arXiv:2610.05448
Performance Analysis of Multiparty GHZ-State Quantum Conference Key Agreement over Optical Fiber Channel
Dipanjan Bera, Ramniwas Meena, Neel Kanth Kundu
Abstract
Quantum conference key agreement (QCKA) enables multiple spatially separated users to establish a common key with composable information-theoretic security by exploiting multipartite quantum correlations. Greenberger--Horne--Zeilinger (GHZ) states are a natural resource for this task, but their distribution over optical fiber is degraded by transmission loss, polarization decoherence, and detector imperfections. We investigate the finite-key performance of an $N$-party GHZ-based QCKA system using the $N$-BB84 protocol, where each optical link is modeled by extending the bipartite erasure--Pauli channel to incorporate detector dark counts. We characterize the impact of this quantum channel on the shared GHZ state and derive closed-form expressions for the error rates. The analytical results reveal that the local bit-error rate depends only on transmissivity and dark counts, while the global phase-error rate compounds over all $N-1$ links and therefore degrades faster with both distance and the number of parties. These error rates are integrated into a finite-key secret-key-rate (SKR) framework, in which we optimize the parameter-estimation probability via Brent's derivative-free method. Numerical results show that increasing fiber distance and network size reduce the achievable SKR. Furthermore, the optimized parameter-estimation probability consistently increases the SKR and extends the maximum secure distance relative to a fixed-allocation baseline, with comparison to the asymptotic limit quantifying the residual finite-key penalty.
AI Summary
The paper studies how fiber attenuation, polarization-mode dispersion (PMD), and detector dark counts affect finite-key performance of GHZ-based $N$-BB84 quantum conference key agreement. It considers a source at Alice distributing qubits to $N-1$ equidistant receivers through independent, identical links, in an actively controlled, dephasing-dominated regime. Each link is modeled by an existing erasure–Pauli channel augmented with dark counts. Propagating the GHZ density matrix and conditioning on all receivers detecting yields joint detection probability $(\eta')^{N-1}$, where $\eta'=\eta+(1-\eta)p_{\mathrm{dc}}$. The derived pairwise bit-error rate is $Q_{AB_i}=(1-\eta/\eta')/2$, independent of party number and dephasing. The global phase-error rate is $Q_X=[1-(\eta e^{-d/L_{\mathrm{DH}}}/\eta')^{N-1}]/2$, showing multiplicative degradation across links. These expressions are inserted into an established composable finite-key bound; the test-round fraction is optimized numerically using Brent’s method. For blocks of $10^6$ rounds, attenuation $0.2$ dB/km, dark-count probability $10^{-3}$, bandwidth $100$ GHz, and PMD coefficient $0.1$ ps/$\sqrt{\mathrm{km}}$, optimization increases the reported secure-distance limit from $85.17$ to $94.19$ km for three parties and from $54.11$ to $69.34$ km for six parties, relative to a fixed test fraction of $0.02$. Corresponding asymptotic limits are $98.00$ and $76.55$ km. The analysis assumes synchronized bases supplied by private pre-shared randomness and homogeneous links. Unequal receiver distances and channel conditions are explicitly left for future work.
Central claim may not hold: The finite-key calculation treats all distributed GHZ rounds as successful detections, although at the reported six-party cutoff a million transmission attempts yield only about 0.13 all-party detections on average. The claimed preshared-randomness deduction subtracts h(p)/L per round even though the specified length-L independent secret basis sequence requires Lh(p) bits of entropy, absent an additional recycling mechanism. The displayed channel action incorrectly adds an erasure term to trace-zero off-diagonal operators, although this error disappears after detection projection and leaves the conditional QBER formulas intact.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.
- Comments
- Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Communications [Under Review]