Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:2610.11438 · Physical Review A

Robust quantum key distribution with imperfections in state preparation and characterization

Yi-Fei Lu, Yan-Yang Zhou, Yang Wang, Xin-Hang Li, Yu Zhou, Xiao-Lei Jiang, Jia-Ji Li, Chun Zhou, Hong-Wei Li, Yu-Yao Guo, Lin-Jie Zhou, Wan-Su Bao

quant-phSubmitted Oct 8, 2026• Announced Oct 9, 2026• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers an approach for secure communication over quantum channels, based on the principles of quantum mechanics. However, the inevitable imperfections in QKD systems can introduce critical vulnerabilities, posing significant challenges to the deployment of QKD in terms of both practical security and performance. In this work, we present a comprehensive security analysis of QKD in the practical scenarios involving imperfections in modulation spaces. Specifically, our analysis focuses on the imperfections related to encoding, intensity modulation, and their characterization. We provide a unified framework based on the operator dominance method to overcome these issues and achieve a tight estimation of the secret key rate (SKR). The simulation results show that the SKR in practical scenarios, with parameters characterized from commercial QKD systems, closely matches the SKR under ideal conditions. In the finite case, the maximum transmission distance can reach up to 250 km with total pulse number $N=10^{12}$ and the SKR closely approaches the asymptotic limit up to 250 km with $N=10^{14}$. This validates the robustness of our method against imperfections in state preparation and characterization. Furthermore, the feasibility and robustness of method in measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD have also been demonstrated. Our analysis not only promotes advancements in enhancing practical security and performance but also highlights the feasibility of deploying QKD for actual applications.

AI Summary

The paper addresses security analysis for QKD when encoding and intensity modulation are imperfect and their experimental characterization is uncertain. It seeks key-rate bounds that use characterized source states while allowing those states to vary within specified uncertainty sets, rather than relying only on worst-case modulation intervals. The analysis adapts an existing operator-dominance method to single-photon, decoy-state, and measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD. Virtual phase-error states are bounded by real linear combinations of prepared states, converting observed detection probabilities into phase-error bounds. Purifications are optimized through a positive-semidefinite Gram matrix, followed by worst-case optimization over characterization uncertainty. Analogous operator inequalities bound single-photon yields from three-intensity decoy statistics. An appendix extends the construction to MDI-QKD. Numerical simulations use phase and intensity parameters drawn from commercial-system characterization, Gaussian fluctuation models, 80% detector efficiency, dark-count probability $10^{-8}$, and fiber loss of $0.2$ dB/km. They report key rates close to ideal-source rates for the considered small characterization uncertainties. With uncertainty parameters $\Delta=\Delta'=0.01$, the reported finite-key transmission limit is approximately 250 km for $N=10^{12}$ pulses and 284 km for $N=10^{14}$; the latter approaches asymptotic rates through 250 km. MDI simulations report distances exceeding 375 km with $\Delta=\Delta'=0.1$. The analysis assumes qubit encoding, independent and identically distributed preparation, and independent encoding and intensity modulation; conventional QKD additionally requires basis-independent inconclusive detection. It excludes source side channels and correlations between successive preparations, identifying these as future extensions. The performance results are simulations, not a new experimental demonstration.

Little sign of AI-generated textIncrementalMissing comparisonStrong assumptionsPossible error

Central claim may not hold: The reported finite-key distances lack a specified finite-key security calculation, confidence bounds and security parameters. The MDI appendix incorrectly tensors indefinite single-source lower bounds, producing a false lower bound on the two-single-photon projector. The intensity appendix's stated scalar conditions do not guarantee its required multiphoton coefficient signs, and its induction does not establish the claimed generality.

Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.

