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arXiv:2603.22122 · Physical Review A

Post-selective attack with multi-mode projection onto Fock subspace

Andrei Gaidash, George Miroshnichenko, Anton Kozubov

quant-phSubmitted Mar 23, 2026• Announced Mar 24, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

In this work we present a comprehensive analysis of a post-selective attack on quantum key distribution protocols employing phase-encoded linearly independent coherent states (or similar alternatives). The attack relies on multimode projection onto a Fock subspace and enables probabilistic extraction of information by an eavesdropper. We derive analytical expressions for the information accessible to the adversary and show that it depends only on three protocol parameters: the mean photon number of the signal states, the phase separation in the information basis, and the expected optical loss of the quantum channel. Several optical realizations of phase-encoded quantum key distribution protocols are analyzed to illustrate the applicability of the results. Possible countermeasures against the proposed attack are also discussed.

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In this work we present a comprehensive analysis of a post-selective attack on quantum key distribution protocols employing phase-encoded linearly independent coherent states (or similar alternatives). The attack relies on multimode projection onto a Fock subspace and enables probabilistic extraction of information by an eavesdropper. We derive analytical expressions for the information accessible to the adversary and show that it depends only on three protocol parameters: the mean photon number of the signal states, the phase separation in the information basis, and the expected optical loss of the quantum channel. Several optical realizations of phase-encoded quantum key distribution protocols are analyzed to illustrate the applicability of the results. Possible countermeasures against the proposed attack are also discussed.
Ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols call for a source that emits single photon signals, but the sources used in typical practical realizations emit weak coherent states instead. A weak coherent state may contain more than one photon, which poses a potential security risk. QKD with weak coherent state signals has nevertheless been proven to be secure, but only under the assumption that the phase of each signal is random (and completely unknown to the adversary). Since this assumption need not be fully justified in practice, it is important to know whether phase randomization is really a requirement for security rather than a convenient technical assumption that makes the security proof easier. Here, we exhibit an explicit attack in which the eavesdropper exploits knowledge of the phase of the signals, and show that this attack allows the eavesdropper to learn every key bit in a parameter regime where a protocol using phase-randomized signals is provably secure. Thus we demonstrate that phase randomization really does enhance the security of QKD using weak coherent states. This result highlights the importance of a careful characterization of the source for proofs of the security of quantum key distribution.
Subject of Research. We present the results of analytical research and experimental implementation of quantum key distribution protocol based on multi-mode weak coherent states with untrusted detection node. Such states are based on interference of phase-coded sidebands in case, where legitimate users are sending these states to the untrusted detection node that could be controlled by an eavesdropper. Method. The method of initial states generation is applied. Their propagation via fiber-optic lines and interference result is shown. A classical approximation is used for description. The experiment is carried out with the power measurement system connected on detection node side. We present the experimental scheme and show that in the classical regime the interference pattern is obtained at the fiber-optic 2x2 beam splitter with 50:50 ratio depending on the phase difference of the radiofrequency modulating signals (4.8 GHz) applied to LiNbO3 phase modulators, which modulate an optical carrier (1550 nm) in the blocks of legitimate users. Main Results. Experimental results are in accordance with analytical ones. Harmonical dependence of the optical power at the sidebands is obtained as an interference result. In this case, visibility of interference pattern is up to 97.4% and is good enough. Thus, application of these results in terms of quantum optics and experimentation in quantum single-photon regime might be a subject of future research. Practical Relevance. Practical application of research results lies in the development of quantum key distribution protocols and optical schemes with special attention to eavesdropping of quantum states and attacking the detection nodes. Application of the proposed multi-mode coherent states enables the legitimate users to extract information, while an eavesdropper does not obtain any information about encoded bits due to ambiguity of detection events.
This paper presents a multi-stage, multi-photon quantum key distribution protocol based on the double-lock cryptography.It exploits the asymmetry in the detection strategies between the legitimate users and the eavesdropper.The security analysis of the protocol is presented with coherent states under the interceptresend attack, the photon number splitting attack, and the man-in-the-middle attack.It is found that the mean photon number can be much larger 1.This complements the recent interest in multi-photon quantum communication protocols that require a pre-shared key between the legitimate users.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is one of the most promising technologies that enable theoretically unbreakable secure communications in this highly advanced information security era. This work provides a comparative analysis of QKD protocols such as BB84, Coherent One-Way (COW), and Differential Phase-Shift (DPS) against eavesdropping attacks e.g., Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attack. It employs a realistic approach to simulations such as using weak coherent pulse (WCP) sources. This work also explores qubit generation and the whole key distribution process in non-ideal conditions. Detailed algorithms have been discussed that simulate the encoding, transmission, and decoding process for every protocol, as well as simulating PNS attacks where an eavesdropper removes photons to gain key information without any detectable errors. Statistical metrics, such as Visibility and the information gain, are used to quantify the impact of these attacks. Future work aspects may include the extension of the simulation to incorporate additional parameters such as channel noise, fiber attenuation, detector dark counts, etc. to provide a realistic analysis to compare various QKD protocols.
Abstract The analysis of the security of quantum key distribution systems with respect to an attack with nondemolishing measurement of the number of photons (photon number splitting—PNS attack) is carried out under the assumption that in the communication channel in each parcel there is a pure Fock state with a different number of photons, and the distribution of states by number of photons has Poisson statistics. In reality, in the communication channel in each parcel there are not individual Fock states, but a pure coherent state with a random phase—a superposition of Fock states with different numbers of photons. The paper analyzes the necessary experimental resources necessary to prepare individual Fock states with a certain number of photons from the superposition of Fock states for a PNS attack. Optical schemes for implementing such an attack are given, and estimates of experimental parameters at which a PNS attack is possible are made.
We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the key information is encoded in the relative phase of a coherent-state reference pulse and a weak coherent-state signal pulse, as in some practical implementations of the protocol. In contrast to previous work, our proof applies even if the eavesdropper knows the phase of the reference pulse, provided that this phase is not modulated by the source, and even if the reference pulse is bright. The proof also applies to the case where the key is encoded in the photon polarization of a weak coherent-state pulse with a known phase, but only if the phases of the four BB84 signal states are judiciously chosen. The achievable key generation rate scales quadratically with the transmission in the channel, just as for BB84 with phase-randomized weak coherent-state signals (when decoy states are not used). For the case where the phase of the reference pulse is strongly modulated by the source, we exhibit an explicit attack that allows the eavesdropper to learn every key bit in a parameter regime where a protocol using phase-randomized signals is provably secure.