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arXiv:2609.27828

A Non-Invasive Cloud-Based Migration Strategy for Post-Quantum Cybersecurity in Smart HVAC Systems: Architecture, Implementation, and Empirical Evaluation

Mahedee Zaman Moon, Kaysarul Anas Apurba, Md Hasibul Hasan, Sk Md Mizanur Rahman

Published Aug 19, 2026• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Legacy smart HVAC controllers rely on vendor-cloud TLS secured by ECDH and RSA, both broken by Shor's algorithm, and typical 10-15 year lifespans mean today's devices remain in service through the quantum-threat era. Direct on-device post-quantum cryptography is infeasible: an ESP32-S3, representative of capable HVAC hardware, has only 339 KB free heap against the 900 KB ML-KEM-768 requires, and even classical ECDH-P256 keygen (111.93 ms) dwarfs hardware AES-128 (0.032 ms). We propose a non-invasive PQC proxy, requiring no device, firmware, or vendor-cloud changes, performing ML-KEM-768 encapsulation and ML-DSA-65 authentication (NIST FIPS 203/204) with AES-256-GCM session keys via HKDF, implemented with Open Quantum Safe liboqs on a Raspberry Pi 4B gateway. Over 500 runs, the post-quantum handshake (Steps 1-6) completes in 2.48 ms, 0.38 ms slower than classical baseline, with PQC computation around 8% of handshake time at 20 ms simulated round-trip network latency. The gateway sustains 443 sessions/second, 100% success under 32 concurrent connections, extrapolating to 3546 sessions/second on a 32-core cloud instance. Five side-channel tests, including verified in-place session-key zeroization and a fixed-vs-random TVLA timing analysis, found no exploitable timing leakage or susceptibility to man-in-the-middle attacks. The architecture is vendor-agnostic and becomes unnecessary once vendors adopt NIST PQC natively.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2609.27828

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Legacy smart HVAC controllers rely on vendor-cloud TLS secured by ECDH and RSA, both broken by Shor's algorithm, and typical 10-15 year lifespans mean today's devices remain in service through the quantum-threat era. Direct on-device post-quantum cryptography is infeasible: an ESP32-S3, representative of capable HVAC hardware, has only 339 KB free heap against the 900 KB ML-KEM-768 requires, and even classical ECDH-P256 keygen (111.93 ms) dwarfs hardware AES-128 (0.032 ms). We propose a non-invasive PQC proxy, requiring no device, firmware, or vendor-cloud changes, performing ML-KEM-768 encapsulation and ML-DSA-65 authentication (NIST FIPS 203/204) with AES-256-GCM session keys via HKDF, implemented with Open Quantum Safe liboqs on a Raspberry Pi 4B gateway. Over 500 runs, the post-quantum handshake (Steps 1-6) completes in 2.48 ms, 0.38 ms slower than classical baseline, with PQC computation around 8% of handshake time at 20 ms simulated round-trip network latency. The gateway sustains 443 sessions/second, 100% success under 32 concurrent connections, extrapolating to 3546 sessions/second on a 32-core cloud instance. Five side-channel tests, including verified in-place session-key zeroization and a fixed-vs-random TVLA timing analysis, found no exploitable timing leakage or susceptibility to man-in-the-middle attacks. The architecture is vendor-agnostic and becomes unnecessary once vendors adopt NIST PQC natively.
