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arXiv:2610.41944

Locality, Probability and the Relevance of History

Sebastian Horvat

quant-phphysics.hist-phSubmitted Oct 30, 2026• Announced Nov 2, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

Relativistic theory and experiments teach us that causal influences are constrained by the speed of light. Deterministic theories incorporate this lesson in $\textit{functional}$ terms: whether an event occurs or not is functionally determined by events that occur in its immediate causal past. In this paper we suggest a natural generalization of this constraint that applies to probabilistic theories: the $\textit{probability}$ that an event occurs is to be functionally determined by the $\textit{probability}$ of the event-occurrences in its immediate causal past. This constraint differs from Bell's criterion of local causality and turns out to imply it only under an additional assumption that requires history to be, in a sense, $\textit{ir}$relevant. Bell-inequality-violating quantum phenomena are thus arguably $\textit{not}$ in tension with relativity, locality, "statistical independence", nor with a supposed "realism". What they instead show is that history is, in a sense, $\textit{relevant}$.

AI Summary

The paper asks whether Bell’s local causality is the appropriate probabilistic expression of relativistic locality, or whether Bell-inequality violations can instead be understood as indicating dependence on history. It introduces “probabilistic world-theories”: sets of spacetime event configurations equipped with probability measures indexed by initial conditions on a Cauchy surface. Its proposed principle, Probabilistic Locality, requires differences in an event’s probability distribution to be accompanied by differences in the joint distribution of events in its arbitrarily immediate causal past. This compares distributions associated with different initial conditions, whereas Bell’s local causality imposes conditional-independence constraints within each distribution. The paper establishes their logical independence through examples, including a theory with only one initial-condition class, for which the new principle holds trivially. It then introduces “Irrelevance of History,” requiring that future probabilities conditioned on a complete present configuration coincide with probabilities obtained by treating that configuration as fresh initial conditions. A formal argument claims that this assumption together with Probabilistic Locality implies Bell’s local causality. Rejecting the history assumption is consequently proposed as a way to accommodate Bell violations while retaining the new locality principle. Time symmetry additionally yields a future-directed counterpart of that principle. No concrete theory reproducing Bell correlations under these requirements is constructed. Stated limitations include unresolved continuum and measure-theoretic details, a fixed spacetime background, and deferred comparisons with existing quantum formulations, other locality assumptions, and GHZ phenomena. The conclusions concern a proposed foundational framework rather than new experimental predictions or quantitative bounds.

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Central claim may not hold: Principle 1 permits two worlds that agree everywhere through t=0 and disagree everywhere afterward, contradicting Proposition 1’s assertion that locality implies determinism. The proof of the central Proposition 3 unjustifiably propagates arbitrarily nearby probability differences backward to a specified initial surface, without assumptions that would validate that propagation. Principle 4 does not require a probability-preserving correspondence between future histories, so it does not generally imply the conditional-probability identities used to prove Proposition 3. The paper does not establish that its proposed Probabilistic Locality is the constraint supported by relativity, and the criterion is vacuous for theories with only one initial-condition probability distribution.

Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.

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33 pages + references; 2 figures

