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arXiv:2610.29050

Buffer-Qubit-Based Quantum Circuit Allocation Method Against Crosstalk Attacks

Haruki Nakayama, Satoyuki Tsukano, Satoshi Kono, Keita Matsumoto, Toshio Mori, Takumi Oikawa, Ryo Uchida

quant-phSubmitted Oct 21, 2026• Announced Oct 22, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

Quantum Multi-Programming (QMP) enables the simultaneous execution of quantum circuits from multiple users on a single quantum chip in cloud quantum computing services. However, QMP is vulnerable to crosstalk attacks, in which a malicious user deliberately induces crosstalk to disrupt other users' computations. As a countermeasure, prior work has proposed the use of buffer qubits, which remain idle and are allocated between quantum circuits to suppress the effect of crosstalk. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, such countermeasures have not been publicly reported in production quantum cloud software. In this paper, we extend the QMP of OQTOPUS, open-source software that is already in production use for operating real quantum computers, with a buffer-qubit-based circuit allocation method. Experiments on a real device characterize the attack effect in terms of energy relaxation and dephasing, showing that observable degradation appears in dephasing characteristics of qubits adjacent to the attacker circuit. Based on this result, we release the proposed method as part of OQTOPUS and confirm that the buffer qubits are correctly reserved around the allocated circuits.

AI Summary

The paper addresses crosstalk attacks in quantum multiprogramming, where a malicious user’s circuit degrades another user’s simultaneous computation. It implements buffer-qubit allocation in OQTOPUS, an open-source quantum-cloud stack already used in production. The method extends an existing subgraph-isomorphism allocator with constraints excluding reserved qubits. After each circuit is mapped, unused qubits within a specified crosstalk range are reserved before allocating subsequent circuits. To select that range, experiments on a superconducting device compare victim-qubit $T_1$ and $T_2^*$ during repeated attacker CNOTs against time-matched idle controls. Each data point uses seven independent runs of 10,000 shots. Approximate 95% confidence intervals for differences between fitted parameters indicate detectable $T_2^*$ degradation only on adjacent qubits: for example, one qubit’s value falls from $2.28\pm0.07$ to $1.95\pm0.05\,\mu\mathrm{s}$ for $\ket{+}$. No $T_1$ difference is detected, nor any $T_2^*$ difference at the tested distances of two or three edges. The implementation therefore reserves adjacent qubits. An allocation test places 100 randomly generated two- to five-qubit circuits into 12 batches on a 64-qubit square lattice without violating buffer constraints. The illustrated batch uses 30 qubits for circuits and 34 (53.1%) as buffers. This verifies reservation behavior, not end-to-end mitigation of victim-output errors. The stated remaining work includes quantifying throughput overhead across circuit-size distributions, evaluating victim-circuit outputs, and testing attacks with longer-range effects.

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Accepted at the 2nd Workshop on Quantum Computing Security, Privacy and Resilience (Q-SEC), IEEE QCE 2026. The accepted manuscript is available here; the final published version will be available on IEEE Xplore

