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arXiv:2609.38387

On Removing Interaction from Quantum Proofs

Nicholas Spooner, Max Tromanhauser

quant-phcs.CRSubmitted Sep 29, 2026• Announced Oct 1, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

An important open question in quantum cryptography is the construction of publicly-verifiable NIZKs for QMA. Classically, one can construct NIZKs for NP in the random oracle model (and sometimes in the standard model) by compiling an honest-verifier ZK (HVZK) $Σ$-protocol for NP using the Fiat-Shamir transformation. Broadbent and Grilo introduced a quantum analog of a $Σ$-protocol (which they call a $Ξ$-protocol) in which the prover's first message is quantum, and show that HVZK $Ξ$-protocols exist for QMA. However, it is not clear how to compile such protocols into NIZKs in the (Q)ROM, because the Fiat-Shamir transformation seems to be incompatible with quantum messages. In this work we give formal evidence that this is indeed the case: we show that if generic "Fiat-Shamir-like" compilers for quantum protocols exist in the QROM (with small completeness and soundness error) then QMA = BQP.

AI Summary

The paper asks whether interaction can be generically removed from public-coin quantum proof protocols, motivated by publicly verifiable non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments for QMA. It formalizes quantum non-interactivity compilers (QNICs): black-box transformations from three-message $\Xi$-protocols to publicly verifiable non-interactive quantum arguments. A compiler is straightline when its prover and verifier algorithms each query their corresponding protocol oracle once. The main result rules out universal straightline QNICs with sufficiently small errors unless $\mathrm{QMA}=\mathrm{BQP}$. Assuming quantum commitments relative to an efficiently simulatable unitary-oracle distribution, a compiler with completeness error $\varepsilon$ and soundness error $\delta$ implies this collapse whenever $\varepsilon+2\delta<1-2/(3\sqrt{3})-\kappa$, with an inverse-polynomial gap $\kappa$. The threshold is approximately $0.615$. In the QROM and quantum Haar random oracle model, commitments exist unconditionally, so no additional commitment assumption is needed. The proof encrypts the first message of a QMA $\Xi$-protocol using quantum ciphertext authentication, producing a family indexed by encryption keys hidden from the black-box compiler. Authentication permits deferring the plaintext choice until after the challenge; special honest-verifier zero knowledge then supplies witness-free transcripts. Uncomputing the compiled verifier yields an efficient decision procedure. Supporting results establish that ciphertext authentication preserves encryption randomness and remains secure when keys and randomness are revealed after acceptance. The barrier does not cover non-straightline compilers, larger errors, designated verification, or compilers restricted to particular protocol subclasses. It therefore does not rule out publicly verifiable QMA NIZKs generally.

No sign of AI-generated textAI use disclosed
The authors used ChatGPT (v5.6 Sol and v6 Astra) as a sounding board, for proofreading, and for some of the technical ideas.

Central claim may not hold: The abstract's impossibility claim omits the essential straightline restriction: the theorem rules out universal black-box compilers using one prover query and one verifier query, while non-straightline compilers remain explicitly open.

Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.

