arXiv:2610.04667
Quantum-State Oblivious Transfer over Quantum Erasure Channels
Remi A. Chou
Abstract
We study quantum-state oblivious transfer over the quantum erasure channel under information-theoretic security guarantees. Specifically, Alice holds two quantum systems, Bob wishes to recover one of them, and the parties have access to independent channel uses and authenticated public classical communication, with no initial shared entanglement. We consider both honest-but-curious and malicious behavior. We establish finite-blocklength converse and achievability bounds, which match in the honest-but-curious setting. The malicious setting construction combines interactive hashing with tests of whether Bob received selected channel outputs, and distributes each input across several qubits so that erasures conceal an entire input from a dishonest receiver, even when the inputs are entangled with an external reference. We also derive fixed-error asymptotic expansions and show that both malicious and honest-but-curious settings have the same capacity.
AI Summary
The paper studies information-theoretic oblivious transfer of quantum states using $n$ independent uses of a qubit erasure channel with erasure probability $\epsilon$, authenticated public classical communication, and no initial shared entanglement. Alice holds two $m$-qubit inputs, possibly entangled with an external reference; Bob should recover one while hiding his choice and learning nothing additional about the other. Both honest-but-curious and malicious behavior are considered. For honest-but-curious parties, the maximum message size is exactly the largest integer $m\leq\lfloor n/2\rfloor$ satisfying $\Pr[m\leq\operatorname{Bin}(n,\epsilon)\leq n-m]\geq1-\delta$, where $\delta$ bounds abort probability. Achievability generates Bell pairs through the channel and teleports the chosen input through received positions and the other through erased positions. The converse combines Schmidt-rank growth with a purification and environment-information argument: successful executions require at least $m$ received and $m$ erased uses. For malicious parties, interactive hashing, possession tests, and random Clifford encoding give the lower bound $m\geq\max\{0,\lfloor n\min\{\epsilon,1-\epsilon\}-16\sqrt{n\ln(256/\min\{\delta,\nu\})}\rfloor\}$, where $\nu$ bounds real–ideal trace-distance error. Both settings therefore have capacity $\min\{\epsilon,1-\epsilon\}$. Explicit Gaussian second-order terms are derived for honest-but-curious transfer; the malicious result gives only an $O(\sqrt n)$ remainder at fixed errors. The characterization is restricted to this erasure-channel resource model. Honest success requires exact recovery and perfect privacy, including a choice-privacy condition imposed separately for compatible erasure patterns. Malicious security allows aborts and one corrupted party fixed before execution; its finite-blocklength bounds do not match.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.