Modern cryptography relies on keyed symmetric ciphers to ensure the secrecy and authenticity of high bandwidth data transfer. While the advent of quantum computers poses a challenge for public key cryptography, unbroken ciphers are considered safe against quantum attacks if their key is sufficiently long. However, concrete bounds on the required key length thus far remain elusive: Despite the well known asymptotic complexity of Grover's quantum search, the optimal algorithm to recover a secret key, no implementation-agnostic tight bounds were established. Here, we discuss the quantum thermodynamic limits of generic search algorithms, and find a work-runtime trade-off for autonomous computers with a fundamental lower bound. By devising an application-specific quantum protocol, which outperforms circuit and adiabatic implementations, and saturates this bound, we demonstrate that it is tight. Applying this limit, we find that a secret key of 831 bit length cannot be reconstructed deterministically in an expanding, dark-energy-dominated universe until star formation is expected to cease. Implications for post quantum cryptography, and quantum key distribution are discussed.
Modern cryptography relies on keyed symmetric ciphers to ensure the secrecy and authenticity of high bandwidth data transfer. While the advent of quantum computers poses a challenge for public key cryptography, unbroken ciphers are considered safe against quantum attacks if their key is sufficiently long. However, concrete bounds on the required key length thus far remain elusive: Despite the well known asymptotic complexity of Grover's quantum search, the optimal algorithm to recover a secret key, no implementation-agnostic tight bounds were established. Here, we discuss the quantum thermodynamic limits of generic search algorithms, and find a work-runtime trade-off for autonomous computers with a fundamental lower bound. By devising an application-specific quantum protocol, which outperforms circuit and adiabatic implementations, and saturates this bound, we demonstrate that it is tight. Applying this limit, we find that a secret key of 831 bit length cannot be reconstructed deterministically in an expanding, dark-energy-dominated universe until star formation is expected to cease. Implications for post quantum cryptography, and quantum key distribution are discussed.
Quantum cryptography provides perfect secrecy if the key exchanged is used for one-time-pad encryption. However, this requires very long keys which are not practical in most scenarios. Further, the key exchange bit-rate for quantum key distribution is very low. Consequently, often quantum key distribution algorithms only exchange (128, 192 or 256 bit) AES keys and then AES is used for data encryption. While Grover's algorithm will force us to only use AES- 256 and does not pose a catastrophic failure to AES, AES does not provide provable security. In this paper, we discuss methods that provide provable security but at the same time the key lengths may be controlled to practical levels. Difficulty of breaking the cipher is directly proportional to the key length and depends on the specific algorithm employed. The key idea is that key lengths can be tweaked such that an acceptable and provable level of security is achieved and therefore the cipher is not reliant on any assumptions for security. The paper will discuss different ways of achieving the above goal.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to current public-key cryptographic systems, necessitating a transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). While the computational and communication overheads of PQC schemes are actively studied, the fundamental entropic costs associated with achieving and maintaining secrecy in this new paradigm remain underexplored. This paper delves into the concept of entropic cost within post-quantum secrecy, defining it as the quantity and quality of randomness required for secure key generation, cryptographic operations, and resistance against information leakage. We review the theoretical underpinnings of information-theoretic security and apply these principles to analyze the entropic demands of leading PQC candidates, including lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based schemes. Our methodology establishes metrics for quantifying entropy consumption and evaluates how different PQC design choices impact these costs. The results indicate that PQC generally imposes higher entropic demands than classical cryptography, particularly in terms of volume and specific statistical distributions of random numbers needed. This elevated requirement has substantial implications for the design and implementation of true random number generators (TRNGs), resource-constrained environments, and side-channel attack resilience. We discuss the trade-offs between security, performance, and entropic efficiency, highlighting the critical need for robust entropy sources to ensure the long-term quantum-resilient security of PQC systems. Future research directions are proposed, emphasizing optimized entropy generation and management strategies.
This paper investigates the potential impact of quantum computing on the security of currently deployed cryptographic algorithms. The core premise is that the advent of powerful quantum computers, leveraging algorithms like Shor's algorithm and Grover's algorithm, poses a significant threat to widely used public-key cryptosystems and symmetric-key algorithms. We present a theoretical analysis of several key algorithms – RSA, ECC, and AES – examining their vulnerabilities when subjected to quantum attacks. Specifically, we explore the exponential speedup offered by Shor's algorithm for factoring large numbers, the impact on the key size of ECC, and the Grover's algorithm's influence on symmetric key search. Our work highlights the urgency of transitioning to post-quantum cryptography standards to mitigate the risks posed by this technological advancement. The goal is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the landscape of quantum cryptanalysis and its implications for the future of secure communication.