Consumer Industrial Control Systems (ICS) - spanning smart homes, building automation, and consumer manufacturing equipment - continue to rely on RSA and ECC-based protocols despite decade-long deployment lifecycles that extend well into the post-quantum era. The harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) threat, wherein adversaries archive ciphertext today for decryption once cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQC) emerge, demands near-term migration for devices with 10–20-year operational horizons. We present an adaptive hybrid protocol that combines ML-KEM (NIST FIPS 203) with classical ECDH, selecting parameter sets dynamically from per-device capability profiles. Over 5,000 TLS handshakes conducted on representative consumer IoT hardware - Raspberry Pi gateways and ESP-class microcontrollers - our adaptive negotiation reduces handshake overhead by 23–31% compared with static hybrid baselines while preserving full backward compatibility with classical-only peers. We further provide a practical migration roadmap comprising a device capability taxonomy, risk-prioritised deployment guidance, and vendor-actionable cost–benefit analysis. All experimental artefacts are released as open-source to facilitate community replication
Abstract—The advent of fault-tolerant Cryptanalytically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs) presents an existential threat to modern information security. Shor's polynomial-time quantum algorithm renders widely deployed public-key cryptographic primitives—including RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH), and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECDH/ECDSA)—completely vulnerable to private key derivation. Furthermore, 'Harvest Now, Decrypt Later' (HNDL) adversarial campaigns actively intercept and store encrypted enterprise telemetry today, anticipating future quantum decryption capabilities. In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalized its primary Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards in FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA). However, transitioning complex enterprise IT ecosystems to quantum-resistant primitives introduces severe architectural and computational disruptions: public key and signature sizes increase by several orders of magnitude, cryptographic handshake latencies escalate, network packets experience Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) fragmentation, and legacy Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) lack microarchitectural support for lattice-based polynomial arithmetic. This paper provides an exhaustive, mathematically grounded technical survey and architectural roadmap for enterprise PQC migration. We formalize the Module Learning with Errors (M-LWE) and Module Short Integer Solution (M-SIS) hardness foundations, evaluate hybrid classical/post-quantum cryptographic transition models across standard transport protocols (TLS 1.3, IKEv2/IPsec, SSH), and formulate an enterprise Crypto-Agility Maturity Model. Furthermore, we construct an empirical enterprise testbed measuring throughput, connection establishment latency, memory footprints, and packet fragmentation across legacy and quantum-resistant suites. Our results show that while ML-KEM-768 achieves microsecond-level encapsulation, its 1,088-byte ciphertext expands TLS ClientHello payloads into multiple TCP segments under constrained networks. Finally, we establish open research directions in post-quantum identity federations, stateful hash signature tracking, and hardware-accelerated polynomial arithmetic. Index Terms—Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), Crypto-Agility, TLS 1.3, Lattice-Based Cryptography, Harvest Now Decrypt Later, Hardware Security Modules (HSM), Enterprise Migration.
Fault-tolerant quantum computing will render RSA and ECC insecure by reducing their underlying mathematical hard problems to polynomial-time computation via Shor's algorithm. The urgency of migrating to NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards is compounded by Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) attacks, in which adversaries archive encrypted traffic today for quantum decryption once capable hardware matures. A uniform substitution of classical primitives with lattice-based alternatives, however, creates deployment friction that existing migration guidance does not fully resolve. ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation keys (1,568 bytes) and ML-DSA signatures (2,420 - 4,627 bytes) can exceed the standard 1,500-byte Ethernet Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) when combined with protocol framing overhead, and ML-DSA payloads strain the volatile memory of many deployed Hardware Security Modules (HSMs). These constraints impose measurable costs on handshake latency, packet fragmentation risk, and Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) verification cycles. This paper makes three contributions. First, it characterizes the operational tension between lattice-based PQC primitives and existing cloud network constraints, drawing on FIPS 203, FIPS 204, FIPS 205, and current IETF transport-layer work. Second, it identifies specific failure modes this tension introduces for Zero Trust identity infrastructure. Third, it proposes a Tiered Cryptographic Agility Model: a workload-stratified migration framework that applies dual-wrap hybrid encryption to cold storage, symmetric key ratcheting to latency-sensitive microservices, and PQC-signed software gateway tokens to bridge the hardware adoption gap. The framework is positioned against the NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust reference architecture and the deployment-security guidance of NIST SP 800-227.
