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arXiv:2605.03230

SILMARILS: Information-Theoretic and Quantum-Secure Designated-Verifier Signatures

Hassan Khodaiemehr, Khadijeh Bagheri, Chen Feng, Dariia Porechna

Published May 4, 2026• 3 citations
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Abstract

SILMARILS is built from a minimal algebraic core over $\mathbb{F}_p$ using true randomness and perfect $2$-out-of-$2$ Shamir secret sharing. The framework supports both two-party and three-party modes. In the two-party setting, SILMARILS realizes a transferable designated-verifier (TDV) signature scheme. The designated verifier can simulate accepting transcripts indistinguishable from real ones, achieving Jakobsson-Sako-Impagliazzo DV security. The verifier may publish a receipt $r$ enabling public verification, yet even with $r$, no external party can tell whether a transcript was signed or simulated. As DV signatures permit simulation, standard EUF-CMA cannot hold for the designated verifier; instead, we prove $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}^{\neg\mathsf{DV}}$ security for all non-designated verifiers in both the random oracle model (ROM) and quantum random oracle model (QROM). In the three-party mode, adopting the broadcast model of Fitzi et al., we obtain a statistically secure signature protocol with simulation-based security and error $1/p$. We analyze security in the Pure IT model, the IT+ROM, and the QROM, extending the Fitzi et al. framework to quantum adversaries with classical I/O. Correctness, secrecy, transferability, and unforgeability for non-designated parties remain equivalent to simulation-based security. Thanks to its simple algebraic structure, SILMARILS offers very compact keys and signatures for the blockchain settings we target, where standardized PQC schemes are already more than sufficient. Our goal is not to compare SILMARILS with PQC, but to highlight its suitability for lightweight TDV authentication. A fair comparison with other DV schemes is omitted due to space and the complexity of aligning models.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2605.03230

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Most of the classical designated verifier signature schemes are insecure against quantum adversary. In this paper, a quantum signature scheme for the designated verifier is proposed. In our scheme, during the initialization phase, the partners share secret keys by performing the quantum key distribution protocol. On the other hand, by performing the quantum direct communication protocol, the key generator center shares secret keys with the signer and the designated verifier, respectively. The key generator center generates a particle sequence of Bell state and distributes the particles between the signer and the designated verifier. During the signature generation phase, the signer encrypts the particle sequence by the secret keys and Hardmard operators. After that, the signer performs the controlled unitary operations on the encrypted particle sequence so as to generate the quantum signature. The designated verifier can simulate the quantum signature by performing the same symmetric signing steps as that performed by the original signer. Hence, the quantum signature signed by the true signer is the same as the one simulated by the receiver, which makes our scheme possess the designated properties. During the signature verification phase, the designated verifier performs the controlled unitary operations on the quantum signature and obtains the quantum ciphertexts. After that, the designated verifier decrypts the quantum ciphertexts by the symmetric secret keys and Hardmard operators so that the quantum signature can be verified. Our signature is secure against forgery attack, inter-resending attacks and Trojan horse attack. Because the trace distance between the density operators of different quantum signatures is zero, the information-theoretical security of our quantum signature scheme can be proved. The unconditionally secure quantum key distribution protocol and the one-time pad encryption algorithm can guarantee the security of the secret keys shared by the partners. What is more, the security assumption about the key generation center is weak. That is, it is not necessary to assume that the key generation center should be fully trusted. On the other hand, in our scheme, the quantum one-way function is not used. To generate a quantum signature, the signer need not prepare for entangled particle sequence. To verify a quantum signature, the verifier need not apply any state comparison to the received particles. The qubit efficiency is 100%. Therefore, our scheme has the advantages in the security and efficiency over the other quantum signature schemes for the designated verifier.

