arXiv:2609.39835
A self-tallying quantum anonymous voting protocol for multiple-selection elections
Guang-Bao Xu, Meng-Na Li, Yu-Guang Yang, Dong-Huan Jiang
Abstract
Self-tallying quantum anonymous voting (SQAV) has drawn considerable attention since it was proposed. However, constrained by design challenges, all existing protocols only accommodate single-selection voting and cannot support multi-selection voting. In this paper, we propose a SQAV protocol with multi-selection voting functionality. In our protocol, $nm$ $n$-particle entangled states are equally divided into $n$ groups, and the $n$ particles in each entangled state are delivered to $n$ voters, one particle per voter. Each voter obtains $n$ voting vectors by sequentially measuring all his (or her) particles that belong to $n$ different group, and then encodes his or her voting information into the vector corresponding to the secret index. Due to entanglement correlation, each voter can verify whether his or her ballot is correct through computation, while any participant can obtain the vote count for each candidate through computation. Our protocol satisfies self-tallying, nonreusability, verifiability, and fairness.
AI Summary
The paper addresses self-tallying quantum anonymous voting for elections in which each voter may select multiple candidates. It proposes a protocol for $n$ voters and $m$ candidates, representing each ballot as a binary vector $v_i\in\{0,1\}^m$, with an optional selection limit $\sum_r v_{r,i}\leq L$. A trusted distributor prepares $1+nm+n\delta$ entangled states, each comprising $n$ particles of dimension $n$. Computational-basis measurements of one state assign distinct secret indices to voters. Fourier-basis measurements of $nm$ states generate random ballot-masking vectors whose components sum to zero modulo $n$. Each voter adds their ballot to the vector group identified by their secret index, then simultaneously broadcasts all encoded vectors. Summing within each group recovers an individual ballot without its voter identity; summing these ballots yields the tally. The information-state resource cost, excluding security checks, is $n(nm+1)\log_2 n$ qubit equivalents. Correctness follows algebraically from the measurement correlations. The paper argues anonymity, nonreusability, individual verifiability, and fairness, and gives a random-sampling analysis: an attack disturbing $x$ states avoids all check states with probability $\binom{1+nm}{x}/\binom{1+nm+n\delta}{x}$. The security model assumes a correct, noncolluding trusted distributor that keeps particle assignments secret, authenticated classical communication, simultaneous broadcast, and at least two honest voters. Privacy means unlinkability of recovered ballots, not concealment of their contents after publication. The analysis is theoretical; no implementation or experimental results are reported.
Central claim may not hold: The protocol does not enforce binary ballots or the maximum L selections: a dishonest voter can encode an invalid ballot in their own slot without failing any honest voter's prescribed verification. An interceptor can measure deterministic relative computational-basis indices without disturbing the distributed states, and one colluding voter's secret index then reveals all voter–ballot associations despite the stated security assumptions.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.