Journal reference
Physical Review A, 2026
DOI
10.1103/tkr4-3l6z

Related papers

Experimental Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key distribution with Flawed State-Preparation over 300 km

Yi-Fei Lu, Yan-Yang Zhou, Yang Wang +10 more

Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises theoretically secure communication. However, it encounters challenges in implementation security and performance due to inevitable device imperfections. Since the proposal of measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD, the critical step toward practical security is to secure QKD with imperfect sources. The source imperfections manifest as state-preparation uncertainty (SPU) in various aspects, e.g., encoding uncertainty, intensity fluctuation, and imperfect vacuum states. Here, we perform an MDI-QKD experiment and achieve both high practical security and superior performance. We address the general form of SPU and guarantee a tight estimation of the secret key rate based on the operator dominance method. We achieve secure key distribution over 303.37 km, which not only represents the farthest distance in experiments involving SPU but also considers the most SPU scenarios. Our experimental results represent a significant step toward promoting practical and secure quantum communication.

quant-pharXiv:2610.11428•EPJ Quantum Technology•Oct 9, 2026•4 citations

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) based on Measurement Device Independent (MDI) Protocols

Jincheng Zhang

This paper investigates the vulnerabilities inherent in existing Measurement Device Independent (MDI) Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols and proposes a novel approach to enhance their security and reliability. The core claim is that current MDI protocols are susceptible to attacks stemming from imperfections within the measurement devices themselves. The proposed protocol leverages advanced error correction and privacy amplification techniques to mitigate these vulnerabilities, resulting in a more robust communication channel. The research focuses on developing a system that minimizes the impact of measurement device imperfections, thereby significantly improving the overall security and practicality of QKD. The key improvements involve a modified Bell-state measurement strategy and a tailored error correction scheme designed for the specific challenges presented by MDI protocols. The theoretical analysis demonstrates the protocol's resilience against a broader range of attacks, offering a substantial advancement in the field of quantum cryptography. The presented framework aims to deliver a practical and secure QKD solution for sensitive applications.

•Aug 29, 2026•0 citations

Security of quantum key distribution with realistic sources

Xoel Sixto

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security grounded in the laws of quantum mechanics rather than computational assumptions. While its theoretical foundations are robust, practical implementations necessarily deviate from the idealized models assumed in security analyses, opening the door to side-channel attacks and implementation loopholes. In particular, most research to date has focused on mitigating vulnerabilities in the measurement devices, leading to the development of Measurement-Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD) and Twin-Field QKD (TF-QKD), which effectively close all receiver-side loopholes. By contrast, the security of the source has remained less explored, despite being critical for the overall integrity of QKD systems. The goal of this thesis is to develop security proofs that explicitly account for realistic imperfections in QKD sources. Special emphasis is placed on three main aspects: correlations between emitted pulses that violate independence assumptions, imperfect phase randomization arising from practical modulation schemes, and leakage of internal settings through passive or active side channels. By formulating rigorous methods to analyze these imperfections, the work aims to provide a framework that enables practitioners to quantify and mitigate implementation risks systematically. Additionally, this thesis seeks to clarify under which conditions the commonly used decoy-state method remains secure, and to what extent source assumptions can be relaxed without compromising performance. This thesis aims to advance the understanding of how real-world deviations impact QKD security and to contribute to the development of protocols and devices. Ultimately, this work is motivated by the ambition to help bring QKD from a theoretically promising idea to a mature technology deployable with confidence in practical scenarios.

•Nov 7, 2025•0 citations

Finite-key security analysis of quantum key distribution with imperfect light sources

Akihiro Mizutani, Marcos Curty, Charles Ci Wen Lim +2 more

In recent years, the gap between theory and practice in quantum key distribution (QKD) has been significantly narrowed, particularly for QKD systems with arbitrarily flawed optical receivers. The status for QKD systems with imperfect light sources is however less satisfactory, in the sense that the resulting secure key rates are often overly dependent on the quality of state preparation. This is especially the case when the channel loss is high. Very recently, to overcome this limitation, Tamaki et al proposed a QKD protocol based on the so-called 'rejected data analysis', and showed that its security—in the limit of infinitely long keys—is almost independent of any encoding flaw in the qubit space, being this protocol compatible with the decoy state method. Here, as a step towards practical QKD, we show that a similar conclusion is reached in the finite-key regime, even when the intensity of the light source is unstable. More concretely, we derive security bounds for a wide class of realistic light sources and show that the bounds are also efficient in the presence of high channel loss. Our results strongly suggest the feasibility of long distance provably secure communication with imperfect light sources.