Acta Physica Sinica•Jan 1, 2020•10 citations
SILMARILS is built from a minimal algebraic core over Fp\mathbb{F}_pFp​ using true randomness and perfect 222-out-of-222 Shamir secret sharing. The framework supports both two-party and three-party modes. In the two-party setting, SILMARILS realizes a transferable designated-verifier (TDV) signature scheme. The designated verifier can simulate accepting transcripts indistinguishable from real ones, achieving Jakobsson-Sako-Impagliazzo DV security. The verifier may publish a receipt rrr enabling public verification, yet even with rrr, no external party can tell whether a transcript was signed or simulated. As DV signatures permit simulation, standard EUF-CMA cannot hold for the designated verifier; instead, we prove EUF-CMA¬DV\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}^{\neg\mathsf{DV}}EUF-CMA¬DV security for all non-designated verifiers in both the random oracle model (ROM) and quantum random oracle model (QROM). In the three-party mode, adopting the broadcast model of Fitzi et al., we obtain a statistically secure signature protocol with simulation-based security and error 1/p1/p1/p. We analyze security in the Pure IT model, the IT+ROM, and the QROM, extending the Fitzi et al. framework to quantum adversaries with classical I/O. Correctness, secrecy, transferability, and unforgeability for non-designated parties remain equivalent to simulation-based security. Thanks to its simple algebraic structure, SILMARILS offers very compact keys and signatures for the blockchain settings we target, where standardized PQC schemes are already more than sufficient. Our goal is not to compare SILMARILS with PQC, but to highlight its suitability for lightweight TDV authentication. A fair comparison with other DV schemes is omitted due to space and the complexity of aligning models.
Permissioned blockchains authenticate transactions, votes and quorum certificates with computationally secure signatures, and post-quantum replacements inflate consensus traffic by orders of magnitude. Information-theoretic alternatives have required a trusted authority, quantum channels, per-signature interaction, or single-use keys with bounded transfer. We present SILMARILS-MV, a multi-verifier unconditionally secure signature in which a signature is the vector α=A e(m)α= A\,e(m)α=Ae(m) and each verifier holds a secret functional ci=ΓTλ(xi)c_i = Γ^T λ(x_i)ci​=ΓTλ(xi​) derived from virtual anchors ΓΓΓ that nobody learns. Against unbounded adversaries corrupting up to ωωω verifiers and any signers, and observing every decision, an honest verifier accepts a forged or invalid signature with probability at most Q/q+1/(q−1)Q/q + 1/(q-1)Q/q+1/(q−1), a bound that is tight in its leading term. The scheme is strongly unforgeable, non-repudiable, transferable across unboundedly many hops, and linearly aggregatable. Keys are issued by the validators through perfectly secure MPC for t<n/3t < n/3t<n/3, without broadcast. To scale, we let the committee itself sign: in threshold notarization, finality certificates have constant size 32(ω+1)32(ω+1)32(ω+1) bytes and per-validator issuance cost no longer depends on nnn. Arbiter-verified keys give clients 32-byte signatures, robust redistribution supports membership changes and share refresh, and verifiers can be enrolled retroactively. A certificate verifies in 2.4 microseconds. In an analytic normal-case model at 1000 validators, threshold notarization needs 71 KiB of authentication traffic per validator per block, 22x less than ML-DSA-44 for admitted verifiers. In a Rust HotStuff prototype with 100 validators, SILMARILS-MV commits 2.8x more transactions per second than ML-DSA-44 with 67x less cryptographic CPU, and Monte-Carlo attacks match the bounds.
Digital signatures are unsuitable for specific applications that are sensitive on a personal or commercial level because they are universally verifiable. Jakobsson et al. proposed the Designated Verifier Signature (DVS) system, which only allows the intended verifier to validate a message’s signature. It prohibits the disclosure of a conviction to a third party. This functionality is useful in applications that require both authenticity and signer privacy, such as electronic voting and tender calls. The vast majority of current DVS schemes are based on difficult number theory problems such as integer factorization or discrete log problems over various groups. The development of a large-scale quantum computer would render these schemes unsafe. As a result, it is critical to develop quantum-resistant DVS methods. In both quantum and classical computers, signatures based on one-way functions are more efficient and secure. They have several advantages over digital signatures based on trapdoor functions. As a result, hash-based signatures are now considered viable alternatives to number-theoretic signatures. Existing hash-based signatures, on the other hand, are easily verifiable by anyone. As a result, they do not protect the signer’s identity. In addition, they are one-time signatures. This paper presents a hash-based multi-time designated verifier signature scheme that ensures signer anonymity. The unforgeability of the signature scheme is also tested in the random oracle model under chosen message attack. The properties such as non-transferability and non-delegatability are investigated.
Abstract Designated verifier signature (DVS) schemes can be applied in many scenes, such as E-voting and E-bidding use DVS attributes to protect the secret of participants. Most traditional DVS schemes are vulnerable to quantum computer attacks. Then, an identity-based semi-trusted third-party quantum DVS (STQDVS) scheme is proposed, which is safe for quantum means of attack. In new STQDVS scheme, the third participant prepares entangled Bell states and allocates them to the signer and the designated verifier (DV). The signer uses the identity information as her public key and the measurement results of corresponding quantum sequences as her private key to generate the signature. The DV applies the identity information as his public key and the measurement results of corresponding quantum sequences as her private key to verify the signature. Non-transferability and hidden origin are guaranteed by the fact that the DV can generate the same signature as the signatory by means of a simulated signature step. Security analysis has shown that attacks such as forgery, inter-resending, and impersonation are ineffective for the proposed scheme and that even third-party cannot forge signatures. On the other hand, the whole process of the scheme does not require any quantum key distribution protocols, quantum one-way functions, and quantum state exchange tests, which makes the STQDVS scheme relatively simple and more efficient than similar schemes.