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An important open question in quantum cryptography is the construction of publicly-verifiable NIZKs for QMA. Classically, one can construct NIZKs for NP in the random oracle model (and sometimes in the standard model) by compiling an honest-verifier ZK (HVZK) ΣΣΣ-protocol for NP using the Fiat-Shamir transformation. Broadbent and Grilo introduced a quantum analog of a ΣΣΣ-protocol (which they call a ΞΞΞ-protocol) in which the prover's first message is quantum, and show that HVZK ΞΞΞ-protocols exist for QMA. However, it is not clear how to compile such protocols into NIZKs in the (Q)ROM, because the Fiat-Shamir transformation seems to be incompatible with quantum messages. In this work we give formal evidence that this is indeed the case: we show that if generic "Fiat-Shamir-like" compilers for quantum protocols exist in the QROM (with small completeness and soundness error) then QMA = BQP.
The paper asks whether interaction can be generically removed from public-coin quantum proof protocols, motivated by publicly verifiable non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments for QMA. It formalizes quantum non-interactivity compilers (QNICs): black-box transformations from three-message Ξ\XiΞ-protocols to publicly verifiable non-interactive quantum arguments. A compiler is straightline when its prover and verifier algorithms each query their corresponding protocol oracle once.
The main result rules out universal straightline QNICs with sufficiently small errors unless QMA=BQP\mathrm{QMA}=\mathrm{BQP}QMA=BQP. Assuming quantum commitments relative to an efficiently simulatable unitary-oracle distribution, a compiler with completeness error ε\varepsilonε and soundness error δ\deltaδ implies this collapse whenever ε+2δ<1−2/(33)−κ\varepsilon+2\delta<1-2/(3\sqrt{3})-\kappaε+2δ<1−2/(33​)−κ, with an inverse-polynomial gap κ\kappaκ. The threshold is approximately 0.6150.6150.615. In the QROM and quantum Haar random oracle model, commitments exist unconditionally, so no additional commitment assumption is needed.
The proof encrypts the first message of a QMA Ξ\XiΞ-protocol using quantum ciphertext authentication, producing a family indexed by encryption keys hidden from the black-box compiler. Authentication permits deferring the plaintext choice until after the challenge; special honest-verifier zero knowledge then supplies witness-free transcripts. Uncomputing the compiled verifier yields an efficient decision procedure. Supporting results establish that ciphertext authentication preserves encryption randomness and remains secure when keys and randomness are revealed after acceptance.
The barrier does not cover non-straightline compilers, larger errors, designated verification, or compilers restricted to particular protocol subclasses. It therefore does not rule out publicly verifiable QMA NIZKs generally.
We initiate the study of quantum Interactive Oracle Proofs (qIOPs), a generalization of both quantum Probabilistically Checkable Proofs and quantum Interactive Proofs, as well as a quantum analogue of classical Interactive Oracle Proofs. In the model of quantum Interactive Oracle Proofs, we allow multiple rounds of quantum interaction between the quantum prover and the quantum verifier, but the verifier has limited access to quantum resources. This includes both queries to the prover's messages and the complexity of the quantum circuits applied by the verifier. The question of whether QMA admits a quantum interactive oracle proof system is a relaxation of the quantum PCP Conjecture. We show the following two main constructions of qIOPs, both of which are unconditional: - We construct a qIOP for QMA in which the verifier shares polynomially many EPR pairs with the prover at the start of the protocol and reads only a constant number of qubits from the prover's messages. - We provide a stronger construction of qIOP for QMA in which the verifier not only reads a constant number of qubits but also operates on a constant number of qubits overall, including those in their private registers. However, in this stronger setting, the communication complexity becomes exponential. This leaves open the question of whether strong qIOPs for QMA, with polynomial communication complexity, exist. As a key component of our construction, we introduce a novel single prover many-qubits test, which may be of independent interest.
Whether some problems require quantum proofs has been a central question in quantum complexity (Aharonov and Naveh, 2002; Aaronson and Kuperberg, CCC 2007). Recently, breakthrough work of Bostanci, Haferkamp, Nirkhe, and Zhandry (STOC 2026), followed by a simpler separation due to Bostanci, Huang, and Vaikuntanathan (FOCS 2026), established a classical oracle separation between QMA\mathsf{QMA}QMA and QCMA\mathsf{QCMA}QCMA. However, while they are not in QCMA\mathsf{QCMA}QCMA, the problems used in both separations still lie in AM\mathsf{AM}AM: they admit a two-message public-coin proof system with a classical verifier. In this work, we ask whether some problems truly require quantum proofs. More formally, we consider the complexity class QCIP\mathsf{QCIP}QCIP, introduced by Buhrman, Le Gall, and Weggemans (2024), where an efficient quantum verifier interacts with an unbounded prover over a classical channel for an arbitrary polynomial number of rounds. We construct a classical oracle O\mathcal{O}O such that QMAO⊈QCIPO\mathsf{QMA}^{\mathcal{O}}\not\subseteq\mathsf{QCIP}^{\mathcal{O}}QMAO⊆QCIPO, thus showing that some languages indeed require quantum proofs, with no classical replacements. Since QCMA=QCIP[1]\mathsf{QCMA}=\mathsf{QCIP}[1]QCMA=QCIP[1], this strengthens the earlier QMA\mathsf{QMA}QMA--QCMA\mathsf{QCMA}QCMA separations, which now follow as a special case of our result. As a technical contribution, we extend to the complexity theory setting the techniques developed by Cakan, Goyal, and Shmueli (CRYPTO 2026) in the context of cryptography for analyzing classically interacting quantum machines. We believe this may be of independent interest.
