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arXiv:2609.36207

What is Physics For? Why Classical Physics is not the Limit of Quantum Mechanics

Adam Frank, Jacques L. Pienaar, Michel Bitbol, Harald Wiltsche, Gabriela Barreto Lemos, Marcelo Gleiser, Marcus Appleby

physics.hist-phquant-phSubmitted Sep 28, 2026• Announced Sep 30, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

Quantum mechanics is justifiably held to be the most successful physical theory ever created; yet no universally accepted interpretation of its mathematical formalism exists after a century of debate. We examine the specific claim that classical physics stands as the low-action limit of quantum mechanics, arguing that the deep interpretive difficulties exposed by the quantum formalism, the measurement problem, the subject-object divide, and the nature of scientific representation, were already latent in classical physics, constituting what we call a blind spot of objectivity. Taking quantum theory as an invitation to re-examine the implicit metaphysical commitments bundled with 'classical physics', we explore two key issues-the objective/subjective split and the nature of theoretical representation-and argue that quantum mechanics does not represent a break with classical physics per se but rather brings previously unacknowledged philosophical assumptions into the limelight. We discuss the London-Bauer interpretation and QBism as exemplars of interpretations that embrace this broader reconceptualisation.

AI Summary

The paper asks whether classical physics can be understood as a limit of quantum mechanics when “classical physics” includes assumptions about observer-independent objects and scientific representation, rather than only equations and predictions. It distinguishes domain-specific mathematical correspondence from continuity between the philosophical frameworks used to interpret the theories. Through historical and philosophical argument, it develops the claim that quantum mechanics exposes problems already present in classical physics: how objectivity depends on situated observers, and how theoretical models relate to reality. Drawing on Kant, phenomenology, and discussions of scientific representation, it proposes understanding objectivity as validity or invariance across a community of agents, rather than access to reality independently of agents. It also distinguishes the constitution of observable meaning through interaction from the claim that observers create reality. The London–Bauer interpretation and QBism serve as examples of approaches that revise the philosophical premises of both classical and quantum physics. A further case study concerns metrology’s shift from estimating a single true value toward expressing measurement uncertainty and ensuring coherence across methods and instruments. The central conclusion is that quantum theory need not mark a philosophical rupture with classical physics if classical physics is separated from its customary realist commitments. The treatment is interpretive, not a derivation of a classical limit: it supplies no new mathematical bounds, predictions, or experiments. The discussion of interpretations is explicitly selective, and the proposed alternatives are presented as examples rather than a unique framework.

Little sign of AI-generated textOverclaimsUnclear noveltyMissing comparisonPossible error

Central claim may not hold: The abstract and Introduction reverse the usual classical-limit condition by calling large action relative to h a 'low-action limit', and the Introduction additionally gives action the incorrect dimensions energy divided by time. The claimed metaphysical obstruction to a classical limit depends explicitly on attaching a particular realist interpretation to classical physics, rather than establishing a failure to recover classical predictions or dynamics. The paper presents observer-dependent constitution as indispensable without establishing that competing interpretations are untenable; its London–Bauer and QBist examples support possibility, not necessity. Section 3 incorrectly treats h as a universal quantum of energy and uses that premise to argue that measurement-induced energy transfer cannot be subtracted, so its physical argument for observer–system inseparability fails. The Introduction overstates Ehrenfest's theorem because the mean force generally differs from the force evaluated at the mean position, preventing an exact closed Newtonian trajectory for expectation values.

Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.

