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arXiv:2510.09149

A one-world interpretation of quantum mechanics

Isaac Layton, Jonathan Oppenheim, Zachary Weller-Davies

Published Oct 10, 2025• 0 citations
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Abstract

The measurement problem is the issue of explaining how the objective classical world emerges from a quantum one. Here we take a different approach. We assume that there is an objective classical system, and then ask that the standard rules of probability theory apply to it when it interacts with a quantum system. Under mild assumptions, we recover the unitary dynamics, collapse and Born rule postulates from quantum theory. Nonetheless, there is no decoherence, because the quantum state remains pure conditioned on the classical trajectory. This results in one world, rather than many-worlds. Our main technical tool is to exploit a change of measure on the space of classical paths, the functional form of which is shown to characterise the quantum dynamics and Born rules of a class of quantum-like theories.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2510.09149

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Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. 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The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.

Classical and Quantum Gravity•Apr 21, 2011•28 citations
The measurement problem is the issue of explaining how the objective classical world emerges from a quantum one. Here we take a different approach. We assume that there is an objective classical system, and then ask that the standard rules of probability theory apply to it when it interacts with a quantum system. Under mild assumptions, we recover the unitary dynamics, collapse and Born rule postulates from quantum theory. Nonetheless, there is no decoherence, because the quantum state remains pure conditioned on the classical trajectory. This results in one world, rather than many-worlds. Our main technical tool is to exploit a change of measure on the space of classical paths, the functional form of which is shown to characterise the quantum dynamics and Born rules of a class of quantum-like theories.
We present a complete, mathematically rigorous, and observer-free resolution of the quantum measurement problem. Building entirely on the axiomatic framework established in the preceding work, which derives the Born rule exclusively from unitary dynamics, uniqueness of classical records, unitary invariance, and ergodic stability, we show that the entire measurement process is governed by a single deterministic law: unitary evolution. The apparent wavefunction collapse is not a physical process but an effective description of the emergence of a unique dynamically stable classical record under decoherence and unique ergodicity. No auxiliary postulates, collapse mechanisms, or observer-dependent inputs are required. We explain the origin of definite measurement outcomes, the emergence of objective probability, the elimination of quantum-classical duality, and provide a fully consistent resolution of the Wigner’s friend paradox. The framework reproduces all experimental predictions of quantum mechanics without contradictions and establishes a unified, self-contained foundation for quantum measurement theory. This work constitutes the first complete, minimal, and mathematically closed solution to the quantum measurement problem.
Quantum mechanics famously posits two distinct evolution rules for the state of a system: a deterministic, unitary time evolution under the Schr¨odinger equation, and a probabilistic “collapse” of the wavefunction upon measurement as dictated by the Born rule. The apparent inconsistency of these two dynamical laws – one continuous and one discontinuous – constitutes the quantum measurement problem. This foundational problem, which underlies the emergence of definite outcomes from quantum superpositions, has persisted since the theory’s inception. In this review, we present a comprehensive and rigorous examination of the measurement problem and survey the leading approaches that seek to resolve or circumvent it. We begin by formulating the measurement problem and its conceptual challenges. We then discuss in detail the major interpretations of quantum mechanics and theoretical frameworks addressing the problem: the Copenhagen interpretation, Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, de Broglie–Bohm pilot-wave theory, objective collapse models, the role of decoherence and environment-induced superselection, and epistemic approaches such as QBism. For each interpretation, we describe the core principles and mathematical formalism, assessing how (and whether) it attempts to solve the measurement problem. We also review modern developments and experiments relevant to quantum measurements, including tests of Bell inequalities, observations of decoherence and macroscopic superpositions, weak measurements and quantum eraser experiments, and thought experiments ‘a la Wigner’s friend. We highlight how these results inform the ongoing debate. Finally, we discuss open problems and challenges that remain in fully resolving the measurement problem.
Ultimately, any explanation of quantum measurement must be extendable to relativistic quantum mechanics (RQM), since many precisely confirmed experimental results follow from quantum field theory (QFT), which is based on RQM. Certainly, the traditional "collapse" postulate for quantum measurement is problematic in a relativistic context, at the very least because, as usually formulated, it violates the relativity of simultaneity. The present paper addresses this with a relativistic model of measurement in which the state of the universe is decomposed into decoherent histories of measurements recorded within it. The approach is essentially Everettian, in the sense that it uses the unmodified, unitary quantum formalism of RQM. But it addresses the difficulty with typical "many worlds" interpretations on how to even define probabilities over different possible ``worlds''. To do this, Zurek's concept of envariance is generalized to the context of relativistic spacetime, giving an objective definition of the probability of any one of the quantum histories, consistent with Born's rule. It is then shown that the statistics of any repeated experiment within the universe also tend to follow the Born rule as the number of repetitions increases. The wave functions that we actually use for such experiments are local reductions of very coarse-grained superpositions of universal eigenstates, and their "collapse" can be re-interpreted as simply an update based on additional incremental knowledge gained from a measurement about the "real" eigenstate of our universe.
The quantum measurement problem arises from a structural asymmetry in standard formulations of quantum mechanics: while unitary evolution is treated as fundamental, irreversible events are introduced only through ad hoc postulates. As a result, measurement, decoherence, and probability appear conceptually disconnected. In this work, we propose a minimal reformulation in which irreversible interaction events are taken as ontological primitives. An event is defined as a completely positive, trace-preserving map that is not equivalent to any unitary transformation. Unitary evolution emerges as an effective description valid between events. Within this framework, quantum measurement is not a special process but a particular class of irreversible events with outcome-resolving structure. The Born rule arises naturally from the statistical structure of event realizations, and environmental decoherence is reinterpreted as a high density of irreversible events. No collapse postulate, observer-dependent rule, or modification of quantum dynamics is required. This formulation provides a unified and physically grounded resolution of the measurement problem and establishes a conceptual foundation for event-based extensions connecting quantum theory with spacetime and gravity.
Three problems stand in the way of deriving classical theories from quantum mechanics: those of realist interpretation, of classical properties and of quantum measurement. Recently, we have identified some tacit assumptions that lie at the roots of these problems. Thus, a realist interpretation is hindered by the assumption that the only properties of quantum systems are values of observables. If one simply postulates the properties to be objective that are uniquely defined by preparation then all difficulties disappear. As for classical properties, the wrong assumption is that there are arbitrarily sharp classical trajectories. It turns out that fuzzy classical trajectories can be obtained from quantum mechanics by taking the limit of high entropy. Finally, standard quantum mechanics implies that any registration on a quantum system is disturbed by all quantum systems of the same kind existing somewhere in the universe. If one works out systematically how quantum mechanics must be corrected so that there is no such disturbance, one finds a new interpretation of von Neumann's "first kind of dynamics", and so a new way to a solution of the quantum measurement problem. The present paper gives a very short review of this work.
Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.