arXiv:2609.36207
What is Physics For? Why Classical Physics is not the Limit of Quantum Mechanics
Adam Frank, Jacques L. Pienaar, Michel Bitbol, Harald Wiltsche, Gabriela Barreto Lemos, Marcelo Gleiser, Marcus Appleby
Abstract
Quantum mechanics is justifiably held to be the most successful physical theory ever created; yet no universally accepted interpretation of its mathematical formalism exists after a century of debate. We examine the specific claim that classical physics stands as the low-action limit of quantum mechanics, arguing that the deep interpretive difficulties exposed by the quantum formalism, the measurement problem, the subject-object divide, and the nature of scientific representation, were already latent in classical physics, constituting what we call a blind spot of objectivity. Taking quantum theory as an invitation to re-examine the implicit metaphysical commitments bundled with 'classical physics', we explore two key issues-the objective/subjective split and the nature of theoretical representation-and argue that quantum mechanics does not represent a break with classical physics per se but rather brings previously unacknowledged philosophical assumptions into the limelight. We discuss the London-Bauer interpretation and QBism as exemplars of interpretations that embrace this broader reconceptualisation.
AI Summary
The paper asks whether classical physics can be understood as a limit of quantum mechanics when “classical physics” includes assumptions about observer-independent objects and scientific representation, rather than only equations and predictions. It distinguishes domain-specific mathematical correspondence from continuity between the philosophical frameworks used to interpret the theories. Through historical and philosophical argument, it develops the claim that quantum mechanics exposes problems already present in classical physics: how objectivity depends on situated observers, and how theoretical models relate to reality. Drawing on Kant, phenomenology, and discussions of scientific representation, it proposes understanding objectivity as validity or invariance across a community of agents, rather than access to reality independently of agents. It also distinguishes the constitution of observable meaning through interaction from the claim that observers create reality. The London–Bauer interpretation and QBism serve as examples of approaches that revise the philosophical premises of both classical and quantum physics. A further case study concerns metrology’s shift from estimating a single true value toward expressing measurement uncertainty and ensuring coherence across methods and instruments. The central conclusion is that quantum theory need not mark a philosophical rupture with classical physics if classical physics is separated from its customary realist commitments. The treatment is interpretive, not a derivation of a classical limit: it supplies no new mathematical bounds, predictions, or experiments. The discussion of interpretations is explicitly selective, and the proposed alternatives are presented as examples rather than a unique framework.
Central claim may not hold: The abstract and Introduction reverse the usual classical-limit condition by calling large action relative to h a 'low-action limit', and the Introduction additionally gives action the incorrect dimensions energy divided by time. The claimed metaphysical obstruction to a classical limit depends explicitly on attaching a particular realist interpretation to classical physics, rather than establishing a failure to recover classical predictions or dynamics. The paper presents observer-dependent constitution as indispensable without establishing that competing interpretations are untenable; its London–Bauer and QBist examples support possibility, not necessity. Section 3 incorrectly treats h as a universal quantum of energy and uses that premise to argue that measurement-induced energy transfer cannot be subtracted, so its physical argument for observer–system inseparability fails. The Introduction overstates Ehrenfest's theorem because the mean force generally differs from the force evaluated at the mean position, preventing an exact closed Newtonian trajectory for expectation values.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.
- Comments
- 26 pages. This chapter will appear in a volume edited by Chris Fuchs and Jacques Pienaar