arXiv:1504.08151•New Journal of Physics•Sep 10, 2015•61 citations

Measurement-device-independent Quantum Cryptography

Zhiyuan Tang

Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two legitimate parties to share a secret key even in the presence of an eavesdropper. The unconditional security of QKD is based on the fundamental laws of quantum physics. Original security proofs of QKD are based on a few assumptions, e.g., perfect single photon sources and perfect single-photon detectors. However, practical implementations of QKD systems do not fully comply with such assumptions due to technical limitations. The gap between theory and implementations leads to security loopholes in most QKD systems, and several attacks have been launched on sophisticated QKD systems. Particularly, the detectors have been found to be the most vulnerable part of QKD. Much effort has been put to build side-channel-free QKD systems. Solutions such as security patches and device-independent QKD have been proposed. However, the former are normally ad-hoc, and cannot close unidentified loopholes. The latter, while having the advantages of removing all assumptions on devices, is impractical to implement today. Measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) turns out to be a promising solution to the security problem of QKD. In MDI-QKD, all security loopholes, including those yet-to-be discovered, have been removed from the detectors, the most critical part in QKD. In this thesis, we investigate issues related to the practical implementation and security of MDI-QKD. We first present a demonstration of polarization-encoding MDI-QKD. Taking finite key effect into account, we achieve a secret key rate of 0.005 bit per second (bps) over 10 km spooled telecom fiber, and a 1600-bit key is distributed. This work, together with other demonstrations, shows the practicality of MDI-QKD. Next we investigate a critical assumption of MDI-QKD: perfect state preparation. We apply the loss-tolerant QKD protocol and adapt it to MDI-QKD to quantify information leakage due to imperfect state preparation. We then present an experimental demonstration of MDI-QKD over 10 km and 40 km of spooled fiber, which for the first time considers the impact of inaccurate polarization state preparation on the secret key rate. This would not have been possible under previous security proofs, given the same amount of state preparation flaws.

•Nov 1, 2016•1 citation

Quantum Key Distribution with Imperfections: Recent Advances in Security Proofs

Patrick Andriolo, Esteban Vasquez, Elizabeth Agudelo +3 more

In contrast to classical public-key cryptosystems, where the security of encoded messages relies on on computational assumptions, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables two distant parties to establish a shared secret key that, when combined with a one-time pad, provides information-theoretically secure encryption, provided that the QKD protocol is supported by a rigorous security proof. In the last decades, security proofs robust against a wide range of eavesdropping strategies have established the theoretical soundness of several QKD protocols. However, most proofs are based on idealized models of the physical systems involved in such protocols and often include assumptions that are not satisfied in practical implementations. This mismatch creates a gap between theoretical security guarantees and actual experimental realizations, making QKD protocols vulnerable to attacks. To ensure the security of real-world QKD systems, it is therefore essential to account for imperfections in security analyses. In this article, we present an overview of recent analytical and numerical developments in QKD security proofs, which provide a versatile approach for incorporating imperfections and re-establishing the security of quantum communication protocols under realistic conditions.

