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arXiv:2610.22879

RAMP: Toward Ubiquitous Quantum-Safe Key Distribution as a Service

Jiafan Wang, Sebastian P. Kish, Dongxi Liu

Published Oct 16, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a security foundation independent of computational hardness assumptions. However, its reliance on specialized hardware limits access by ordinary users. Turning QKD into a service poses a fundamental trust challenge, as the providers that supply QKD-derived material themselves could retain knowledge of the keying inputs of users. This makes end-to-end confidentiality solely depend on the trustworthiness of the service infrastructure. We present RAMP, a service-oriented framework that decouples QKD material generation from key consumption. Providers operate QKD infrastructure and supply raw-key materials, while users securely acquire, mask, and locally process them into final keys without operating QKD devices. RAMP employs reconciliation-preserving masking compatible with both DV- and CV-QKD. It mitigates the trust dependence by separating the QKD-service and user-side masking domains. We formalize complementary confidentiality guarantees: RAMP protects the final key even if colluding providers expose their complete raw-key views, provided the masking domain remains secure; conversely, exposing the complete masking state does not break final-key secrecy as long as the QKD source and acquisition paths remain protected. The results establish the dual-domain security boundary of RAMP. We implement RAMP using experimentally acquired QKD data and standardized quantum-safe cryptography. After acquiring service-provisioned keying material, commodity endpoints complete user-side QKD post-processing with an average key-distillation throughput of 2.1Kb/s on an M4 Pro CPU. To our knowledge, we demonstrate the first experimental realization of such service-provisioned, user-side QKD processing, presenting a viable path toward QKD as a service.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2610.22879

