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arXiv:2607.17086

Against Many Worlds

Emily Adlam, Jacob A. Barandes

quant-phphysics.hist-phSubmitted Jul 19, 2026• Announced Jul 21, 2026• 1 citation
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Abstract

Any viable interpretation of quantum theory needs to account for the Born rule, from which the theory gets its probabilistic empirical predictions. In this paper, we give an overview of possible approaches to this problem in the context of the Many Worlds interpretation. We argue that, for structural reasons, none of them can possibly succeed. More precisely, we argue that the Many Worlds interpretation must obtain the Born rule by proceeding either axiomatically, deductively, or inductively, and that all three of these approaches run into general, fundamental obstructions.

Comments
22 pages, no figures; to appear in The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy and the Multiverse

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A novel puzzle for the notion of probability in the Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is presented. The puzzle makes use of a thought experiment that some have claimed would provide empirical support for many-worlds over alternatives. It is argued that, if the predictions of Many-Worlds do indeed differ from other inter-pretations as claimed, then Born’s rule must generally be invalid in Many-Worlds. It is shown that the thought experiment provides a counter example for recent decision-theoretic arguments that purport to establish Born’s rule. Finally, it is shown that the puzzle can be grounded in general considerations regarding the nature of prediction in Many-Worlds. The Many-Worlds interpretation (MW) of quantum mechanics is routinely mentioned alongside various hidden-variable, collapse and modal formulations as a proposed solution to the quantum measurement problem. The MW is unique among these alternatives, how-ever, for the fact that there is serious contention over what predictions the theory makes. Though Hugh Everett III is credited with first proposing a many-worlds interpretation,
There have been many attempts over the years to derive the Born Rule from the wave equation since Everett's Many Worlds Interpretation was proposed; however, none of these have been satisfactory as shown when critics pointed out loopholes and unsupported assumptions. In this paper the case is made that the currently fashionable decision-theoretic approach founded by David Deutsch and explicated by David Wallace is likewise unsatisfactory. A more fundamental computationalist approach is advocated.
We consider how to define a natural probability distribution over worlds within a simple class of deterministic many-worlds theories. This can help us understand the typical properties of worlds within such states, and hence explain the empirical success of quantum theory within a many-worlds framework. We give three reasonable axioms which lead to the Born rule in the case of quantum theory, and also yield natural results in other cases, including a many-worlds variant of classical stochastic dynamics.
The Everett (or relative-state, or many-worlds) interpretation of quantum mechanics has come under fire for inadequately dealing with the Born rule (the formula for calculating quantum probabilities). Numerous attempts have been made to derive this rule from the perspective of observers within the quantum wavefunction. These are not really analytic proofs, but are rather attempts to derive the Born rule as a synthetic a priori necessity, given the nature of human observers (a fact not fully appreciated even by all of those who have attempted such proofs). I show why existing attempts are unsuccessful or only partly successful, and postulate that Solomonoff's algorithmic approach to the interpretation of probability theory could clarify the problems with these approaches. The Sleeping Beauty probability puzzle is used as a springboard from which to deduce an objectivist, yet synthetic a priori framework for quantum probabilities, that properly frames the role of self-location and self-selection (anthropic) principles in probability theory. I call this framework "algorithmic synthetic unity" (or ASU). I offer no new formal proof of the Born rule, largely because I feel that existing proofs (particularly that of Gleason) are already adequate, and as close to being a formal proof as one should expect or want. Gleason's one unjustified assumption--known as noncontextuality--is, I will argue, completely benign when considered within the algorithmic framework that I propose. I will also argue that, to the extent the Born rule can be derived within ASU, there is no reason to suppose that we could not also derive all the other fundamental postulates of quantum theory, as well. There is nothing special here about the Born rule, and I suggest that a completely successful Born rule proof might only be possible once all the other postulates become part of the derivation. As a start towards this end, I show how we can already derive the essential content of the fundamental postulates of quantum mechanics, at least in outline, and especially if we allow some educated and well-motivated guesswork along the way. The result is some steps towards a coherent and consistent algorithmic interpretation of quantum mechanics.
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