quant-pharXiv:2602.05057•Brazilian Journal of Physics•Feb 6, 2026•2 citations
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers an approach for secure communication over quantum channels, based on the principles of quantum mechanics. However, the inevitable imperfections in QKD systems can introduce critical vulnerabilities, posing significant challenges to the deployment of QKD in terms of both practical security and performance. In this work, we present a comprehensive security analysis of QKD in the practical scenarios involving imperfections in modulation spaces. Specifically, our analysis focuses on the imperfections related to encoding, intensity modulation, and their characterization. We provide a unified framework based on the operator dominance method to overcome these issues and achieve a tight estimation of the secret key rate (SKR). The simulation results show that the SKR in practical scenarios, with parameters characterized from commercial QKD systems, closely matches the SKR under ideal conditions. In the finite case, the maximum transmission distance can reach up to 250 km with total pulse number N=1012N=10^{12}N=1012 and the SKR closely approaches the asymptotic limit up to 250 km with N=1014N=10^{14}N=1014. This validates the robustness of our method against imperfections in state preparation and characterization. Furthermore, the feasibility and robustness of method in measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD have also been demonstrated. Our analysis not only promotes advancements in enhancing practical security and performance but also highlights the feasibility of deploying QKD for actual applications.
The paper addresses security analysis for QKD when encoding and intensity modulation are imperfect and their experimental characterization is uncertain. It seeks key-rate bounds that use characterized source states while allowing those states to vary within specified uncertainty sets, rather than relying only on worst-case modulation intervals.
The analysis adapts an existing operator-dominance method to single-photon, decoy-state, and measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD. Virtual phase-error states are bounded by real linear combinations of prepared states, converting observed detection probabilities into phase-error bounds. Purifications are optimized through a positive-semidefinite Gram matrix, followed by worst-case optimization over characterization uncertainty. Analogous operator inequalities bound single-photon yields from three-intensity decoy statistics. An appendix extends the construction to MDI-QKD.
Numerical simulations use phase and intensity parameters drawn from commercial-system characterization, Gaussian fluctuation models, 80% detector efficiency, dark-count probability 10−810^{-8}10−8, and fiber loss of 0.20.20.2 dB/km. They report key rates close to ideal-source rates for the considered small characterization uncertainties. With uncertainty parameters Δ=Δ′=0.01\Delta=\Delta'=0.01Δ=Δ′=0.01, the reported finite-key transmission limit is approximately 250 km for N=1012N=10^{12}N=1012 pulses and 284 km for N=1014N=10^{14}N=1014; the latter approaches asymptotic rates through 250 km. MDI simulations report distances exceeding 375 km with Δ=Δ′=0.1\Delta=\Delta'=0.1Δ=Δ′=0.1.
The analysis assumes qubit encoding, independent and identically distributed preparation, and independent encoding and intensity modulation; conventional QKD additionally requires basis-independent inconclusive detection. It excludes source side channels and correlations between successive preparations, identifying these as future extensions. The performance results are simulations, not a new experimental demonstration.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises theoretically secure communication. However, it encounters challenges in implementation security and performance due to inevitable device imperfections. Since the proposal of measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD, the critical step toward practical security is to secure QKD with imperfect sources. The source imperfections manifest as state-preparation uncertainty (SPU) in various aspects, e.g., encoding uncertainty, intensity fluctuation, and imperfect vacuum states. Here, we perform an MDI-QKD experiment and achieve both high practical security and superior performance. We address the general form of SPU and guarantee a tight estimation of the secret key rate based on the operator dominance method. We achieve secure key distribution over 303.37 km, which not only represents the farthest distance in experiments involving SPU but also considers the most SPU scenarios. Our experimental results represent a significant step toward promoting practical and secure quantum communication.
This paper investigates the vulnerabilities inherent in existing Measurement Device Independent (MDI) Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols and proposes a novel approach to enhance their security and reliability. The core claim is that current MDI protocols are susceptible to attacks stemming from imperfections within the measurement devices themselves. The proposed protocol leverages advanced error correction and privacy amplification techniques to mitigate these vulnerabilities, resulting in a more robust communication channel. The research focuses on developing a system that minimizes the impact of measurement device imperfections, thereby significantly improving the overall security and practicality of QKD. The key improvements involve a modified Bell-state measurement strategy and a tailored error correction scheme designed for the specific challenges presented by MDI protocols. The theoretical analysis demonstrates the protocol's resilience against a broader range of attacks, offering a substantial advancement in the field of quantum cryptography. The presented framework aims to deliver a practical and secure QKD solution for sensitive applications.