arXiv:2610.04359
A Cheat-Sensitive Primitive for Destination-Private Quantum Routing
S. F. E. Oliviero, S. Onofri, V. Giovannetti
Abstract
Quantum networks will rely on intermediate nodes to distribute entanglement, but the same nodes may learn which users are being connected. We introduce a minimal two-call routing primitive in which a user, Alice, establishes an entangled link with one of several clients while testing whether the provider, Bob, has disturbed a coherently encoded request. The construction adapts the hidden-order mechanism of quantum private queries: one call contains a direct request, the other a coherent superposition of the desired and null addresses, and Alice keeps their order secret. A private matching qubit held by the selected client restores the coherent test state after a favorable Bell-measurement outcome, so that Alice can test the returned query without any further operation by Bob. The claim is deliberately limited. The protocol shows that a routing request can carry a physical cheating test, and it detects an explicit destination-reading attack with nonzero probability. It does not yet provide a quantitative information-disturbance tradeoff, composable security, or certification of an unmeasured output against arbitrary attacks. We also characterize the exact perfect-pass limit, in which Bob's residual state, averaged over the private matching states, is independent of the destination.
AI Summary
Can an untrusted entanglement router learn a requested destination only at the risk of detectable disturbance? This paper adapts the hidden-order mechanism of quantum private queries to a two-call routing primitive. Alice sequentially sends one direct destination request and one coherent superposition of the destination and a null address, hiding their order. Bob’s honest operation is an address-controlled swap using two pre-shared singlets per client. A private matching qubit at the selected client, followed by a favorable Bell-measurement outcome, restores the coherent request so Alice can projectively test it. Honest runs are conclusive with probability $1/4$; conditioned on that herald, the checks pass deterministically and the direct call supplies a singlet. Measuring both query addresses reveals the destination but dephases the trap: detection occurs with probability $1/2$ conditioned on the herald, or $1/8$ per attempt. An exact perfect-pass argument, using sequentiality and linearity, establishes destination independence of Bob’s residual state after averaging over independently sampled private matching states with mean $I/2$. This result assumes that both hidden orders preserve the trap, direct address, and direct singlet exactly. The primitive does not establish a quantitative information–disturbance tradeoff, composable security, or certification of the unmeasured output against arbitrary attacks. It assumes ideal initial singlets, trusted user/client devices, private authenticated classical channels, and fixed-pattern cover traffic. Loss, noise, malicious clients, and repeated destination use are outside its scope; no approximate-pass continuity bound is provided.
Language models were only used to edit the manuscript. All results were derived by hand by the authors.
Error found: The abstract's perfect-pass destination-privacy statement omits the essential assumption that the retained direct output is an exact singlet, which the protocol's stated acceptance tests do not certify.
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