Verification protocols provide cryptographic guarantees that the outcome of a delegated quantum computation is correct, a key requirement for scalable and trustworthy quantum computing. A central assumption underlying these protocols is secret independence: the noise affecting state preparation must not depend on the classical secrets that specify the prepared states. In earlier protocols this assumption was enforced by the physical separation of client and server; in the recent on-chip setting it becomes a property of the hardware itself, and one that high-fidelity devices do not automatically satisfy. We first make the requirement quantitative, deriving a bound that shows how residual secret dependence limits the size of any verifiable computation within this framework. Motivated by this, we introduce a calibration framework that enforces secret independence through pulse-level quantum control, producing state preparations that are simultaneously high-fidelity and secret-independent. We assess its performance on a nitrogen-vacancy centre system via emulation, showing that it reduces the secret dependence of the preparations by more than an order of magnitude compared to standard optimal control, and that it is robust against detuning and drive-amplitude errors commonly encountered in experiment. The framework operates entirely at the calibration stage and is platform-agnostic, offering a practical pathway towards verifiable quantum computing at scale.
Verification protocols provide cryptographic guarantees that the outcome of a delegated quantum computation is correct, a key requirement for scalable and trustworthy quantum computing. A central assumption underlying these protocols is secret independence: the noise affecting state preparation must not depend on the classical secrets that specify the prepared states. In earlier protocols this assumption was enforced by the physical separation of client and server; in the recent on-chip setting it becomes a property of the hardware itself, and one that high-fidelity devices do not automatically satisfy. We first make the requirement quantitative, deriving a bound that shows how residual secret dependence limits the size of any verifiable computation within this framework. Motivated by this, we introduce a calibration framework that enforces secret independence through pulse-level quantum control, producing state preparations that are simultaneously high-fidelity and secret-independent. We assess its performance on a nitrogen-vacancy centre system via emulation, showing that it reduces the secret dependence of the preparations by more than an order of magnitude compared to standard optimal control, and that it is robust against detuning and drive-amplitude errors commonly encountered in experiment. The framework operates entirely at the calibration stage and is platform-agnostic, offering a practical pathway towards verifiable quantum computing at scale.
How can a user with limited quantum resources verify the output of an untrusted, fully quantum server? This manuscript provides a conceptual synthesis of some recent developments toward answering this question under statistical (information-theoretic) security. Rather than duplicating the dense technical proofs of the underlying publications, our focus here is on the physical motivations, the structural connections between different protocols, and the path toward hardware-efficient implementation.
We begin by introducing a modular, composable framework that partitions verification into three distinct, independent primitives: remote state preparation, trap-based deviation detection, and error-correcting embedding. Using this framework, we show how the demanding hardware requirements of early protocols can be systematically relaxed. We review schemes that eliminate the spatial overhead, remove the need to prepare computational-basis dummy states, and replace single-photon sources with trusted local rotations or weak coherent pulses. Finally, we examine how these techniques scale, both to asymmetric multi-party settings and to the delegation of fully fault-tolerant computations in the presence of gate-level noise. This document is intended as a guide to the architectural principles of practical quantum verification.
Preparation and verification of specific quantum states is an important capability for quantum devices to realise advantages over classical computations and algorithms. In this work, we have demonstrated an end-to-end framework that combines resource-efficient quantum state preparation with rapid, robust fidelity verification on near-term quantum hardware. By experimentally preparing and validating a structured complex quantum state encoding a digitized acoustic signal on the Quantinuum H2-1 trapped-ion platform, we achieved a high hardware fidelity of Fhw=0.929. Crucially, this milestone was realized without relying on idealized assumptions or deep fault-tolerant overhead, but rather through resource-minimal circuits optimized for NISQ-era and early fault-tolerant devices.
Furthermore, we addressed a key limitation in current quantum state certification. While validation methods like shadow overlap work well for random states, their sample complexity can become prohibitively high for the structured states used in practical algorithms. We mitigate this by introducing a pre-measurement basis-change technique that reduces the verification parameter, τ, by over 10 orders of magnitude for structured targets. This approach tightens the theoretical certification guarantees of the shadow overlap method and integrates tensor-network preparation and shadow validation into a unified workflow. These results shift the paradigm of how structured classical data can be mapped to and verified on quantum hardware under realistic noise and measurement budgets. By compressing a robust verification procedure to just 1,000 measurement shots, this framework offers an immediate, scalable benchmarking standard.