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a security foundation independent of computational hardness assumptions. However, its reliance on specialized hardware limits access by ordinary users. Turning QKD into a service poses a fundamental trust challenge, as the providers that supply QKD-derived material themselves could retain knowledge of the keying inputs of users. This makes end-to-end confidentiality solely depend on the trustworthiness of the service infrastructure. We present RAMP, a service-oriented framework that decouples QKD material generation from key consumption. Providers operate QKD infrastructure and supply raw-key materials, while users securely acquire, mask, and locally process them into final keys without operating QKD devices. RAMP employs reconciliation-preserving masking compatible with both DV- and CV-QKD. It mitigates the trust dependence by separating the QKD-service and user-side masking domains. We formalize complementary confidentiality guarantees: RAMP protects the final key even if colluding providers expose their complete raw-key views, provided the masking domain remains secure; conversely, exposing the complete masking state does not break final-key secrecy as long as the QKD source and acquisition paths remain protected. The results establish the dual-domain security boundary of RAMP. We implement RAMP using experimentally acquired QKD data and standardized quantum-safe cryptography. After acquiring service-provisioned keying material, commodity endpoints complete user-side QKD post-processing with an average key-distillation throughput of 2.1Kb/s on an M4 Pro CPU. To our knowledge, we demonstrate the first experimental realization of such service-provisioned, user-side QKD processing, presenting a viable path toward QKD as a service.
This work investigates recent advances in implementing secure communication and computing services using quantum technologies, namely Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems. The approach is centered around the concept of oblivious keys, a fundamental cryptographic primitive where a transmitter knows a complete key while the receiver knows only half, with the transmitter being unaware of which half the receiver possesses [1]. We demonstrate that oblivious keys can be derived from the raw key material of standard discrete-variable (DV-QKD) and continuous-variable (CV-QKD) systems [2]–[5]. We also presented a hybrid framework that uses QKD with post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms, creating a dual-layer security model to bolster defenses against the threat of quantum computers. The practical applications of this framework are illustrated through its implementation in two critical domains: genomic medicine, where robust safeguards are essential for protecting sensitive genetic data, and the defense sector, which can profit from secure collaboration with minimal information disclosure.
Abstract: This study advances a unifying systems perspective on quantum-safe network security by synthesizing recent progress in quantum cryptography with practical integration patterns across carrier-grade infrastructures. Concept analysis distinguishes the roles of quantum key distribution (QKD), device-independent variants, quantum authentication, and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) within zero-trust architectures. Building on this, a layered framework—spanning physical/entanglement resources, key management, crypto-agility, control plane orchestration, and policy/compliance—is articulated to support end-to-end, composable guarantees. The problem addressed is the realization of verifiable, quantum-resilient security under operational constraints involving latency, key-rate variability, and heterogeneous trust assumptions. Methodology combines a structured literature synthesis with formal composability mapping to universal composability principles, adversarial threat modeling for quantum-enabled attackers, and testbed/simulation evaluation of hybrid QKD–PQC pipelines across L2–L3 segments and 5G/6G backhaul scenarios. Key results indicate that (i) selective QKD deployment on high-value links coupled with PQC at endpoints enhances resilience while preserving crypto-agility; (ii) automated key-lifecycle orchestration reduces exposure windows; and (iii) device-independent assurances strengthen guarantees where trust relaxation is necessary. The impact is a deployment-ready reference architecture, measurable integration metrics, and guidance aligned with emerging standards for critical infrastructure and national networks. The implications extend to procurement, compliance, and roadmap planning for quantum-era network security. Keywords: quantum-safe cryptography, quantum key distribution (QKD), post-quantum cryptography (PQC), hybrid QKD–PQC, composable security, device-independent QKD, zero-trust networks, key management and orchestration, 5G/6G backhaul, network security architecture, standards and interoperability
The nature of network services has drastically changed in recent years. New demands require new capabilities, forcing the infrastructure to dynamically adapt to new scenarios. Novel network paradigms, such as software-defined networking (SDN) and network functions virtualization, have appeared to provide flexibility for network management and services. The reliance on software and commoditized hardware of these new paradigms introduces new security threats and, consequently, one of the most desired capabilities is a strengthened security layer when connecting remote premises. On the other hand, traditional cryptographic protocols are based on computational complexity assumptions. They rely on certain mathematical problems (e.g., integer factorization, discrete logarithms, or elliptic curves) that cannot be efficiently solved using conventional computing. This general assumption is being revisited because of quantum computing. The creation of a quantum computer would put these protocols at risk and force a general overhaul of network security. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a novel technique for providing synchronized sources of symmetric keys between two separated domains. Its security is based on the fundamental laws of quantum physics, which makes it impossible to copy the quantum states exchanged between both endpoints. Therefore, if implemented properly, QKD generates highly secure keys, immune to any algorithmic cryptanalysis. This work proposes a node design to provide QKD-enhanced security in end-to-end services and analyze the control plane requirements for service provisioning in transport networks. We define and demonstrate the necessary workflows and protocol extensions in different SDN scenarios, integrating the proposed solution into a virtual router providing QKD-enhanced IPsec sessions.
The existence of quantum computing presents an existential threat to the traditional cryptographic algorithms, and there is a need to create communication mechanisms that are fundamentally secure. In this regard, the concept of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security, which is founded on quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, conventional QKD protocols have serious shortcomings such as lack of distance in communication, vulnerability to side-channel attacks, and inability to support the large-scale heterogeneous network. We suggest that HQNet-QKD a Hybrid Quantum Key Distribution framework can help solve these issues by offering a more secure, scalable and future-proof key exchange framework in hybrid classical-quantum networks. To support multi-layered security, the proposed architecture is a network ensuring the smoothness of decoy-state BB84, Measurement-Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD), entanglement/twin-field-based QKD with verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). It provides a complete methodology such as system architecture, mathematical modeling, and end-to-end key synthesis. When used over a distance of 300 km, simulation and testing have shown that HQNet-QKD can achieve up to2.7×2.7 \times2.7×higher secret key rate (SKR) than conventional methods, secret communication at 700 km and resilience to both quantum and classical attacks more than 96%. In addition, the framework guarantees forward secrecy, detector-side immunity, contextbound key derivation, and composability and thus resistant to current and future adversaries. It has a low-computational overhead modular design, making it trivial to deploy in a real world, in applications like quantum-secured 5G backbones, cloud data centers, critical infrastructure, and satellite-based communication systems. The findings make HQNet-QKD a new generation solution to quantum-safe secure communication and the first step towards the implementation of the quantum internet.
Quantum secure communication technology, grounded in the principles of quantum mechanics, has revolutionized traditional cryptographic methods, which predominantly rely on mathematical algorithms and logical transformations. Quantum key distribution (QKD) facilitates the secure sharing of symmetric keys between legitimate parties, ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of information in communication channels. Among various QKD schemes, continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) has emerged as a viable alternative to the more established discrete variable quantum key distribution (DV-QKD). CV-QKD boasts several advantages, including straightforward deployment, reduced operational costs, and stable signal quality, positioning it as a significant component of the quantum communication landscape. Quantum noise stream cipher (QNSC) represents a technique that employs redundant data streams to encrypt plaintext. Notably, QNSC shares structural similarities with the optical path used in quantum key distribution, allowing for compatibility with existing QKD infrastructure. Furthermore, the keys generated through quantum key distribution ensure absolute security, enabling them to substitute the data streams produced by pseudo-random sequences traditionally used in classical encryption schemes. This substitution enhances the overall security framework of the quantum noise stream encryption approach. The quantum access network (QAN) extends quantum key distribution capabilities from point-to-point connections to point-to-multipoint configurations, thereby becoming an essential component of contemporary network architectures. By interlinking multiple end users with a network backbone, quantum access networks can seamlessly integrate with quantum key distribution protocols. This integration offers a cost-effective and scalable solution for user access to the network. Extensive experimental verifications have demonstrated the viability of downstream access networks, indicating that the merging of quantum access network structures with quantum stream encryption technologies can yield a comprehensive quantum experimental platform. On this platform, security keys are derived through quantum key distribution, which subsequently facilitates the encryption of plaintext information. Notably, experimental validations involving eight users have been successfully executed on this platform, underscoring its practical applicability and effectiveness.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is regarded as providing information-theoretic security guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. However, a substantial body of practical attacks shows that deployed QKD systems can be compromised without violating these principles, by exploiting weaknesses in devices, control processes, and system integration. This paper presents a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on the system and infrastructure security of QKD deployments. We analyze 81 research works and develop a unified taxonomy together with an assumption-based model that explains attacks as violations of a small set of shared system assumptions spanning transmitters, channels, receivers, and classical infrastructure.Our central finding is that practical QKD security is limited not by the absence of defenses, but by the absence of system-level assurance. Existing work strengthens individual components but does not ensure that these protections guarantee end-to-end security. This creates an assurance gap: local defenses exist, yet there is no reliable way to confirm that system-wide assumptions remain valid in real deployments. We show that attacks follow recurring mechanisms and that infrastructure dependencies remain fragmented. Taken together, this work reframes QKD security as a system-level assurance problem driven by engineering realities, essential for hybrid QKD and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) architectures/quantum-safe infrastructures.