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arXiv:2604.18422 · npj Quantum Information

Security Risks of VOA-Induced Luminescence in Chip-Based quantum key distribution

Zijian Li, Chenyu Xu, Xin Hua, Yongqiang Du, Xin Liu, Tao Lin, Xi Xiao, Kejin Wei

quant-phphysics.opticsSubmitted Apr 20, 2026• Announced Apr 21, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

Integrated photonics is widely regarded as a key enabler for scalable quantum key distribution (QKD), offering compactness, stability, and compatibility with semiconductor fabrication. Despite rapid advances in chip-based QKD, the implementation security of integrated photonic components remains insufficiently understood. Here we present the first systematic study of an implementation-level security vulnerability associated with p-n junction-based variable optical attenuators (VOAs), a ubiquitous component in integrated QKD transmitters. We theoretically and experimentally demonstrate that electrically biased p-n junction VOAs emit spontaneous luminescence. Using a single-photon-sensitive spectral measurement technique, we identify the emission wavelength to be centered around 1107 nm, well separated from the C-band quantum signals. This spectral separation gives rise to a previously unrecognized wavelength-resolved side channel, enabling potential wavelength-splitting attacks without directly disturbing the encoded quantum states. By incorporating the measured luminescence into a quantitative security analysis, we show that even extremely weak emission can lead to non-negligible information leakage. Our findings reveal a fundamental and previously overlooked security risk in photonic integrated QKD systems and highlight the necessity of security-aware device design for future integrated quantum communication technologies.