Quantum computers promise to offer a considerable speed-up in solving certain problems, compared to the best classical algorithms. In many instances, the gap between quantum and classical running times is conjectured to be exponential. While this is great news for those applications where quantum computers would provide such an advantage, it also raises a significant challenge: how can classical computers verify the correctness of quantum computations? In attempting to answer this question, a number of protocols have been developed in which a classical client (referred to as verifier) can interact with one or more quantum servers (referred to as provers) in order to certify the correctness of a quantum computation performed by the server(s). These protocols are of one of two types: either there are multiple non-communicating provers, sharing entanglement, and the verifier is completely classical; or, there is a single prover and the classical verifier has a device for preparing or measuring quantum states. The latter type of protocols are, arguably, more relevant to near term quantum computers, since having multiple quantum computers that share a large amount of entanglement is, from a technological standpoint, extremely challenging. Before the realisation of practical single-prover protocols, a number of challenges need to be addressed: how robust are these protocols to noise on the verifier's device? Can the protocols be made fault-tolerant without significantly increasing the requirements of the verifier? How do we know that the verifier's device is operating correctly? Could this device be eliminated completely, thus having a protocol with a fully classical verifier and a single quantum prover? Our work attempts to provide answers to these questions. First, we consider a single-prover verification protocol developed by Fitzsimons and Kashefi and show that this protocol is indeed robust with respect to deviations on the quantum state prepared by the verifier. We show that this is true even if those deviations are the result of a correlation with the prover's system. We then use this result to give a verification protocol which is device- independent. The protocol consists of a verifier with a measurement device and a single prover. Device-independence means that the verifier need not trust the measurement device (nor the prover) which can be assumed to be fully malicious (though not communicating with the prover). A key element in realising this protocol is a robust technique of Reichardt, Unger and Vazirani for testing, using non-local correlations, that two untrusted devices share a large number of entangled states. This technique is referred to as rigidity of non-local correlations. Our second result is to prove a rigidity result for a type of quantum correlations known as steering correlations. To do this, we first show that steering correlations can be used in order to certify maximally entangled states, in a setting in which each test is independent of the previous one. We also show that the fidelity with which we characterise the state, in this specific test, is optimal. We then improve the previous result by removing the independence assumption. This then leads to our desired rigidity result. We make use of it, in a similar fashion to the device-independent case, in order to give a verification protocol that is one-sided device-independent. The importance of this application is to show how different trust assumptions affect the efficiency of the protocol. Next, we describe a protocol for fault-tolerantly verifying quantum computations, with minimal "quantum requirements" for the verifier. Specifically, the verifier only requires a device for measuring single-qubit states. Both this device, and the prover's operations are assumed to be prone to errors. We show that under standard assumptions about the error model, it is possible to achieve verification of quantum computation using fault-tolerant principles. As a proof of principle, and to better illustrate the inner workings of the protocol, we describe a toy implementation of the protocol in a quantum simulator, and present the results we obtained, when running it for a small computation. Finally, we explore the possibility of having a verification protocol, with a classical verifier and a single prover, such that the prover is blind with respect to the verifier's computation. We give evidence that this is not possible. In fact, our result is only concerned with blind quantum computation with a classical client, and uses complexity theoretic results to argue why it is improbable for such a protocol to exist. We then use these complexity theoretic techniques to show that a client, with the ability to prepare and send quantum states to a quantum server, would not be able to delegate arbitrary NP problems to that server. In other words, even a client with quantum capabilities cannot exploit those capabilities to delegate the computation of NP problems, while keeping the input, to that computation, private. This is again true, provided certain complexity theoretic conjectures are true.
We present a novel approach to cryptographically secure verification and benchmarking of quantum computing, demonstrating our approach on an ion-trap quantum computer. Unlike previous cryptographically secure verification protocols, which typically require quantum communication between client and server, our approach is implemented entirely on chip. This eliminates the need for a quantum capable client, and significantly enhances practicality. We perform tomography to justify the additionally required assumption that the noise is independent of the secret used to prepare the server's single-qubit states. We quantify the soundness error that may be caused by residual secret dependencies. We demonstrate our protocol on the 20-qubit Quantinuum H1-1 ion-trap quantum processing unit, using qubit measurements and resets to construct measurement patterns with up to 52 vertices. To our knowledge, these are the largest verified measurement-based quantum computations performed to date.
In order to guarantee the output of a quantum computation, we usually assume that the component devices are trusted. However, when the total computation process is large, it is not easy to guarantee the whole system when we have scaling effects, unexpected noise, or unaccounted for correlations between several subsystems. If we do not trust the measurement basis or the prepared entangled state, we do need to be worried about such uncertainties. To this end, we propose a self-guaranteed protocol for verification of quantum computation under the scheme of measurement-based quantum computation where no prior-trusted devices (measurement basis or entangled state) are needed. The approach we present enables the implementation of verifiable quantum computation using the measurement-based model in the context of a particular instance of delegated quantum computation where the server prepares the initial computational resource and sends it to the client, who drives the computation by single-qubit measurements. Applying self-testing procedures, we are able to verify the initial resource as well as the operation of the quantum devices and hence the computation itself. The overhead of our protocol scales with the size of the initial resource state to the power of 4 times the natural logarithm of the initial state's size.
With the advent of quantum cloud computing, the security of delegated quantum computation has become of utmost importance. While multiple statistically secure blind verification schemes in the prepare-and-send model have been proposed, none of them achieves full quantum fault-tolerance, a prerequisite for useful verification on scalable quantum computers. In this paper, we present the first fault-tolerant blind verification scheme for universal quantum computations able to handle secret-dependent noise on the verifier's quantum device. Composable security of the proposed protocol is proven in the Abstract Cryptography framework. Our main tools are two novel distillation protocols that turn secret-dependent noise into secret-independent noise. The first one is run by the verifier and acts on its noisy gates, while the second and more complex one is run entirely on the prover's device and acts on states provided by the verifier. Both are required to overcome the leakage induced by secret-dependent noise. We use these protocols to prepare states in the X-Y-plane whose noise is overwhelmingly secret-independent, which then allows us to verify with exponential confidence arbitrary fault-tolerant BQP computations.