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Quantum Multi-Programming (QMP) enables the simultaneous execution of quantum circuits from multiple users on a single quantum chip in cloud quantum computing services. However, QMP is vulnerable to crosstalk attacks, in which a malicious user deliberately induces crosstalk to disrupt other users' computations. As a countermeasure, prior work has proposed the use of buffer qubits, which remain idle and are allocated between quantum circuits to suppress the effect of crosstalk. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, such countermeasures have not been publicly reported in production quantum cloud software. In this paper, we extend the QMP of OQTOPUS, open-source software that is already in production use for operating real quantum computers, with a buffer-qubit-based circuit allocation method. Experiments on a real device characterize the attack effect in terms of energy relaxation and dephasing, showing that observable degradation appears in dephasing characteristics of qubits adjacent to the attacker circuit. Based on this result, we release the proposed method as part of OQTOPUS and confirm that the buffer qubits are correctly reserved around the allocated circuits.
The paper addresses crosstalk attacks in quantum multiprogramming, where a malicious user’s circuit degrades another user’s simultaneous computation. It implements buffer-qubit allocation in OQTOPUS, an open-source quantum-cloud stack already used in production. The method extends an existing subgraph-isomorphism allocator with constraints excluding reserved qubits. After each circuit is mapped, unused qubits within a specified crosstalk range are reserved before allocating subsequent circuits.
To select that range, experiments on a superconducting device compare victim-qubit T1T_1T1​ and T2∗T_2^*T2∗​ during repeated attacker CNOTs against time-matched idle controls. Each data point uses seven independent runs of 10,000 shots. Approximate 95% confidence intervals for differences between fitted parameters indicate detectable T2∗T_2^*T2∗​ degradation only on adjacent qubits: for example, one qubit’s value falls from 2.28±0.072.28\pm0.072.28±0.07 to 1.95±0.05 μs1.95\pm0.05\,\mu\mathrm{s}1.95±0.05μs for ∣+⟩\ket{+}∣+⟩. No T1T_1T1​ difference is detected, nor any T2∗T_2^*T2∗​ difference at the tested distances of two or three edges. The implementation therefore reserves adjacent qubits.
An allocation test places 100 randomly generated two- to five-qubit circuits into 12 batches on a 64-qubit square lattice without violating buffer constraints. The illustrated batch uses 30 qubits for circuits and 34 (53.1%) as buffers. This verifies reservation behavior, not end-to-end mitigation of victim-output errors. The stated remaining work includes quantifying throughput overhead across circuit-size distributions, evaluating victim-circuit outputs, and testing attacks with longer-range effects.
This work presents a novel security attack based on CNOT gate induced crosstalk in superconducting qubit systems. Compared to previous work, this work introduces a double-sided crosstalk attack where attacker's circuits are located on either side of the victim circuit executing in a multi-tenant cloud-based quantum computer. The attacker, a malicious tenant or user, can interfere with, or disrupt, the state of neighboring qubits in the victim tenant or user without direct access to victim's qubits, by taking advantage of interference and crosstalk among the otherwise logically isolated qubits. New aspect of this attack is the location of the attacker's circuits on both sides of the victim. Experimental validation on cloud-based Rigetti quantum devices demonstrates that these attacks can compromise data integrity and cause the victim's circuit's outputs to change. Magnitude of the change is evaluated using total variational distance and tested on number of common benchmarks that can execute on today's quantum computers. This work underscores the need for improved isolation mechanisms and secure scheduling in multitenant quantum computing cloud environments.
Quantum computing, while allowing for processing information exponentially faster than classical computing, is far from becoming a personal commodity. Indeed, because of cost and needs for ultra-cold temperature, shielded environment, and complex wiring for control, access to quantum computers is likely to be provided remotely, through quantum servers. Sharing quantum hardware between multiple users enables the efficient use of quantum resources, but makes some security threats possible. For instance, previous studies demonstrated that crosstalk between attacker and victim's qubits can be exploited to mount security attacks. In this work, we address the problem of securing user circuits submitted to quantum servers. We propose the Qubit Allocation for Inter-Circuit Crosstalk Countermeasure (QAICCC), which aims to maximize qubit usage, reduce inter-circuit crosstalk as well as intra-circuit noise. QAICCC performs (1) a crosstalk analysis of the targeted quantum processor to determine qubits involved in crosstalk with the largest intensity; (2) the allocation of qubits in the safest possible way; and (3) the application of existing techniques to further reduce crosstalk between circuits and noise in user circuits. The main contribution is the allocation algorithm, which aims to maximize qubit usage (including making unused qubits available for future usage) while minimizing the largest inter-circuit crosstalk error rate. Thus, QAICCC will support quantum computing adoption by securing the usage of quantum servers by a large number of actors.
