experimental capabilities.
We develop a generic framework to bound the phase error rate for quantum key distribution protocols using passive detection setups with imperfections and memory effects. This framework can be used in proof techniques based on the entropic uncertainty relation or phase error correction, to prove security in the finite-size regime against coherent attacks. Our framework can incorporate on-the-fly announcements of click/no-click outcomes on Bob's side. In the case of imperfections without memory effects, it can be combined with proofs addressing source imperfections in a modular manner. We apply our framework to compute key rates for the decoy-state BB84 protocol, when the beam splitting ratio, the detection efficiency, and dark counts of the detectors are only known to be within some ranges. We also compute key rates in the presence of memory effects in the detectors. In this case, our results allow for protocols to be run at higher repetition rates, resulting in a significant improvement in the secure key generation rate.
This thesis is concerned with rigorous security analyses of practical Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols, using a variety of modern proof techniques. The main results are as follows. First, we establish a security proof for variable-length QKD protocols against IID collective attacks, and extend this result to coherent attacks using the postselection technique. In doing so, we resolve a long-standing flaw in the application of the postselection technique to QKD, thereby placing it on a rigorous mathematical footing. Second, we develop a method to bound phase error rates in entropic uncertainty relation-based and phase error rate-based proofs, using only the observed statistics of the protocol, even when detectors are imperfect and only approximately characterized. This removes a key assumption of identical detector behaviour and enables these techniques to be applied in realistic settings. Third, we present a very general security analysis based on the marginal-constrained entropy accumulation theorem. The resulting framework can be readily adapted to practical imperfections and side channels, and is suitable for certification efforts. Finally, we show that the security of QKD protocols under realistic authentication assumptions can be reduced to the standard idealized setting, where authentication is assumed to behave honestly, with only minor protocol modifications. A distinctive feature of this thesis is its unified presentation of several major QKD security proof frameworks using consistent protocol descriptions and notation. Consequently, this thesis is intended not only as a collection of new technical results, but also as a useful reference for understanding rigorous security analysis in quantum key distribution.
Quantum key distribution promises information-theoretic security, but practical implementations face vulnerabilities due to device imperfections. Existing security proofs typically address source and detector imperfections separately and cannot be directly combined, while the few attempts to handle both simultaneously have assumed idealized scenarios with infinitely many protocol rounds, which is insufficient to certify the security of real-world systems. Here, we close this gap by introducing a modular lifting theorem that extends any (present or future) phase-error-based security proof for active-basis-choice BB84-type protocols to incorporate detector efficiency mismatches. By applying this theorem to a state-of-the-art analysis for source imperfections, we obtain the first finite-key security proof against general coherent attacks that simultaneously addresses both source and detector imperfections.