Comments
26 pages. This chapter will appear in a volume edited by Chris Fuchs and Jacques Pienaar

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Quantum mechanics is justifiably held to be the most successful physical theory ever created; yet no universally accepted interpretation of its mathematical formalism exists after a century of debate. We examine the specific claim that classical physics stands as the low-action limit of quantum mechanics, arguing that the deep interpretive difficulties exposed by the quantum formalism, the measurement problem, the subject-object divide, and the nature of scientific representation, were already latent in classical physics, constituting what we call a blind spot of objectivity. Taking quantum theory as an invitation to re-examine the implicit metaphysical commitments bundled with 'classical physics', we explore two key issues-the objective/subjective split and the nature of theoretical representation-and argue that quantum mechanics does not represent a break with classical physics per se but rather brings previously unacknowledged philosophical assumptions into the limelight. We discuss the London-Bauer interpretation and QBism as exemplars of interpretations that embrace this broader reconceptualisation.
The paper asks whether classical physics can be understood as a limit of quantum mechanics when “classical physics” includes assumptions about observer-independent objects and scientific representation, rather than only equations and predictions. It distinguishes domain-specific mathematical correspondence from continuity between the philosophical frameworks used to interpret the theories.
Through historical and philosophical argument, it develops the claim that quantum mechanics exposes problems already present in classical physics: how objectivity depends on situated observers, and how theoretical models relate to reality. Drawing on Kant, phenomenology, and discussions of scientific representation, it proposes understanding objectivity as validity or invariance across a community of agents, rather than access to reality independently of agents. It also distinguishes the constitution of observable meaning through interaction from the claim that observers create reality.
The London–Bauer interpretation and QBism serve as examples of approaches that revise the philosophical premises of both classical and quantum physics. A further case study concerns metrology’s shift from estimating a single true value toward expressing measurement uncertainty and ensuring coherence across methods and instruments. The central conclusion is that quantum theory need not mark a philosophical rupture with classical physics if classical physics is separated from its customary realist commitments.
The treatment is interpretive, not a derivation of a classical limit: it supplies no new mathematical bounds, predictions, or experiments. The discussion of interpretations is explicitly selective, and the proposed alternatives are presented as examples rather than a unique framework.
In this work we analyze the deep link between the 20th Century positivist re-foundation of physics and the famous measurement problem of quantum mechanics. We attempt to show why this is not an "obvious" nor "self evident" problem for the theory of quanta, but rather a direct consequence of the empirical-positivist understanding of physical theories when applied to the orthodox quantum formalism. In contraposition, we discuss a representational realist account of both physical 'theories' and 'measurement' which goes back to the works of Einstein, Heisenberg and Pauli. After presenting a critical analysis of Bohr's definitions of 'measurement' we continue to discuss the way in which several contemporary approaches to QM --such as decoherence, modal interpretations and QBism-- remain committed to Bohr's general methodology. Finally, in order to expose the many inconsistencies present within the (empirical-positivist) presuppositions responsible for creating the quantum measurement problem, we show how through these same set of presuppositions it is easy to derive a completely analogous paradox for the case of classical mechanics.
ABSTRACT The paper aims to bridge the history of quantum theory with its philosophical implications. The focus is not only on the scientific underpinnings of quantum mechanics (these theories emerged as ‘ad hoc’ responses to experimental anomalies) but also on the philosophical ramifications of its probabilistic nature and indeterminacy, which differ from classical realism. The paper examines Dirac's, Bell's, and modern views, focusing on how quantum mechanics (QM) challenges traditional notions of causality, objectivity, and truth while embracing epistemological and metaphysical perspectives. Debates over collapse theories and hidden variables are discussed, as well as Putnam's philosophical outlook, which includes his trenchant involvement with realism, logic, and the measurement problem. Finally, the paper proposes that QM represents a philosophical revolution that renews our understanding of reality, knowledge, and scientific explanation, rather than simply serving as a physical theory for assessing the prospects of quantum philosophy by connecting it to broader aspects such as relativity, causality, and scientific realism.