Classical public-key cryptography (RSA-2048, ECDH) is vulnerable to Shor's algorithm on quantum computers, with harvest-now-decrypt-later threats already targeting archived cloud traffic for future decryption. While NIST's 2024 ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) standards provide quantumresistant primitives, uniform PQC deployment across diverse cloud workloads remains computationally inefficient and lacks validated hybrid security and scalability. This paper introduces AH-KEM, an adaptive hybrid key encapsulation mechanism for TLS 1.3-compatible cloud communication. The AH-KEM algorithm determines a risk rating for each session from three dimensions-sensitivity of the data, expected length of the session, and network exposure-and then uses a deterministic method to choose among four modes of cryptography, which include Classical-only (X25519/ECDSA), Parallel-Hybrid (X25519/ML-KEM-512/ML-DSA-44), PQC-Dominant(ML-KEM-768/ML-DSA-65), and Full-Hybrid (X25519/ML-KEM-1024/ML-DSA-87). The safe dual-PRF combiner combines the classical and post-quantum shared keys to obtain a single session key that is secure in the Quantum Random Oracle Model if either KEM used is secure. Implemented in Python with FIPS-compliant software stubs on a Lenovo LOQ 15APH8 (AMD Ryzen 7 7840HS), AH-KEM demonstrates that, when both are generated fresh per session to satisfy forward secrecy, ML-KEM-768 key generation is over 11, 000× faster than RSA-2048 (0.004 ms vs. 44.335 ms); note RSA keys are not conventionally regenerated per session in deployed TLS, so this comparison isolates the cost of per-session ephemeral generation rather than RSA's typical amortized cost. Full-Hybrid end-to-end handshake latency is 0.514 ms (a sub-millisecond overhead); servers sustain zero errors at 250 concurrent clients; and risk classification achieves 100.0% accuracy over 10,000 sessions.
The convergence of quantum computing and the scale of Internet of Things (IoT) deployments creates a compounded security problem: classical public-key cryptography securing today’s IoT traffic is vulnerable to harvest-now, decrypt-later attacks, while the constrained hardware typical of IoT devices limits the security mechanisms can be deployed. Prior work has largely evaluated post-quantum cryptography (PQC), federated learning (FL)-based anomaly detection, and quantum-resilient storage separately or in partial combinations, leaving open whether these mechanisms remain practical when composed on constrained hardware under a shared operational budget. This paper answers that question with a three-layer architecture — a hybrid PQC pipeline (Kyber-based key encapsulation, ML-DSA signatures, AES-GCM encryption, and PQC-TLS transport), a federated anomaly-detection layer, and a quantum-resilient storage and audit layer (DeSSE and MuReQua) — executed end-to-end on a Raspberry Pi 5 edge node under AWS IoT Greengrass Core, with nine concurrent virtual IoT nodes processing real attack traffic from the N-BaIoT and TON_IoT datasets. Benchmarking across 27 cryptographic algorithm combinations (810 pipeline executions) shows that all 27 configurations completed in under 2.1 ms, with the deployed Kyber768/ML-DSA-65/AES-256-GCM tier adding 4,521 bytes of per-message overhead, which remained compatible with the evaluated 20 ms inter-row transmission budget. Live federated deployment across the nine virtual IoT nodes on N-BaIoT achieves F1-scores above 0.998 on eight of nine devices, processing at approximately 900 rows/second with zero signature verification failures; a centralized baseline evaluation further confirms 99.46% attack recall on unseen TON_IoT threats withheld from training. The quantum-resilient storage layer maintains 100% chain integrity and complete signature coverage across 4,471 audit records, with independent tamper simulations reliably detected. PQC-TLS introduces a one-time handshake overhead of 13.7 ms (288.5% relative increase) over classical TLS, which remains small relative to the multi-minute FL round intervals measured in the evaluated deployment. Together, these results demonstrate that quantum-resilient cryptography, federated intelligence, and auditable storage can be jointly executed on constrained IoT edge hardware as a single experimentally demonstrated pipeline within the operational conditions evaluated in this study.
The rapid progress of quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography, particularly to RSA and elliptic-curve schemes that are vulnerable to Shor and Grover based attacks. This paper investigates the practical transition toward quantum-resilient security through a comprehensive evaluation of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). We combine threat modeling, quantum-attack simulation, and empirical benchmarking of NIST-standardized PQC algorithms, including ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), and SPHINCS+. Results demonstrate that although PQC introduces larger key sizes and computational overhead, its integration into real network environments via hybrid TLS deployments—remains feasible with acceptable latency and resource impact. Based on these findings, we propose a crypto-agile migration strategy supporting phased deployment, interoperability with legacy systems, and risk-driven prioritization. The study provides practical guidance for organizations preparing for the transition to quantum-resilient infrastructures.