Based on a set of locally indistinguishable orthogonal product (LIOP) states, a quantum designated multi-verifier signature scheme (LIOP-QDMVS) is proposed. In this scheme, each verifier can independently verify partial signature without exchanging information with other verifiers. The protocol can address the issue of excessive power from individual verifiers, as the signature is accepted as valid only when all verifiers confirm its validity. Additionally, all designated verifiers can collaborate to simulate signatures from the signer, that achieve the non-transferability and source hiding of the protocol. Furthermore, the scheme does not require any third-party involvement, and no entangled states need to be prepared during signature generation. It is proven that the LIOP-QDMVS owns unforgeability, correctness, theoretical information security, and designated verifier properties, as well as it is resistant to replay attacks and impersonation attacks. Therefore, LIOP-QDMVS offers better security and efficiency.
The Signal protocol and its X3DH key exchange core are regularly used by billions of people in applications like WhatsApp but are unfortunately not quantum-secure. Thus, designing an efficient and post-quantum secure X3DH alternative is paramount. Notably, X3DH supports asynchronicity, as parties can immediately derive keys after uploading them to a central server, and deniability, allowing parties to plausibly deny having completed key exchange. To satisfy these constraints, existing post-quantum X3DH proposals use ring signatures (or equivalently a form of designated-verifier signatures) to provide authentication without compromising deniability as regular signatures would. Existing ring signature schemes, however, have some drawbacks. Notably, they are not generally proven secure in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) and so the quantum security of parameters that are proposed is unclear and likely weaker than claimed. In addition, they are generally slower than standard primitives like KEMs. In this work, we propose an efficient, deniable and post-quantum X3DH-like protocol that we call K-Waay, that does not rely on ring signatures. At its core, K-Waay uses a split-KEM, a primitive introduced by Brendel et al. [SAC 2020], to provide Diffie-Hellman-like implicit authentication and secrecy guarantees. Along the way, we revisit the formalism of Brendel et al. and identify that additional security properties are required to prove a split-KEM-based protocol secure. We instantiate split-KEM by building a protocol based on the Frodo key exchange protocol relying on the plain LWE assumption: our proofs might be of independent interest as we show it satisfies our novel unforgeability and deniability security notions. Finally, we complement our theoretical results by thoroughly benchmarking both K-Waay and existing X3DH protocols. Our results show even when using plain LWE and a conservative choice of parameters that K-Waay is significantly faster than previous work.
Most of the classical designated verifier signature schemes are insecure against quantum adversary. In this paper, a quantum signature scheme for the designated verifier is proposed. In our scheme, during the initialization phase, the partners share secret keys by performing the quantum key distribution protocol. On the other hand, by performing the quantum direct communication protocol, the key generator center shares secret keys with the signer and the designated verifier, respectively. The key generator center generates a particle sequence of Bell state and distributes the particles between the signer and the designated verifier. During the signature generation phase, the signer encrypts the particle sequence by the secret keys and Hardmard operators. After that, the signer performs the controlled unitary operations on the encrypted particle sequence so as to generate the quantum signature. The designated verifier can simulate the quantum signature by performing the same symmetric signing steps as that performed by the original signer. Hence, the quantum signature signed by the true signer is the same as the one simulated by the receiver, which makes our scheme possess the designated properties. During the signature verification phase, the designated verifier performs the controlled unitary operations on the quantum signature and obtains the quantum ciphertexts. After that, the designated verifier decrypts the quantum ciphertexts by the symmetric secret keys and Hardmard operators so that the quantum signature can be verified. Our signature is secure against forgery attack, inter-resending attacks and Trojan horse attack. Because the trace distance between the density operators of different quantum signatures is zero, the information-theoretical security of our quantum signature scheme can be proved. The unconditionally secure quantum key distribution protocol and the one-time pad encryption algorithm can guarantee the security of the secret keys shared by the partners. What is more, the security assumption about the key generation center is weak. That is, it is not necessary to assume that the key generation center should be fully trusted. On the other hand, in our scheme, the quantum one-way function is not used. To generate a quantum signature, the signer need not prepare for entangled particle sequence. To verify a quantum signature, the verifier need not apply any state comparison to the received particles. The qubit efficiency is 100%. Therefore, our scheme has the advantages in the security and efficiency over the other quantum signature schemes for the designated verifier.