We introduce noise-adaptive quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, in which the honest parties optimize the encoding (state preparation) and decoding (measurement basis) operations according to the noise models affecting the honest subsystems induced by an eavesdropper. This extends conventional QKD schemes that employ fixed encoding and decoding strategies independent of the noise characteristics of the communication channel. We investigate three representative protocols: entanglement-based secure dense coding (SDC), the entanglement-free Lucamarini and Mancini (LM05), and a two-way prepare-and-measure Bennett Brassard (BB84) protocols. Using entropic uncertainty relations, we derive the corresponding secret key rates for both adaptive and conventional non-adaptive scenarios under collective attacks. For independent but identical noise acting on the forward and backward transmission channels, as well as for correlated and non-Markovian environments, we identify classes of channels for which adaptive schemes yield enhanced secret key rates for the considered protocols. In contrast, we also determine Pauli channels, including depolarizing and bit flip channels, for which adaptive strategies provide no benefit. We further show that these optimal sets are generally non-unique and can differ substantially from the unitaries that maximize dense-coding capacity in the absence of security constraints. Our results establish noise-adaptive encoding and decoding as a powerful framework for improving secure communication over realistic noisy quantum channels.
We introduce noise-adaptive quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, in which the honest parties optimize the encoding (state preparation) and decoding (measurement basis) operations according to the noise models affecting the honest subsystems induced by an eavesdropper. This extends conventional QKD schemes that employ fixed encoding and decoding strategies independent of the noise characteristics of the communication channel. We investigate three representative protocols: entanglement-based secure dense coding (SDC), the entanglement-free Lucamarini and Mancini (LM05), and a two-way prepare-and-measure Bennett Brassard (BB84) protocols. Using entropic uncertainty relations, we derive the corresponding secret key rates for both adaptive and conventional non-adaptive scenarios under collective attacks. For independent but identical noise acting on the forward and backward transmission channels, as well as for correlated and non-Markovian environments, we identify classes of channels for which adaptive schemes yield enhanced secret key rates for the considered protocols. In contrast, we also determine Pauli channels, including depolarizing and bit flip channels, for which adaptive strategies provide no benefit. We further show that these optimal sets are generally non-unique and can differ substantially from the unitaries that maximize dense-coding capacity in the absence of security constraints. Our results establish noise-adaptive encoding and decoding as a powerful framework for improving secure communication over realistic noisy quantum channels.
Quantum communication is at the heart of the quantum information theory. We study two types of quantum communication protocols over noisy transmission channels, i.e. super dense coding and cryptography protocols. In the first part of this thesis, for various scenarios, it is discussed how the super dense coding capacity is influenced by noisy quantum channels. The case of memoryless channels as well as those channels with memory which are modelled by uncorrelated and correlated noise, respectively, are considered. Explicitly Pauli channels over arbitrary dimensions are treated and the super dense coding capacity for some resource states is derived. For the qubit depolarizing channel, when noise is uncorrelated, the super dense coding capacity with respect to the input state is also optimized. This illustrates a threshold value of the noise parameter below which the super dense coding capacity is optimized by a maximally entangled initial state, while above the threshold value the super dense coding capacity is optimized by a product state. For Pauli channels, with correlated noise, the case of non unitary encoding is studied and the super dense coding capacity is derived. The first part of this thesis is concluded with an example for multipartite super dense coding.
In the second part of the thesis, the problem of optimal eavesdropping on noisy states in quantum key distribution is investigated. The case of the six state protocol, when the signal states are mixed with white noise, is considered. This situation may arise either when Alice deliberately adds noise to the signal states before they leave her lab, or, in a realistic scenario when the eavesdropper (referred to as Eve) is not assumed to replace the noisy quantum channel by a noiseless one. For individual attacks, we find Eve's optimal mutual information with Alice as a function of the quantum bit error rate. Finally, the results illustrate that adding noise on the quantum level can make quantum key distribution more robust against eavesdropping.
