arXiv:2610.02093
One-Way Quantum Symmetric Private Information Retrieval Protocol From A Single Database Server Using NISQ Devices
Xiang Zou, H. F. Chau
Abstract
Symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR) lets an inquirer obtain one specific bit only, without leaking any information about its index to the database owner. With a single server, this is impossible for parties with unrestricted quantum power. We show that it becomes possible, with information-theoretic security, when the server and the user hold only noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) devices without long-term quantum memory and measure each qubit on arrival, while the eavesdropper remains all-powerful; this is a stricter form of the memory restriction of the bounded- and noisy-quantum-storage models. The server sends BB84 states one way; the user discriminates them unambiguously and so knows a random subset of the bits. After a joint random permutation into blocks, the user announces the conclusive locations of one privately chosen block, and the server hashes and takes a random parity of these locations in every block; the permutation makes it exponentially unlikely that one set of locations fits two blocks. We prove secrecy against the eavesdropper, database privacy through an explicit size rule for the announced set, and user privacy against a server who prepares the prescribed BB84 states and announces truthfully, exactly for single photons and up to a small multi-photon term over a tolerated noise channel. The only addition to BB84 equipment is a passive linear-optical measurement with one ancillary mode. For a $10^{4}$-bit database and database privacy $10^{-6}$, blocks of about a thousand qubits suffice over a tolerated noise channel for a user who applies the prescribed measurement; certifying an arbitrary memoryless user and committing to the permutation need larger auxiliary transmissions, which we quantify with finite keys. Database privacy extends to decoy-state weak coherent pulses, and simulations show that the bound is nearly tight.
AI Summary
The paper asks whether single-server symmetric private information retrieval can be implemented with statistical security under quantum-storage restrictions. It proposes a prepare-and-measure protocol with one-way quantum communication, an authenticated classical channel, and an unbounded external eavesdropper. The participants lack long-term quantum memory; a dishonest client must additionally measure qubits individually, not jointly. BB84 states and unambiguous state discrimination give the honest client a random known subset, with ideal conclusive probability $1-1/\sqrt2\approx0.293$. A jointly generated permutation partitions the records into blocks. The client announces conclusive locations from one block; the server applies those locations to every block, publishes error-correction checks, and extracts one parity per block. QKD-derived pads protect the database transmission and query shift from the eavesdropper. Database privacy follows from an exact parity-leakage calculation and bounds on pairwise overlaps of known locations. For a $10^4$-bit database and database-privacy error $10^{-6}$, reported block lengths are approximately $884$ without noise and $3962$ at a $2\%$ conclusive-bit error rate. Simulations test overlap statistics and an explicit two-block attack. The guarantees have distinct qualifications. Index privacy assumes prescribed BB84 preparations and truthful set confirmations; arbitrary server deviations are not covered. The arbitrary-client measurement certificate is noiseless and requires $10^8$–$10^{10}$ test positions. Storage-model commitment adds substantial permutation overhead. Weak-coherent-pulse database privacy is analyzed using decoys, but requires low intensity and larger tests; index privacy there additionally relies on a laser-source assumption and simulations.
Central claim may not hold: The abstract omits the state-symmetry and position-homogeneity conditions under which the paper proves exact single-photon user privacy over a noisy channel. The paper's noisy-channel SPIR guarantee does not cover an arbitrary individually measuring dishonest user, because its receiver-certification theorem is restricted to a noiseless channel and its noisy-channel examples assume the prescribed measurement.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.
- Comments
- 40 pages, 7 figures