arXiv:2610.11513
Certifying Hidden Paths: Scalable Topology Assurance for QKD Networks
Alessandro Colombo, Margherita Cozzolino, Stephan Krenn, Thomas Lorünser
Abstract
Large-scale Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) networks rely on trusted repeaters, making the security properties of the selected communication path an essential part of end-to-end assurance. At the same time, network operators may be unwilling to disclose their internal topology. We present a topology-certification mechanism that lets a provider prove in zero knowledge that policy-compliant routes between two endpoints exist, without disclosing the routes in an individual presentation. Our main idea is to certify nodes and edges independently using multi-message signatures, rather than signing the complete graph as one object. For a route chosen in advance, proof size and cryptographic proving and verification work depend on its positions and attributes, independently of the overall network size, whereas route discovery and certification have separate graph-dependent costs. The construction hides the actual route length up to a public bound and sketches extensions to node-disjoint routes and monotonic additions within a graph epoch. We give a formal security model and conditional proofs of unforgeability and graph hiding for a generic construction. For a BBS-based construction, presentation-size estimates remain below $300$\,KiB at $\ell=m=n=50$, and measured generation and verification times remain below $400$\,ms at $\ell=64$ and $m=n=8$.
AI Summary
Trusted-repeater QKD networks make end-to-end security depend on the chosen route, but providers may not disclose their topology. This paper addresses how an auditor-certified network can support zero-knowledge proofs that policy-compliant routes exist between public endpoints, without revealing the selected route or its actual length. The construction independently signs nodes and directed edges, including attributes, endpoint identifiers, a graph identifier, and a shared random tag preventing components from different certification runs being combined. A presentation proves signature validity, adjacency, endpoint agreement, and node/edge policies. Certified self-loops pad routes to a public bound $\ell$ on node positions. For an already selected route, the proof checks $\ell$ nodes and $\ell-1$ edges; cryptographic costs depend on this padded route and its attributes, not total graph size. Formal games define unforgeability and graph hiding. Generic proofs assume EUF-CMA-secure signatures and a zero-knowledge, fresh-statement weakly simulation-extractable proof system. A BBS/Schnorr instantiation uses Fiat–Shamir in the random-oracle model. Estimated presentations remain below $300$ KiB at $\ell=m=n=50$. Rust benchmarks at $m=n=8$ and $\ell=64$ report generation and verification times of $353$ ms and $275$ ms, respectively, using equality-based attribute policies. Certification storage and route discovery remain graph-dependent. Node-disjoint routes, additions, and non-connectivity are extensions; removals require new epochs and rejection of superseded certificates. The concrete instantiation is not post-quantum, and proving route existence does not ensure that key forwarding uses that route.
Generative AI tools, in particular ChatGPT models from the GPT-5 and GPT-6 families, were used during the preparation and revision of this manuscript for language editing, consistency checks
Error found: The padded node-disjoint-route extension lacks an endpoint exemption in its displayed pseudonym relation, causing the common destination's first occurrence to produce matching pseudonyms and fail the proposed cross-route disjointness check.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.