In the noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) era, the idea ofquantum multiprogramming, running multiple quantum circuits (QCs) simultaneously on the same hardware, helps to improve the throughput of quantum computation. However, the crosstalk, unwanted interference between qubits on NISQ processors, may cause performance degradation when using multiprogramming. To address this challenge, we introducepalloq(parallel allocation of QCs), a novel compilation protocol. Palloq improves the performance of quantum multiprogramming on NISQ processors, while paying attention to 1) the combination of QCs chosen for parallel execution and 2) the assignment of program qubit variables to physical qubits, to reduce unwanted interference among the active set of QCs. We also propose a software-based crosstalk detection protocol using a new combination of randomized benchmarking methods. Our method successfully characterizes the suitability of hardware for multiprogramming with relatively low detection costs. We found a tradeoff between the success rate and execution time of the multiprogramming. Our results will be of value when device throughput becomes a significant bottleneck. Until service providers have enough quantum processors available to more than meet demand, this approach will be attractive to the service providers and users who want to optimize job management and throughput of the processor.
Abstract Quantum computing has the potential to provide solutions to problems that are intractable on classical computers, but the accuracy of the current generation of quantum computers suffer from the impact of noise or errors such as leakage, crosstalk, dephasing, and amplitude damping among others. As the access to quantum computers is almost exclusively in a shared environment through cloud‐based services, it is possible that an adversary can exploit crosstalk noise to disrupt quantum computations on nearby qubits, even carefully designing quantum circuits to purposely lead to wrong answers. In this study, the extent and characteristics of crosstalk noise are studied through tomography conducted on IBM Quantum computers, leading to an enhanced crosstalk simulation model. These results indicate that crosstalk noise is a significant source of errors on IBM quantum hardware, making crosstalk based attack a viable threat to quantum computing in a shared environment. Based on the crosstalk simulator benchmarked against IBM hardware, the impact of crosstalk attacks and develop strategies are assessed for mitigating crosstalk effects. Through a systematic set of simulations, the effectiveness of three crosstalk attack mitigation strategies is assessed, namely circuit separation, qubit allocation optimization via reinforcement learning, and the use of spectator qubits, and show that they all overcome crosstalk attack risk with varying degrees of success and help to secure quantum computing in a shared platform.
NISQ devices have several physical limitations and unavoidable noisy quantum operations, and only small circuits can be executed on a quantum machine to get reliable results. This leads to the quantum hardware under-utilization issue. Here, we address this problem and improve the quantum hardware throughput by proposing a Quantum Multi-programming Compiler (QuMC) to execute multiple quantum circuits on quantum hardware simultaneously. This approach can also reduce the total runtime of circuits. We first introduce a parallelism manager to select an appropriate number of circuits to be executed at the same time. Second, we present two different qubit partitioning algorithms to allocate reliable partitions to multiple circuits – a greedy and a heuristic. Third, we use the Simultaneous Randomized Benchmarking protocol to characterize the crosstalk properties and consider them in the qubit partition process to avoid the crosstalk effect during simultaneous executions. Finally, we enhance the mapping transition algorithm to make circuits executable on hardware using a decreased number of inserted gates. We demonstrate the performance of our QuMC approach by executing circuits of different sizes on IBM quantum hardware simultaneously. We also investigate this method on VQE algorithm to reduce its overhead.
Abstract With the increasing demand for quantum hardware, shared and multi-tenant environments have been proposed to optimize resource utilization. However, the multi-tenancy paradigm in quantum computing inherently introduces security threats. This paper examines crosstalk-mediated attacks targeting three-qubit Grover’s search algorithm and explores two fundamental mitigation strategies: gate-based dynamical decoupling and the use of a buffer qubit. We evaluate the effectiveness of each method individually and in combination, finding that while both strategies offer some level of attack mitigation, their combined application yields the most significant performance improvement. Beyond security vulnerabilities, our work also has implications for unintentional circuit interference that can occur when multiple quantum circuits are executed in close proximity.