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security grounded in the laws of quantum mechanics rather than computational assumptions. While its theoretical foundations are robust, practical implementations necessarily deviate from the idealized models assumed in security analyses, opening the door to side-channel attacks and implementation loopholes. In particular, most research to date has focused on mitigating vulnerabilities in the measurement devices, leading to the development of Measurement-Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD) and Twin-Field QKD (TF-QKD), which effectively close all receiver-side loopholes. By contrast, the security of the source has remained less explored, despite being critical for the overall integrity of QKD systems. The goal of this thesis is to develop security proofs that explicitly account for realistic imperfections in QKD sources. Special emphasis is placed on three main aspects: correlations between emitted pulses that violate independence assumptions, imperfect phase randomization arising from practical modulation schemes, and leakage of internal settings through passive or active side channels. By formulating rigorous methods to analyze these imperfections, the work aims to provide a framework that enables practitioners to quantify and mitigate implementation risks systematically. Additionally, this thesis seeks to clarify under which conditions the commonly used decoy-state method remains secure, and to what extent source assumptions can be relaxed without compromising performance. This thesis aims to advance the understanding of how real-world deviations impact QKD security and to contribute to the development of protocols and devices. Ultimately, this work is motivated by the ambition to help bring QKD from a theoretically promising idea to a mature technology deployable with confidence in practical scenarios.
In recent years, the gap between theory and practice in quantum key distribution (QKD) has been significantly narrowed, particularly for QKD systems with arbitrarily flawed optical receivers. The status for QKD systems with imperfect light sources is however less satisfactory, in the sense that the resulting secure key rates are often overly dependent on the quality of state preparation. This is especially the case when the channel loss is high. Very recently, to overcome this limitation, Tamaki et al proposed a QKD protocol based on the so-called 'rejected data analysis', and showed that its security—in the limit of infinitely long keys—is almost independent of any encoding flaw in the qubit space, being this protocol compatible with the decoy state method. Here, as a step towards practical QKD, we show that a similar conclusion is reached in the finite-key regime, even when the intensity of the light source is unstable. More concretely, we derive security bounds for a wide class of realistic light sources and show that the bounds are also efficient in the presence of high channel loss. Our results strongly suggest the feasibility of long distance provably secure communication with imperfect light sources.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two legitimate parties to share a secret key even in the presence of an eavesdropper. The unconditional security of QKD is based on the fundamental laws of quantum physics. Original security proofs of QKD are based on a few assumptions, e.g., perfect single photon sources and perfect single-photon detectors. However, practical implementations of QKD systems do not fully comply with such assumptions due to technical limitations. The gap between theory and implementations leads to security loopholes in most QKD systems, and several attacks have been launched on sophisticated QKD systems. Particularly, the detectors have been found to be the most vulnerable part of QKD. Much effort has been put to build side-channel-free QKD systems. Solutions such as security patches and device-independent QKD have been proposed. However, the former are normally ad-hoc, and cannot close unidentified loopholes. The latter, while having the advantages of removing all assumptions on devices, is impractical to implement today. Measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) turns out to be a promising solution to the security problem of QKD. In MDI-QKD, all security loopholes, including those yet-to-be discovered, have been removed from the detectors, the most critical part in QKD. In this thesis, we investigate issues related to the practical implementation and security of MDI-QKD. We first present a demonstration of polarization-encoding MDI-QKD. Taking finite key effect into account, we achieve a secret key rate of 0.005 bit per second (bps) over 10 km spooled telecom fiber, and a 1600-bit key is distributed. This work, together with other demonstrations, shows the practicality of MDI-QKD. Next we investigate a critical assumption of MDI-QKD: perfect state preparation. We apply the loss-tolerant QKD protocol and adapt it to MDI-QKD to quantify information leakage due to imperfect state preparation. We then present an experimental demonstration of MDI-QKD over 10 km and 40 km of spooled fiber, which for the first time considers the impact of inaccurate polarization state preparation on the secret key rate. This would not have been possible under previous security proofs, given the same amount of state preparation flaws.
In contrast to classical public-key cryptosystems, where the security of encoded messages relies on on computational assumptions, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables two distant parties to establish a shared secret key that, when combined with a one-time pad, provides information-theoretically secure encryption, provided that the QKD protocol is supported by a rigorous security proof. In the last decades, security proofs robust against a wide range of eavesdropping strategies have established the theoretical soundness of several QKD protocols. However, most proofs are based on idealized models of the physical systems involved in such protocols and often include assumptions that are not satisfied in practical implementations. This mismatch creates a gap between theoretical security guarantees and actual experimental realizations, making QKD protocols vulnerable to attacks. To ensure the security of real-world QKD systems, it is therefore essential to account for imperfections in security analyses. In this article, we present an overview of recent analytical and numerical developments in QKD security proofs, which provide a versatile approach for incorporating imperfections and re-establishing the security of quantum communication protocols under realistic conditions.