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Relativistic theory and experiments teach us that causal influences are constrained by the speed of light. Deterministic theories incorporate this lesson in functional\textit{functional}functional terms: whether an event occurs or not is functionally determined by events that occur in its immediate causal past. In this paper we suggest a natural generalization of this constraint that applies to probabilistic theories: the probability\textit{probability}probability that an event occurs is to be functionally determined by the probability\textit{probability}probability of the event-occurrences in its immediate causal past. This constraint differs from Bell's criterion of local causality and turns out to imply it only under an additional assumption that requires history to be, in a sense, ir\textit{ir}irrelevant. Bell-inequality-violating quantum phenomena are thus arguably not\textit{not}not in tension with relativity, locality, "statistical independence", nor with a supposed "realism". What they instead show is that history is, in a sense, relevant\textit{relevant}relevant.
The paper asks whether Bell’s local causality is the appropriate probabilistic expression of relativistic locality, or whether Bell-inequality violations can instead be understood as indicating dependence on history. It introduces “probabilistic world-theories”: sets of spacetime event configurations equipped with probability measures indexed by initial conditions on a Cauchy surface.
Its proposed principle, Probabilistic Locality, requires differences in an event’s probability distribution to be accompanied by differences in the joint distribution of events in its arbitrarily immediate causal past. This compares distributions associated with different initial conditions, whereas Bell’s local causality imposes conditional-independence constraints within each distribution. The paper establishes their logical independence through examples, including a theory with only one initial-condition class, for which the new principle holds trivially. It then introduces “Irrelevance of History,” requiring that future probabilities conditioned on a complete present configuration coincide with probabilities obtained by treating that configuration as fresh initial conditions. A formal argument claims that this assumption together with Probabilistic Locality implies Bell’s local causality. Rejecting the history assumption is consequently proposed as a way to accommodate Bell violations while retaining the new locality principle. Time symmetry additionally yields a future-directed counterpart of that principle.
No concrete theory reproducing Bell correlations under these requirements is constructed. Stated limitations include unresolved continuum and measure-theoretic details, a fixed spacetime background, and deferred comparisons with existing quantum formulations, other locality assumptions, and GHZ phenomena. The conclusions concern a proposed foundational framework rather than new experimental predictions or quantitative bounds.
In papers published in the 25 years following his famous 1964 proof, John Bell refined and reformulated his views on locality and causality. Although his formulations of local causality were in terms of probability, he had little to say about that notion. But assumptions about probability are implicit in his arguments and conclusions. Probability does not conform to these assumptions when quantum mechanics is applied to account for the particular correlations Bell argues are locally inexplicable. This account involves no superluminal action and there is even a sense in which it is local, but it is in tension with the requirement that the direct causes and effects of events be nearby. Introduction I never met John Bell, but his writings have supplied me with a continual source of new insights as I read and reread them over 40 years. As I worked toward a rather different understanding of quantum mechanics he was foremost in my mind as a severe but honest critic of such attempts. We all would love to know what Einstein would have made of Bell's theorem. I confess that the deep regret I feel that Bell cannot respond to this paper is sometimes assuaged by a sense of relief. Locality and Local Causality In his seminal 1964 paper [1], John Bell expressed locality as the requirement that the result of a measurement on one system be unaffected by operations on a distant system with which it has interacted in the past. [2, p. 14] This seems to require that the result of a measurement would have been the same, no matter what operations had been performed on such a distant system. But suppose the result of a measurement were the outcome of an indeterministic process. Then the result of the measurement might have been different even if exactly the same operations (if any) had been performed on that distant system. So can no indeterministic theory satisfy the locality requirement? Bell felt no need to address that awkward question in his 1964 paper [1], since he took the EPR argument to establish that any additional variables needed to restore locality and causalitywould have to determine a unique result of ameasurement.
I compare deterministic and stochastic hidden variable models of the Bell experiment, exphasising philosophical distinctions between the various ways of combining conditionals and probabilities. I make four main claims. (1) Under natural assumptions, locality as it occurs in these models is equivalent to causal independence, as analysed (in the spirit of Lewis) in terms of probabilities and conditionals. (2) Stochastic models are indeed more general than deterministic ones. (3) For factorizable stochastic models, relativity's lack of superluminal causation does not favour locality over completeness. (4) If we prohibit all superluminal causation, then the violation of the Bell inequality teaches us a lesson, besides quantum mechanics' familiar ones that quantities can lack precise values and that pairs of quantities can lack joint probabilities: namely, some pairs of events are not screened off by their common past.
In papers published in the 25 years following his famous 1964 proof John Bell refined and reformulated his views on locality and causality. Although his formulations of local causality were in terms of probability, he had little to say about that notion. But assumptions about probability are implicit in his arguments and conclusions. Probability does not conform to these assumptions when quantum mechanics is applied to account for the particular correlations Bell argues are locally inexplicable. This account involves no superluminal action and there is even a sense in which it is local, but it is in tension with the requirement that the direct causes and effects of events are nearby.
Review and preview In chapters 6 and 7, I described some links between locality and the treatment of probabilities in models of the EPR–Bohm experiment. From chapter 6, the main lesson was that, given the strict correlations of quantum mechanics, factorizability of the two-time probabilities is equivalent to two-time determinism. I also noted there that an adequate factorizable theory – one that avoids Bell's theorem – is possible only if λ-independence fails. In chapter 7, I argued that weak symmetry, local determination, and independent evolution together entail deterministic results and weak deterministic transitions. In chapter 8, I discussed the relationships among the locality conditions of chapter 6 and 7, Lorentz-invariance, and ‘metaphysical’ locality, especially local causality. I have by no means tried to give general answers to the questions raised there. Indeed, part of my thesis is that there is no general answer to be had. Nonetheless, one can use the results of chapters 6 and 7 to investigate the status of various interpretations. Most obviously, they can be used to evaluate whether a given theory is local: if a theory can be shown to violate one or more of the types of determinism entailed by the locality conditions of chapters 6 and 7, then that theory must be non-local in some sense.
In strict accordance with special relativity, locality is defined in terms of observed results. In a non-deterministic "hidden-parameter" theory, admitting "statistical independence" of the outcomes for a single pair, locality and a restriction ("primary locality") at the level of "primary probabilities", Bell's inequalities are recollected. Their violation is traced to the assumption of an algebraic structure defining relations between single-constituent "probabilistic" descriptions that cannot be interpreted as distinctive properties of the components. It is then concluded that the experimental violation of Bell's inequalities cannot be a test of non-locality, even if locality is interpreted at the unobservable level, in terms of "primary probabilities".
The concept of local realism entails certain restrictions concerning the possible occurrence of correlated events. Although these restrictions are inherent in classical physics they have never been noticed until Bell showed in 1964 that general correlations in quantum mechanics can not be interpreted in a classical way. We demonstrate how a local realistic way of thinking about measurement results necessarily leads to limitations with regard to the possible appearance of correlated events. These limitations, which are equivalent to Bell's inequality can be easily formulated as an immediate consequence of our discussion.