This paper re-opens the debate on the failure of quantum mechanics to provide an understandable view of micro-reality. A critique is offered of the commonly accepted ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ of a theory that is only a mathematical approach to the level of reality characterized by atoms and electrons. This critique is based on the oldest approach to thinking about nature for over 2500 years, known as Natural Philosophy. Quantum mechanics (QM) was developed over the first quarter of the 20th Century, when scientists were enthralled by a new philosophy known as Positivism, whose foundations were based on the assumption that material objects exist only when measured by humans – This central assumption conflates epistemology (knowledge) with ontology (existence). The present critique rejects this human-centered view of reality by assuming material reality has existed long before (and will persist long after) human beings (“Realism”). The defensive view that the micro-world is too different to understand using regular thinking (and only a mathematical approach is possible) is rejected totally. At least 12 earlier QM interpretations are critically analyzed, indicating the broad interest in “what does QM mean?” The standard theory of quantum mechanics is thus constructed on only how the micro-world appears to macro measurements - as such, it cannot offer any view of how the foundations of the world are acting when humans are not observing it - this has generated almost 100 years of confusion and contradiction at the very heart of physics. Significantly, we live in a world that is not being measured by scientists but is interacting with itself and with us. QM has failed to provide explanations: only recipes (meaningless equations), not insights. Physics has returned to the pre-Newtonian world of Ptolemaic phenomenology: only verifiable numbers without real understanding. The focus needs to be on an explicit linkage between the micro-world, when left to itself, and our mental models of this sphere of material reality, via the mechanism of measurement. This limits the role of measurement to confirming our mental models of reality but never confusing these with a direct image of ‘the thing in itself’. This implies a deep divide between reality and appearances. This paper proposes that it is the attempt to preserve continuum mathematics (especially calculus), which drives much of the mystery and confusion behind all attempts to understand quantum mechanics. The introduction of discrete mathematics is proposed to help analyze the discrete interactions between the quintessential quantum objects: the electrons and their novel properties. Additionally, several hidden major assumptions have been present in Classical Mechanics (represented by continuum mathematics) since its inception by Newton that are blocking progress and understanding of quantum mechanics. A related paper demonstrates that it is possible to create a point-particle theory of electrons that explains all their peculiar (and ‘paradoxical’) behavior without introducing the continuum mathematical ideas of fields or waves. * Surrey, B.C. Canada (604) 542-2299 spsi99@telus.net Version 1.195 10-07-2016 Begun 23-06-2008 {pp. 80, 70.4 Kw; 800 KB}
Quantum Mechanics (QM) has faced deep controversies and debates since its origin when Werner Heisenberg proposed the first mathematical formalism capable to operationally account for what had been recently discovered as the new field of quantum phenomena. Today, even though we have reached a standardized version of QM which is taught in Universities all around the world, there is still no consensus regarding the conceptual reference of the theory and, if or if not, it can refer to something beyond measurement outcomes. In this work we will argue that the reason behind the impossibility to reach a meaningful answer to this question is strictly related to the 20th Century Bohrian-positivist re-foundation of physics which is responsible for having introduced within the theory of quanta a harmful combination of metaphysical dogmatism and naive empiricism. We will also argue that the possibility of understanding QM is at plain sight, given we return to the original framework of physics in which the meaning of understanding has always been clear.
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.
In this paper we discuss the representational realist stance as a pluralist ontic approach to inter-theoretic relationships. Our stance stresses the fact that physical theories require the necessary consideration of a conceptual level of discourse which determines and configures the specific field of phenomena discussed by each particular theory. We will criticize the orthodox line of research which has grounded the analysis about QM in two (Bohrian) metaphysical presuppositions -accepted in the present as dogmas that all interpretations must follow. We will also examine how the orthodox project of "bridging the gap" between the quantum and the classical domains has constrained the possibilities of research, producing only a limited set of interpretational problems which only focus in the justification of "classical reality" and exclude the possibility of analyzing the possibilities of non-classical conceptual representations of QM. The representational realist stance introduces two new problems, namely, the superposition problem and the contextuality problem, which consider explicitly the conceptual representation of orthodox QM beyond the mere reference to mathematical structures and measurement outcomes. In the final part of the paper, we revisit, from a representational realist perspective, the quantum to classical limit and the orthodox claim that this inter-theoretic relation can be explained through the principle of decoherence.