The widely held belief that BQP strictly contains BPP raises fundamental questions: Upcoming generations of quantum computers might already be too large to be simulated classically. Is it possible to experimentally test that these systems perform as they should, if we cannot efficiently compute predictions for their behavior? Vazirani has asked: If predicting Quantum Mechanical systems requires exponential resources, is QM a falsifiable theory? In cryptographic settings, an untrusted future company wants to sell a quantum computer or perform a delegated quantum computation. Can the customer be convinced of correctness without the ability to compare results to predictions? To answer these questions, we define Quantum Prover Interactive Proofs (QPIP). Whereas in standard Interactive Proofs the prover is computationally unbounded, here our prover is in BQP, representing a quantum computer. The verifier models our current computational capabilities: it is a BPP machine, with access to few qubits. Our main theorem can be roughly stated as: "Any language in BQP has a QPIP, and moreover, a fault tolerant one". We provide two proofs. The simpler one uses a new (possibly of independent interest) quantum authentication scheme (QAS) based on random Clifford elements. This QPIP however, is not fault tolerant. Our second protocol uses polynomial codes QAS due to BCGHS, combined with quantum fault tolerance and multiparty quantum computation techniques. A slight modification of our constructions makes the protocol "blind": the quantum computation and input are unknown to the prover. After we have derived the results, we have learned that Broadbent at al. have independently derived "universal blind quantum computation" using completely different methods. Their construction implicitly implies similar implications.
Since the introduction of the complexity class QMA as a quantum-verifier analogue of NP (Kitaev, 1997), many have wondered whether quantum proofs are necessary or classical proofs suffice - that is, whether QMA = QCMA or QCMA != QMA (Aharonov and Naveh, 2002; Aaronson and Kuperberg, CCC '07). This longstanding question was recently answered by works of Bostanci, Haferkamp, Nirkhe, and Zhandry (STOC '26) and Bostanci, Huang, and Vaikuntanathan (FOCS '26), which showed that quantum proofs are more powerful than classical ones in the classical-oracle setting. However, it remains unclear what exactly makes quantum proofs more powerful than classical ones. In the information-theoretic setting, a family of quantum states is not classicalizable if and only if it is unclonable. Indeed, these recent works also explicitly highlight the unclonability of their quantum proofs as a key mechanism behind their separations, and their arguments crucially rely on this property. This raises the question of whether unclonability is necessary for quantum proofs to be more powerful than classical ones. In this work, we show that even clonable quantum proofs can be more powerful than classical ones relative to a classical oracle by constructing a classical oracle O such that QCMA^O != ClonableQMA^O. This resolves the open question of Nehoran and Zhandry (ITCS '24), who established the analogous separation relative to a quantum oracle. We also show a classical-oracle separation between BQP/clonableqpoly and BQP/poly, and give applications of our results to quantum cryptography.
We initiate the study of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) arguments for languages in QMA. Our first main result is the following: if Learning With Errors (LWE) is hard for quantum computers, then any language in QMA has an NIZK argument with preprocessing. The preprocessing in our argument system consists of (i) the generation of a CRS and (ii) a single (instance-independent) quantum message from verifier to prover. The instance-dependent phase of our argument system involves only a single classical message from prover to verifier. Importantly, verification in our protocol is entirely classical, and the verifier needs not have quantum memory; its only quantum actions are in the preprocessing phase. Our second contribution is to extend the notion of a classical proof of knowledge to the quantum setting. We introduce the notions of arguments and proofs of quantum knowledge (AoQK/PoQK), and we show that our non-interactive argument system satisfies the definition of an AoQK. In particular, we explicitly construct an extractor which can recover a quantum witness from any prover which is successful in our protocol. Finally, we show that any language in QMA has an (interactive) proof of quantum knowledge.
The Fiat-Shamir transformation is a famous technique to turn identification schemes into signature schemes. The derived scheme is provably secure in the random-oracle model against classical adversaries. Still, the technique has also been suggested to be used in connection with quantum-immune identification schemes, in order to get quantum-immune signature schemes. However, a recent paper by Boneh et al. (Asiacrypt 2011) has raised the issue that results in the random-oracle model may not be immediately applicable to quantum adversaries, because such adversaries should be allowed to query the random oracle in superposition. It has been unclear if the Fiat-Shamir technique is still secure in this quantum oracle model (QROM). Here, we discuss that giving proofs for the Fiat-Shamir transformation in the QROM is presumably hard. We show that there cannot be black-box extractors, as long as the underlying quantum-immune identification scheme is secure against active adversaries and the first message of the prover is independent of its witness. Most schemes are of this type. We then discuss that for some schemes one may be able to resurrect the Fiat-Shamir result in the QROM by modifying the underlying protocol first. We discuss in particular a version of the Lyubashevsky scheme which is provably secure in the QROM.