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arXiv:2607.12174

Anticipating Decoder Side-channel Attacks in Fault-tolerant Quantum Computers

Shashvat Shukla, Dan E. Browne, Shin Nishio

quant-phcs.CRSubmitted Jul 13, 2026• Announced Jul 15, 2026• 3 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

As quantum computing emerges as an applied technology, there is a growing need to protect quantum computers against information security attacks. This work identifies a new class of side-channel attacks against fault-tolerant quantum computers, in which the syndrome data that is sent to the decoder system is used to infer which computation (logical circuit) is taking place on the quantum computer. Our work introduces the concept of gate fingerprints, which describes those patterns present in syndrome data that indicate which logical operation took place on the quantum computer. We show different effects by which logical operations produce gate fingerprints by focusing on Clifford+T computation in the surface code. We then explore how gate fingerprint information can be used to make inferences about the circuits or algorithms run on a quantum computer. Our findings indicate that decoder systems can be a vector for side-channel attacks and thus to prevent this, decoder systems should either be secured or built by a trusted party.

Comments
10 pages, 10 figures. Comments are welcome

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As quantum computing emerges as an applied technology, there is a growing need to protect quantum computers against information security attacks. This work identifies a new class of side-channel attacks against fault-tolerant quantum computers, in which the syndrome data that is sent to the decoder system is used to infer which computation (logical circuit) is taking place on the quantum computer. Our work introduces the concept of gate fingerprints, which describes those patterns present in syndrome data that indicate which logical operation took place on the quantum computer. We show different effects by which logical operations produce gate fingerprints by focusing on Clifford+T computation in the surface code. We then explore how gate fingerprint information can be used to make inferences about the circuits or algorithms run on a quantum computer. Our findings indicate that decoder systems can be a vector for side-channel attacks and thus to prevent this, decoder systems should either be secured or built by a trusted party.
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Benchmarking physical devices and verifying logical algorithms are important tasks for scalable fault-tolerant quantum computing. Numerous protocols exist for benchmarking devices before running actual algorithms. In this work, we show that both physical and logical errors of fault-tolerant circuits can even be characterized in-situ using syndrome data. To achieve this, we map general fault-tolerant Clifford circuits to subsystem codes using the spacetime code formalism and develop a scheme for estimating Pauli noise in Clifford circuits using syndrome data. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the learnability of physical and logical noise from given syndrome data, and show that we can accurately predict logical fidelities from the same data. Importantly, our approach requires only a polynomial sample size, even when the logical error rate is exponentially suppressed by the code distance, and thus gives an exponential advantage against methods that use only logical data such as direct fidelity estimation. We demonstrate the practical applicability of our methods in various scenarios using synthetic data as well as the experimental data from a recent demonstration of fault-tolerant circuits by Bluvstein et al. [Nature 626, 7997 (2024)]. Our methods provide an efficient, in-situ way of characterizing a fault-tolerant quantum computer to help gate calibration, improve decoding accuracy, and verify logical circuits.
Machine learning (ML) decoders are increasingly used in quantum error correction (QEC) to model noise, analyze imperfect syndrome measurements, and replace iterative matching algorithms with a learned inference pass, making them a critical component of the classical control stack of a fault-tolerant quantum computer. Prior security analysis of the ML decoders in the controller stack has addressed integrity and fault-injection attacks on the decoders. This work is the first to explore physical power side-channel attacks on ML decoders. In particular, it studies a convolutional Deep Q-Learning decoder for the distance-5 surface code. This work profiles the decoder to capture the power signatures generated during classification tasks and trains a classifier to identify which qubit the decoder identified as having errors based on the power signatures. The trained classifier is then applied to test data, where it recovers the correct data qubit label from the decoder’s side-channel data with up to 83.2%83.2\%83.2% accuracy across 25 classes, against 4%4\%4% for random guessing. A second classifier is trained to identify the type of error labeled by the decoder, Pauli X or Z, and reaches 84.6%84.6\%84.6% accuracy, against 50%50\%50% for random guessing. This work further performs an initial study of a timing channel, which complements the power side channels, exploring how the duration of the decoder’s first convolutional layer can leak the code size for which the decoder is compiled. All the side-channel attacks demonstrated in this work motivate treating the embedded QEC decoder as a confidentiality-critical component of the quantum control stack.
The rapidly growing interest in quantum computing also increases the importance of securing these computers from various physical attacks. Constantly increasing qubit counts and improvements to the fidelity of the quantum computers hold great promise for the ability of these computers to run novel algorithms with highly sensitive intellectual property. However, in today's cloud-based quantum computer setting, users lack physical control over the computers. Physical attacks, such as those perpetrated by malicious insiders in data centers, could be used to extract sensitive information about the circuits being executed on these computers. This work shows the first exploration and study of power-based side-channel attacks in quantum computers. The explored attacks could be used to recover information about the control pulses sent to these computers. By analyzing these control pulses, attackers can reverse-engineer the equivalent gate-level description of the circuits, and the algorithms being run, or data hard-coded into the circuits. This work introduces five new types of attacks, and evaluates them using control pulse information available from cloud-based quantum computers. This work demonstrates how and what circuits could be recovered, and then in turn how to defend from the newly demonstrated side-channel attacks on quantum computing systems.
Abstract With the growing deployment of quantum computing, side-channel attacks have emerged as one of the most serious security threats for cloud quantum service providers. This study investigates whether it is possible to infer the execution order and start times of quantum gates—and ultimately reconstruct the victim circuit—solely from measurements of the power consumption of quantum controllers. While most previous research has focused on reconstructing quantum circuits composed of standard basis gates, the possibility of reconstructing users’ custom quantum circuits from the power leakage of quantum controllers has received little attention. Our approach is evaluated under two observation models: per-channel power and total power. In the per-channel setting, the power trace of each channel is analyzed separately and compared with simulated pulse templates for different gates, in order to identify the most likely gate type and its start time. In this setting, template-based power comparison accurately determines both the gate and its onset time, and simple decision rules reduce misclassification between similar gates. In the total-power setting, an optimization model is employed to recover the logical ordering of the circuit with good accuracy, without requiring access to individual channel traces. The results show that even with a single measurement, circuit reconstruction is feasible provided that the pulse shapes and the device topology are known.
Surface codes are a popular error-correction route to fault-tolerant quantum computation. The so-called exponential backlog problem that can arise when one has to do logical TTT-gates within the surface code demands real-time decoding of the syndrome information to diagnose the appropriate Pauli frame in which to do the gate. This in turn puts a minimum requirement on the communication rate between the quantum processing unit, where the syndrome information is collected, and the classical processor, where the decoding algorithm is run. This minimum communication rate can be difficult to achieve while preserving the quality of the quantum processor. Here, we present two decoders that make use of a reduced syndrome information volume, relying on a number of syndrome bits that scale only as the width -- and not the usual area -- of the surface-code patch. This eases the communication requirements necessary for real-time decoding.