arXiv:2610.01025
Device-Independent Conference Keys from Parity-Extended Games
Suvradip Chakraborty, Ronak Ramachandran, Aniruddha Sen
Abstract
Device-independent conference key agreement (DI-CKA) lets a group of parties establish a shared secret key from untrusted quantum devices, with security certified by non-locality. Existing DI-CKA protocols are each built around a single Bell inequality, typically a multiparty variant of the CHSH game. DI-QKD protocols, in contrast, have been built from a much richer landscape of non-local games, and it has remained unclear how to carry this landscape over to the conference setting. We introduce $\textit{Parity-$G$ games}$, which extend any two-player game $G$ to $N$ players, for every $N$, provided $G$ has an optimal strategy in which one player measures Pauli observables. The extension preserves the quantum and classical values of $G$, and the security of the resulting $N$-party protocol follows from an analysis of the two-player game alone. Our framework recovers the Parity-CHSH game of Ribeiro, Murta and Wehner (Phys. Rev. A, 2018) as a special case. Applied to the Mermin--Peres Magic Square Game, it yields a new $N$-player pseudo-telepathy game, the $\textit{Parity Magic Square Game}$, which ideal devices win in every round. We use it to construct the $\textit{first}$ DI-CKA protocol based on a pseudo-telepathy game. We prove the protocol secure against coherent attacks. It produces up to two key bits per round, and at low noise its key rate exceeds that of the DI-CKA protocol based on the Parity-CHSH game.
AI Summary
The paper asks how to transfer two-party nonlocal-game constructions to device-independent conference key agreement (DI-CKA), while keeping security analysis tractable as the number of parties grows. It defines $N$-player “Parity-$G$” extensions for games with an optimal strategy using EPR pairs and commuting Pauli measurements on Alice’s side. Conference-key generation additionally requires a computational-basis key input. Auxiliary players’ output parities specify corrections to Alice’s answers; measuring GHZ states supplies an honest strategy. The extension preserves both classical and quantum game values. Its main security reduction shows that any convex lower bound on Alice’s key-output entropy for the two-party game also applies to its parity extension, independently of $N$. The proof conditions on auxiliary outputs, relabels Alice’s measurements, and applies convexity. For the magic-square game, the construction gives an $N$-party pseudo-telepathy game with quantum value $1$ and classical value $8/9$. The associated protocol yields up to two key bits per round. Security against coherent attacks is established using numerical two-party entropy bounds, generalized entropy accumulation, and privacy amplification; one reported affine bound is $H(A|E)\geq33.4\omega-31.47$. Under global depolarizing noise, the reported asymptotic rate exceeds Parity-CHSH below approximately $5\%$ noise. Limitations include non-tight numerical entropy bounds, declining rates with party number under local noise, and an unresolved resource-matched comparison with parallel CHSH protocols. An explicit attack reveals Alice’s entire key while winning with probability $5/9+(4/9)\cos^2(\pi/8)\approx0.935$.
It was also used to aid in proofreading and some parts of writing the paper. It did not contribute to any of the main ideas or conceptual insights of this work.
Central claim may not hold: The abstract's Pauli-strategy applicability condition omits the additional tested, full-rank Z-type key input required by the paper's general conference-key construction. The magic-square key-rate calculation subtracts a one-bit binary entropy instead of the conditional entropy of the entire two-bit raw-key symbol, overstating its rates under the stated noise models. The coherent-attack secrecy theorem lacks a justified acceptance-conditioned entropy-accumulation argument and a protocol-specific tradeoff accounting for key/test rounds and public disclosures.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.
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- 32 pages, 4 figures