Compared with electronic computers, quantum parallelism has led to a significant increase in the computing power of quantum computers.However, the computing power of quantum computers will also be limited by the laws of physics, and hence there is no doubt that the computing power of quantum computers is not unlimited.For an algorithm, we need to consider both its space complexity and time complexity.This not only requires quantum computers to achieve large-scale integration, but also requires the quantum coherence time to be sufficiently long.If either of the above two conditions is not met, the task cannot be completed.Shor's algorithm [1] reduced the computational complexity of large integer factorization to the polynomial level.This complexity is of the same order as that of the encryption and decryption for the RSA public key cryptography protocol, which leads to the insecurity of the RSA in universal quantum computing.In addition, some other quantum algorithms show different kinds of enhanced speeds for solving different problems, such as the Grover's search algorithm [2] and its improved works [ 3 , 4 ], and the HHL algorithm [5] .With the remarkable computational power of these quantum algorithms, physicists have begun to seek suitable physical systems for the implementation of quantum computing.The implementation of quantum computing includes several basic technologies, such as preparation, precise control, measurement of the physical qubits, and construction of logical qubits.At present, there are many experimental candidate quantum computing platforms, including the superconducting system [6] , trapped ions system [7] , nitrogenvacancy centers in diamonds [8] , and ultra-cold atoms [9] .Recently, Google experimentally demonstrated quantum supremacy with a superconducting quantum computer [10] , thus placing the research on quantum computing at the forefront.With the booming development of quantum computing technology, the public key cryptosystem also needs to be updated periodically.Thus, cryptographers have to constantly look for public key protocols to resist quantum computing attacks, which leads to the emergence of postquantum cryptography.It is worth noting that although the name of post-quantum cryptography contains the word 'quantum', it essentially consists of protocols of classical cryptography.The current research on post-quantum cryptography mainly includes protocols based on the following four frameworks: the protocols based on Hash function, the pro- * Corresponding author.
Quantum cryptography is a new field of research that tries to resolve the critical security concerns brought by quantum computing. There is an increasing effort to construct quantum-safe cryptographic solutions due to the threat that quantum algorithms, especially Shor’s and Grover’s, pose to popular cryptographic systems. Traditional cryptographic methods like RSA and ECC are based on problems that will be efficiently tackled by quantum computers, putting them at risk in a post-quantum world. Also, symmetric cryptography, despite being stronger against that threat, faces its own challenges as well, especially from Grover’s algorithm, which effectively slashes the key length by half, increasing the necessary key size for maintaining security. The rise of quantum technologies has come with additional risks such as cyber threats and security vulnerabilities, therefore creating a need for research in quantum as well as post-quantum cryptography. Quantum cryptography particularly Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) exploits quantum mechanical phenomena to safeguard the exchange of cryptographic keys with information-theoretic security. Eavesdropping in QKD is always detectable. However, due to stringent hardware requirements, QKD is limited for broader practical use. Meanwhile, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) seeks to devise traditional algorithms for cryptography which will continue to remain secure under attacks from quantum computers. Such algorithms include lattice-based cryptography and code-based cryptography which, among others, are being standardized by NIST. This paper examines the current status of quantum cryptography alongside the vulnerabilities present in traditional systems as well as the efforts dedicated to implementing post-quantum algorithms. It covers the standardization and implementation challenges while also outlining prospective future research avenues aimed at reinforcing the cryptographic infrastructure in the era of quantum computing.
Grover search algorithm is the most representative quantum attack method that threatens the security of symmetric key cryptography. If the Grover search algorithm is applied to symmetric key cryptography, the security level of target symmetric key cryptography can be lowered from n-bit to n2-bit. When applying Grover’s search algorithm to the block cipher that is the target of potential quantum attacks, the target block cipher must be implemented as quantum circuits. Starting with the AES block cipher, a number of works have been conducted to optimize and implement target block ciphers into quantum circuits. Recently, many studies have been published to implement lightweight block ciphers as quantum circuits. In this paper, we present optimal quantum circuit designs of symmetric key cryptography, including PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers. The proposed method optimized PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers by minimizing qubits, quantum gates, and circuit depth. We compare proposed PRESENT and GIFT quantum circuits with other results of lightweight block cipher implementations in quantum circuits. Finally, quantum resources of PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers required for the oracle of the Grover search algorithm were estimated.