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arXiv:2609.01121

Sentinel-Based Failover for QKD-Augmented IPsec Tunnels

Juan Carlos Hernandez-Hernandez, Francesco Vista, Haftay Gebreslasie Abreha, Intidhar Bedhief, Seid Koudia, Symeon Chatzinotas

Published Sep 1, 2026• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Quantum-safe IPsec through hybrid key establishment is practical, but creates a critical operational challenge: how to maintain tunnel availability when the QKD infrastructure becomes unavailable. In this paper, we present the design, implementation, and experimental evaluation of a quantum-safe key establishment mechanism for an IPsec tunnel that combines X25519, ML-KEM, and ETSI GS QKD 014 keys through the RFC 9370 multiple key exchange mechanism, and that degrades gracefully when the QKD key delivery fails. Our open-source StrongSwan plugin uses a sentinel-based coordination protocol, thereby permitting us to complete the handshake even if the QKD leg fails, instead of aborting, restoring the QKD share at the next rekey. On a testbed connected to a metropolitan QKD link over 33 km of deployed fiber, we evaluated five configurations, from a classical X25519 with RSA baseline to a hybrid one that adds ML-KEM-1024 and a QKD key. The full hybrid authentication costs 103 ms against 61 ms for the baseline, the QKD retrieval itself adds only about 7 ms. Failure injection experiments confirm that the tunnel survives a complete KME outage without any interruption of the protected traffic.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2609.01121

