arXiv:2610.28239
Observable-Level Framework for Finite-Key Security in Coherent-One-Way Quantum Key Distribution
Aryan Kuntal, Utkarsh Giradkar, Mudit Chaudhary, Amit D. Lad
Abstract
Practical security analysis of Coherent-One-Way (COW) quantum key distribution requires optical-device modeling, finite experimental statistics, and security inference to be treated consistently without conflating assumptions. We present a modular observable-level simulation framework organized through the pipeline θ_phys -> p -> O -> S_j(O), in which physical source, channel, receiver, and detector parameters determine detector-resolved event probabilities, a finite-block layer applies an effective dead-time treatment and generates aggregate detector counts, and interchangeable security evaluators act on the same observable record. The framework is verified against analytical optical, virtual-state, and finite-key relations and evaluated against reported experimental COW-QKD operating points. The Kato finite-key calculation reproduces the refined experimentally reported secure-key rates most closely at intermediate distances, with deviations of -1.5% at 50 km and -10.3% at 75 km. Monitoring bright-port decoy counts agree within 0.9-2.4%, while remaining distance-dependent dark-port residual identifies the principal model-sensitive observable of the present physical description. Applying Kato and Azuma-Hoeffding concentration treatments to identical detector records isolates the effect of finite-key statistical inference and shows substantially tighter Kato phase-error bounds for rare-event monitoring records studied here. Holding the Kato evaluator fixed, joint optimization of coherent-state mean photon number mu and receiver splitting fraction t_B increases model-predicted secure-key rate by 7.4-20.2% relative to optimization of mu alone with t_B = 0.3. The framework therefore provides a common computational interface for experimental reproduction, controlled security-model comparison, model-based protocol optimization, and modular adversarial stress testing in COW-QKD.
AI Summary
The paper addresses how optical-device modeling, finite detector statistics, and security inference can be connected consistently in modified coherent-one-way (COW) QKD. It implements a modular pipeline from physical parameters to detector-event probabilities, finite-block count records, and interchangeable security evaluators. The model combines Gaussian coherent-state propagation, phase-noise averaging, an effective stationary non-paralyzable dead-time correction, and aggregate binomial count sampling. Security evaluation uses existing virtual-state bounds with Kato or Azuma–Hoeffding concentration inequalities; no new security proof is proposed. Checks compare individual pipeline components with analytical optical, count-statistical, and security relations. Benchmarking against reported experimental operating points, using visibility calibrated from dark-port decoy counts, gives Kato secure-key-rate residuals of $+17.3\%$, $-1.5\%$, $-10.3\%$, and $-76.9\%$ at 25, 50, 75, and 100 km. Bright-port decoy counts, not used for calibration, agree within $0.9$–$2.4\%$. On identical simulated records, minimum Kato phase-error bounds are approximately $0.0016$, $0.025$, $0.118$, and $0.296$, respectively; Azuma–Hoeffding reaches the $0.5$ security threshold throughout the sampled intensity range at distances of at least 50 km. Joint optimization of source intensity and receiver splitting improves predicted rates by $7.4$–$20.2\%$ over intensity-only optimization. The paper identifies distance-dependent dark-port discrepancies as a limitation of the physical model, which omits implementation-specific monitoring backgrounds. Dead time and count generation remain effective approximations. The concentration-bound comparison is specific to the sparse records studied, and intercept–resend and USD-motivated perturbations are illustrative stress tests rather than complete optimized attacks.
Error found: The dead-time correction in Section II.C.2 uses each preparation class's own click probability instead of the combined load on the shared detector, incorrectly modeling class-conditioned counts and potentially affecting the benchmarking and optimization.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.
- Comments
- Main Article: 9 Pages with 4 Figures. Supplemental Material: 7 Pages with 6 Figures