We study classical and quantum indistinguishability of sums of independent random permutations and related transformations from permutations to functions. Let $G$ be a finite abelian group of order $N$, and let $π^k_+(x)=π_1(x)+\cdots+π_k(x)$ for $k\geq2$ independent uniform random permutations of $G$. We give a unified Fourier analytic treatment in which the construction is represented by its probability density and a distinguisher by its acceptance function, with the classical and quantum query models imposing different restrictions on the Fourier support of the latter. Classically, we obtain the bound $O_k(q/N^{k-1/2})$ for every $q
We study classical and quantum indistinguishability of sums of independent random permutations and related transformations from permutations to functions. Let G be a finite abelian group of order N, and let π+k(x)=π1(x)+⋯+πk(x) for k≥2 independent uniform random permutations of G. We give a unified Fourier analytic treatment in which the construction is represented by its probability density and a distinguisher by its acceptance function, with the classical and quantum query models imposing different restrictions on the Fourier support of the latter. Classically, we obtain the bound Ok(q/Nk−1/2) for every $q
The XOR of two or more independent random permutations (XoP) is the prototypical pseudorandom function built from permutations achieving security beyond the birthday bound. The classical security of the XoP construction is well established, but its security against quantum attacks that query XoP in superposition has remained widely open.
We prove that the XOR of r≥2 random permutations over {0,1}n is indistinguishable from a random function by any q-query quantum algorithm with advantage O(min{2rnq3,2(r−0.5)nq1.5,2(r−1.5)n1}) for all q≪2n. In particular, XoP remains secure throughout the entire query range, far beyond the 2n/3 bound due to quantum collision finding attacks. This is the first construction from permutations that achieves the quantum version of the beyond birthday bound security. We also present several heuristic attacks suggesting the tightness of our bounds in ranges q≤2n/2 and ≈2n.
We use a Fourier-analytic variant of the polynomial method: the advantage of any q-query quantum algorithm is controlled by the Fourier components of degree at most 2q, or by 2q input-output data of the construction. The norms of most components are bounded well, proving the bound 2−(r−3/2)n.
The norm of low-degree components turn out to be too large for the bounds q3/2rn and q1.5/2(r−0.5)n. We reinterpret these low-degree components as (sums of) advantages of the other problems. For example, the degree-2 and degree-4 terms are interpreted as the advantages against random functions with and without \emph{planted collisions}, which in turn are bounded using Zhandry's small-range distributions. Along the way, we prove a new bound for the small-range indistinguishability for (ironically) large ranges, which is of independent interest.
It is known since the work of [AA14] that for any permutation symmetric function f, the quantum query complexity is at most polynomially smaller than the classical randomized query complexity, more precisely that R(f)=O(Q7(f)). In this paper, we improve this result and show that R(f)=O(Q3(f)) for a more general class of symmetric functions. Our proof is constructive and relies largely on the quantum hardness of distinguishing a random permutation from a random function with small range from Zhandry [Zha15].
We employ concepts and tools from the theory of finite permutation groups in order to analyse the Hidden Subgroup Problem via Quantum Fourier Sampling (QFS) for the symmetric group. We show that under very general conditions both the weak and the random-strong form (strong form with random choices of basis) of QFS fail to provide any advantage over classical exhaustive search. In particular we give a complete characterisation of polynomial size subgroups, and of primitive subgroups, that can be distinguished from the identity subgroup with the above methods. Furthermore, assuming a plausible group theoretic conjecture for which we give supporting evidence, we show that weak and random-strong QFS for the symmetric group have no advantage whatsoever over classical search.
Non-uniform security allows an adversary to receive bounded advice about an oracle before attempting a fresh challenge. This captures the most realistic attacks and has already been studied extensively in prior work. In this work, we introduce an operator-norm approach for non-uniform security in the quantum random oracle and random permutation models. This new approach yields a unified reduction for both search success probability and distinguishing advantage. Previously, the reduction only worked with success probability even in the decision games, yielding a worse bound.
Our framework enables tight bounds for Yao's box, both with and without salting, and improved bounds for pseudorandom generators. We also prove an optimal generic salting theorem for decision games. By defining a property of a game, which separates the contributions of the existing queries in the offline stage and subsequent online queries, we obtain stronger bounds for specific salted constructions. These include salted permutation inversion, tight up to logarithmic factors, and salted random-function inversion, tight up to logarithmic factors and the gap already present in classical function inversion.
The problem of distinguishing between a random function and a random permutation on a domain of size N is important in theoretical cryptography, where the security of many primitives depend on the problem's hardness. We study the quantum query complexity of this problem, and show that any quantum algorithm that solves this problem with bounded error must make $\Omega(N^{1/5}/\polylog N)$ queries to the input function. Our lower bound proof uses a combination of the Collision Problem lower bound and Ambainis's adversary theorem.
Cryptographic security proofs often involve an adversary interacting with a larger, keyed oracle that consists of (potentially exponentially) many independent instances of a smaller, base oracle. However, showing quantum indistinguishability between two such keyed oracles can be tricky, since a single query made by an adversary may involve a superposition that covers all instances of the base oracles simultaneously.
In this paper, we establish a generic indistinguishability lifting theorem of the following form: if the two base oracles are indistinguishable under quantum queries, then their corresponding keyed oracles are too, up to an O(q^2) multiplicative loss in distinguishing advantage, where q is the number of queries made by the adversary. Our lifting theorem applies to both statistical and computational settings, and to oracles that are stateful as well. It is also optimal in that it matches the obvious Grover search attack for a certain (contrived) choice of oracles.
As an immediate application, we extend Carolan's compressed permutation oracle to an efficiently implementable compressed ideal cipher, and use it to prove preimage resistance of the Davies-Meyer compression function in the quantum ideal cipher model. Thanks to our lifting theorem, the soundness of our compressed ideal cipher reduces to that of Carolan's oracle, and any further improvement on the latter would automatically carry over to the former.
As our second application, we give a modular construction that doubles the message length of any quantum-secure strong pseudorandom permutation. Along the way, we show that an existing two-round tweakable Feistel construction is indistinguishable from a random permutation under quantum bidirectional queries. This is done via a dedicated polynomial-method argument, which may be of independent interest.