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Quantum-safe IPsec through hybrid key establishment is practical, but creates a critical operational challenge: how to maintain tunnel availability when the QKD infrastructure becomes unavailable. In this paper, we present the design, implementation, and experimental evaluation of a quantum-safe key establishment mechanism for an IPsec tunnel that combines X25519, ML-KEM, and ETSI GS QKD 014 keys through the RFC 9370 multiple key exchange mechanism, and that degrades gracefully when the QKD key delivery fails. Our open-source StrongSwan plugin uses a sentinel-based coordination protocol, thereby permitting us to complete the handshake even if the QKD leg fails, instead of aborting, restoring the QKD share at the next rekey. On a testbed connected to a metropolitan QKD link over 33 km of deployed fiber, we evaluated five configurations, from a classical X25519 with RSA baseline to a hybrid one that adds ML-KEM-1024 and a QKD key. The full hybrid authentication costs 103 ms against 61 ms for the baseline, the QKD retrieval itself adds only about 7 ms. Failure injection experiments confirm that the tunnel survives a complete KME outage without any interruption of the protected traffic.
As Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) deployments expand and adversaries adopt “store-now, decrypt-later” strategies, operators need empirical data on the cost of migrating critical control interfaces to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). This paper experimentally evaluates the impact of integrating a NIST-aligned Module-Lattice Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) into IKEv2/IPsec, protecting the E2 interface between the 5G Node B (gNB) and the Near-Real-Time RAN Intelligent Controller (Near-RT RIC). Using an open-source testbed built from srsRAN, Open5GS, FlexRIC and strongSwan (with liboqs), we compare three configurations: no IPsec, classical Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH)-based IPsec, and ML-KEM-based IPsec. This study focuses on IPsec tunnel-setup latency and the runtime behaviour of Near-RT RIC xApps under realistic signalling workloads. Results from repeated, automated runs show that ML-KEM integration adds a small overhead to tunnel establishment, which is approximately 2.7~4.7 ms in comparison to classical IPsec, while xApp operation and RIC control loops remain stable in our experiments. These findings, produced from an open, reproducible testbed, indicate that ML-KEM-based IPsec on the E2 interface is practically feasible and inform quantum-safe migration strategies for O-RAN deployments.
We present a layered and modular network architecture that combines Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to provide scalable end-to-end security across long distance multi-hop, trusted-node quantum networks. To ensure interoperability and efficient practical deployment, hop-wise tunnels between physically secured nodes are protected by WireGuard with periodically rotated pre-shared keys sourced via the ETSI GS QKD 014 interface. On top, Rosenpass performs a PQC key exchange to establish an end-to-end data channel without modifying deployed QKD devices or network protocols. This dual-layer composition yields post-quantum forward secrecy and authenticity under practical assumptions. We implement the design using open-source components and validate and evaluate it in simulated and lab test-beds. Experiments show uninterrupted operation over multi-hop paths, low resource footprint and fail-safe mechanisms. We further discuss the design's compositional security, wherein the security of each individual component is preserved under their combination and outline migration paths for operators integrating QKD-aware overlays in existing infrastructures.
• The first functional implementation that integrates SDN, QKD, and IPsec technologies within a unified architecture, enabling dynamic establishment of IPsec tunnels protected with Quantum Key Distribution. • The proposed solution is based on the implementation of IPsec in accordance with QKD-related standards defined by ETSI, specifically adhering to the specifications ETSI GS QKD 004 and ETSI GS QKD 015. This approach ensures interoperability and alignment with current best practices for quantum secure network deployments. • Experimental results were obtained from a field-deployed QKD network operating over a hybrid quantum-classical infrastructure, providing empirical validation of the proposed approach in a production-grade environment laying a solid foundation for future large-scale deployments. The importance of digital communications makes protecting data in transit a critical priority. Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) plays a central role in this protection, by ensuring data confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. However, quantum computing threatens the foundations of IPsec. Its ability to efficiently solve mathematical problems such as factoring and discrete logarithms could break the public-key cryptography used for IPsec key exchange. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is one of the most promising solutions to this problem, offering a security layer immune to both classical and quantum computational attacks. This work proposes a solution that integrates emerging quantum technologies into existing security and communication infrastructures to ensure long-term protection. We combine IPsec with Software-Defined Networking and QKD to build a novel network security infrastructure. It is designed to resist both classical and quantum threats. It is based on recent standardization efforts and operational tools for QKD integration. We demonstrate advanced capabilities such as rekeying and secure key transport on a field deployed QKD network operating within a shared quantum-classical production infrastructure.
Quantum-Safe Networks (QSNs) use quantum key distribution (QKD) to deliver keys generated using a Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) to consumers at scale. In practice, prevailing Quantum-Key-as-a-Service (QKaaS) offerings still assume that each consumer site deploys on-premise QKD hardware, creating cost and feasibility barriers that limit adoption. Although ETSI GS QKD 014 standardizes APIs for key retrieval between Secure Application Entities (SAEs) and Key Management Entities (KMEs), it does not address key delivery across untrusted classical networks to consumers without local QKD devices. We close this gap with a gateway architecture that transparently secures ETSI-compliant QKD APIs using Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)—applying PQC signatures and key-encapsulation mechanisms end-to-end—without requiring changes to existing devices or software. The design supports cryptographic agility, enabling runtime selection and rotation among standardized PQC schemes. Evaluations on both simulated QKD environments and production-grade hardware show minimal overhead (≈1.3×\approx 1.3\times≈1.3×–1.5× versus baseline) and robust scaling across concurrent connections and multiple consumer sites, extending the reach of QSNs beyond premises equipped with QKD while preserving end-to-end quantum-safe guarantees. Overall, this paper equips practitioners with a systematized view of PQC–QKD integration in QSNs, with an actionable gateway blueprint for extending QSNs without the need for on-premise QKD deployments.
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and quantum key distribution (QKD) address the quantum threat from opposite directions: PQC replaces vulnerable public-key algorithms with schemes believed to resist quantum cryptanalysis, while QKD derives keys whose secrecy rests on physical assumptions rather than computational ones. Because each approach has a distinct failure mode, a growing body of work combines them so that a session key remains secure if either component holds. We first establish the deployed baseline, hybrid classical-plus-PQC key exchange, against which QKD-augmented designs must be judged. We then propose a taxonomy of hybrid PQC-QKD designs along eight dimensions (integration layer, combiner construction, authentication scope and source, QKD topology, trusted entities, key-delivery interface, classical component, and evidence type), and use it to compare published protocols, including Muckle and its successors, MACsec and TLS integrations, and IKEv2 mechanisms standardised in RFCs 8784, 9370, and 9867. We examine key-combiner constructions in light of the KEM-combiner literature and of NIST, ETSI, and ITU-T guidance, and map the security arguments for hybrid PQC-QKD protocols onto a common grid of security model, assumptions, permitted compromise, established guarantee, and limitations. We synthesise deployment evidence from metropolitan and national QKD networks, distinguishing the few testbeds that have run PQC in the key path from pure-QKD deployments, and summarise the standards and policy landscape, including the positions of national security agencies that recommend against relying on QKD alone. We close with open problems: authentication of the QKD classical channel, shared-infrastructure threat models, device certification versus formal proofs, formal verification of hybrid handshakes, and the lack of peer-reviewed deployment economics.
The advent of quantum computing will pose great challenges to the current communication systems, requiring essential changes in the establishment of security associations in traditional architectures. In this context, the multi-technological and heterogeneous nature of 5G networks makes it a challenging scenario for the introduction of quantum communications. Specifically, 5G networks support the unification of non-3GPP access technologies (i.e. Wi-Fi), which are secured through the IPsec protocol suite and the Non-3GPP Interworking Function (N3IWF) entity. These mechanisms leverage traditional public key cryptography and Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanisms, which should be updated to quantum-safe standards. Therefore, in this paper we present the design and development of a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) based non-3GPP access mechanism for 5G networks, integrating QKD keys with IPsec tunnel establishment. Besides, we also demonstrate the feasibility of the system by experimental validation in a testbed with commercial QKD equipment and an open-source 5G core implementation. Results show that the time required to complete the authentication and IPsec security association establishment is 4.62% faster than traditional cryptography PSK-based systems and 5.17% faster than the certificate-based system, while ensuring Information-Theoretic Security (ITS) of the QKD systems.