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Integrated photonics is widely regarded as a key enabler for scalable quantum key distribution (QKD), offering compactness, stability, and compatibility with semiconductor fabrication. Despite rapid advances in chip-based QKD, the implementation security of integrated photonic components remains insufficiently understood. Here we present the first systematic study of an implementation-level security vulnerability associated with p-n junction-based variable optical attenuators (VOAs), a ubiquitous component in integrated QKD transmitters. We theoretically and experimentally demonstrate that electrically biased p-n junction VOAs emit spontaneous luminescence. Using a single-photon-sensitive spectral measurement technique, we identify the emission wavelength to be centered around 1107 nm, well separated from the C-band quantum signals. This spectral separation gives rise to a previously unrecognized wavelength-resolved side channel, enabling potential wavelength-splitting attacks without directly disturbing the encoded quantum states. By incorporating the measured luminescence into a quantitative security analysis, we show that even extremely weak emission can lead to non-negligible information leakage. Our findings reveal a fundamental and previously overlooked security risk in photonic integrated QKD systems and highlight the necessity of security-aware device design for future integrated quantum communication technologies.
Fully integrated quantum key distribution (QKD) transmitters must attenuate classical optical powers to the single-photon level on the same photonic chip. We show that on-chip attenuation can be limited not by the classical extinction ratio of an integrated variable optical attenuator (VOA), but by residual chip-level stray light or substrate-guided modes. We report results for an indium phosphide QKD transmitter, where characterization at classical optical power levels suggests reachable on-chip powers below −90 dBm, while photon-counting measurements reveal a residual optical leakage floor at approximately −55 dBm to −70 dBm. Fiber-displacement measurements show comparable power levels, indicating that this leakage floor reaches the output collection fiber outside the intended waveguide path. A coherent modulation measurement confirms a residual carrier-like component, while the applied modulation sidebands remain suppressible. These results identify stray-light-limited attenuation as a key design and characterization challenge for integrated QKD transmitters and show that VOA performance must be qualified at QKD-relevant power levels.
Implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) need vulnerability assessment against loopholes in their optical scheme. Most of the optical attacks involve injecting or receiving extraneous light via the communication channel. An eavesdropper can choose her attack wavelengths arbitrarily within the quantum channel passband to maximize the attack performance, exploiting spectral transparency windows of system components. Here we propose a wide-spectrum security evaluation methodology to achieve full optical spectrum safety for QKD systems. This technique requires transmittance characterization in a wide spectral band with a high sensitivity. We report a testbench that characterizes insertion loss of fiber-optic components in a wide spectral range of 400–2300 nm and up to 70 dB dynamic range. To illustrate practical application of the proposed methodology, we give a full Trojan-horse attack analysis for some typical QKD system configurations and discuss briefly induced-photorefraction and detector-backflash attacks. Our methodology can be used for certification of QKD systems.
In this paper, we investigate spectral vulnerabilities in quantum key distribution systems arising from the use of shorter-wavelength radiation in the 400–800 nm range, with particular focus on the induced photorefraction attack (IPA). Crucial elements influenced by the IPA include various types of both phase and intensity modulators, and we consider different scenarios and their implications. Through combined theoretical and experimental analysis, we demonstrate that optical components commonly used as countermeasures in the telecom band (1000–2100 nm) exhibit significantly reduced effectiveness at shorter wavelengths. The efficiency of IPA is shown to increase as the wavelength decreases, posing a substantial threat to phase-modulation-based QKD protocols. We analyze the impact of IPA across different QKD architectures and assess the feasibility of potential countermeasures under realistic implementation scenarios. Our results highlight the necessity of broadband security evaluations and wavelength-aware component design in future QKD systems.
In the evolving field of Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CV-QKD), notable for its synergistic potential with existing optical communication infrastructures, a high channel capacity, and an anticipated surge in secret rates, the Measurement Device Independent (MDI) framework stands as a bulwark against side-channel vulnerabilities at the measurement juncture [1] –[4]. Recent years have witnessed quantum photonics technology leapfrogging into a realm that promises the realization of fully integrated CV-MDI-QKD transmitter terminals, a cornerstone for large-scale CV-MDI-QKD networks. However, integrating high-efficiency on-chip light sources while effectively navigating the treacherous waters of practical security challenges remains a formidable task [5], [6]. This study is pioneering in its focus on the practical security intricacies stemming from imperfections in on-chip light sources within CV-MDI-QKD systems. We propose defense mechanisms tailored to shield against the risks associated with source defects, thereby laying a robust foundation for secure, reliable on-chip CV-MDI-QKD transmission terminals. This advancement is a critical enabler for the widespread adoption of CV-MDI-QKD, signaling a paradigm shift in secure communications.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a quantum communication technology that offers absolute security. Among its various implementations, continuous-variable (CV) QKD has garnered significant attention due to its high secret key generation rates and compatibility with conventional optical telecommunication infrastructure, which operates under ambient conditions. However, chip-based integration is crucial for realizing practical and scalable CV-QKD networks, and photonic integrated circuit technology is a potential solution, leveraging the on-chip integration of essential optical components onto silicon photonic circuits. Therefore, this work presents a compact, stable, and cost-effective quantum photonic CV-QKD system on a chip. Our architecture combines time- and polarization-multiplexing with high-extinction-ratio pulse generation to mitigate excess noise. At the same time, a real-time feedback control mechanism compensates for polarization drift, ensuring robust system performance. Fiber-based evaluations reveal secret key generation rates of 2.55 Mbps over 25 km and 0.737 Mbps over 50 km with 12 h stable operation, establishing, to our knowledge, a new benchmark for integrated photonic CV-QKD systems with both the transmitter and receiver on-chip. These results mark a significant milestone in on-chip quantum communication, paving the way for widespread adoption of photonic integrated circuits in future metropolitan quantum-secure networks.
Breakthroughs in chip integration technology have accelerated the practical deployment and scalable implementation of quantum key distribution (QKD). On-chip quantum light sources are critical components of fully integrated QKD systems. Measurement-Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD) offers significant advantages in network communication by eliminating vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks at the detector side, while relying on high-visibility Hong-Ou-Mandel interference between photons emitted by two independent lasers. Here, we present an innovative design of the silicon-based hybrid integrated self-injection locking (SIL) laser chip that achieves high-frequency-stability operation with the frequency detuning between independent lasers suppressed to within 15 MHz, enabling high-visibility HOM interference in MDI-QKD. Leveraging this design, we experimentally demonstrate a loss-tolerant MDI-QKD system employing the setting-choice-independent correlation security framework explicitly accounting for state-preparation uncertainty. The system achieves a finite-key secret rate of 17 b/s under 34 dB channel loss (or 170-km standard fiber), surpassing previously reported MDI-QKD experiments that incorporated state preparation uncertainty under equivalent transmission loss conditions. Our result makes a promising contribution to practical applications of fully integrated quantum communication networks.