We investigate the resilience to noise of single-qubit quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols in the scenario of security against independent eavesdropping attacks and key distillation based on one-way classical communication. To this end, we introduce a noise-based metric that quantifies the efficiency of QKD protocols. Within this framework, we analyze the maximal noise levels that allow Alice and Bob to asymptotically establish a secure secret key. Using this assumption, we compare the noise tolerance of general single-qubit QKD protocols, in particular the BB84, B92, E91, and six-state protocols. Our main result determines the noise level threshold for QKD allowing one to distill an asymptotically secure secret key. Additionally, we demonstrate that the six-state protocol achieves the greatest resistance to noise while simultaneously yielding a higher post-selection efficiency than the other analyzed single-qubit protocols, confirming its robustness within the considered security model. Finally, we perform an analysis of the proposed noise-based metric and the conventional quantum bit error rate (QBER) metric.
We present a technique for proving the security of quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols. It is based on direct information-theoretic arguments and thus also applies if no equivalent entanglement purification scheme can be found. Using this technique, we investigate a general class of QKD protocols with one-way classical post-processing. We show that, in order to analyze the full security of these protocols, it suffices to consider collective attacks. Indeed, we give new lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate which only involve entropies of two-qubit density operators and which are thus easy to compute. As an illustration of our results, we analyze the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the six-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols with one-way error correction and privacy amplification. Surprisingly, the performance of these protocols is increased if one of the parties adds noise to the measurement data before the error correction. In particular, this additional noise makes the protocols more robust against noise in the quantum channel.
Quantum Key Distribution is theoretically possible secure communication through the use of quantum-mechanical principles, such as superposition, measurement disturbance, and others. The BB84 and E91 protocols provide security by leveraging quantum principles against classical eavesdropping; nevertheless, the current implementation of QKD is vulnerable to photon-number-splitting attacks, imperfections in the devices used, and environmental quantum noise. Improving practical resistance to all of those is crucial for providing secure real-life use of QKD. Extending the current state-of-the-art through further development of research on eavesdropper detection and improvement of qubit-based security mechanisms, this research aims to develop the state-of-the art further by introducing a decoy-state BB84 framework and analyzing the behavior of such a system under realistic quantum noise. To find solutions to these problems, the current research will try to adopt the decoy-state BB84 model and analyze the system behavior under realistic quantum noise scenarios. So, the proposed approach, a standard BB84 protocol, will first be formulated and then further enhanced with decoy-state pulse generation to handle the vulnerabilities due to multi-photon pulses. Models like depolarizing noise, amplitude damping, and measurement errors will be used as real-world quantum channels. The model performance will be measured in terms of various performance metrics such as Key agreement ratio, Quantum Bit Error rate, and secure key rate for different qubit lengths. Scalability analysis and validation based on IBM quantum hardware will also be performed in order to measure the impact of real-world device noise on the reliability of generated keys.
The quantum dense-coding (DC) protocol, which has no security feature, deals with the transmission of classical information encoded in a quantum state by using shared entanglement between a single sender and a single receiver. Its appropriate variant has been established as a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme for shared two-qubit maximally entangled states, with the security proof utilizing the uncertainty relation of complementary observables and the Shor-Preskill entanglement purification scheme. We present the DC-based QKD protocol for higher-dimensional systems and report the lower bounds on the secret key rate, when the shared state is a two-qudit maximally entangled state, and mixtures of maximally entangled states with different ranks. The analysis also includes the impact of noisy channels on the secure key rates, before and after encoding. In both the noiseless and the noisy scenarios, we demonstrate that the key rate as well as the robustness of the protocol against noise increases with the dimension. Further, we prove that the set of useless states in the DC-based QKD protocol is convex and compact.
We investigate a general class of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols using one-way classical communication. We show that full security can be proven by considering only collective attacks. We derive computable lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate of those QKD protocols involving only entropies of two-qubit density operators. As an illustration of our results, we determine new bounds for the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the 6-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols. We show that in all these cases the first classical processing that the legitimate partners should apply consists in adding noise.