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arXiv:2509.03098 · Lecture notes in computer science

Compressed Verification for Post-quantum Signatures with Long-Term Public Keys

Gustavo Banegas, Anaëlle Le Dévéhat, Benjamin Smith

Published Nov 12, 2025• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/978-981-95-4434-9_1

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The advent of quantum computers poses a direct threat to the security of traditional digital signature schemes, which are based on the Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) cryptosystems. Shor's algorithm allows solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) in polynomial time, whereas Grover's algorithm significantly reduces the effort required for brute-force attacks on symmetric hash functions and ciphers. Although many post-quantum solutions have been proposed, such as lattice-based schemes (e.g., CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon) or hash-based schemes (e.g., SPHINCS+), they still have some limitations to overcome, such as large public keys, bulky signatures, high computational costs, and difficulties in integrating into existing Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs). In this paper, we propose a new type of hard problem, defined over a finite prime field, in which the generator is kept secret to prevent any direct Shor attack and is only subject to a limited influence from Grover. Based on this newly proposed hard problem, we construct a post-quantum digital signature scheme that is both Shor-resistant and Grover-resistant, secure against classical attacks, and fully compatible with current PKI infrastructures. Compared with existing post-quantum digital signature schemes, our solution significantly optimizes the size of public keys and signatures while increasing the speed of signing and verification. The newly proposed hard problem cannot be solved by known classical or quantum algorithms, thus ensuring long-term security. Performance evaluation results show that the scheme provides an optimal balance between performance and security, opening up a cost-effective implementation path for the post-quantum cryptography era.
ABSTRACT This paper presents a one‐time quantum public‐key signature protocol for classical messages that integrates message‐level generalized‐isometric‐tensor compression, a Full Quantum One‐Way Function (Full QOWF), public control‐dependent unitary encoding, and symmetric‐subspace quantum‐signature compression. The message‐level compressor reduces the message‐dependent length from to , while the transcript digest binds the message, compression metadata, compressed length, and one‐time public‐key identifier. For each control position, independent quantum private‐key branches are generated and mapped to public‐key states by the Full QOWF. The selected signature tag is encoded by a public unitary, and its identical copies are compressed in the symmetric subspace before transmission. Verification decompresses each block, reverses the unitary encoding, evaluates the Full QOWF, and performs repeated SWAP tests against authenticated public‐key copies. Under ideal implementation, honest signatures are accepted with probability one. Conditional one‐time unforgeability is established under quantum second‐preimage resistance, authenticated finite‐copy public‐key distribution, and bounded‐copy accepting‐preimage generation hardness. The online signature cost is reduced to qubits; for and , each repeated block decreases from 2048 to 507 transmitted qubits.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a fundamental threat to classical cryptographic mechanisms that underpin modern digital security. Shor’s algorithm can efficiently solve integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems, thereby breaking widely used public-key cryptosystems such as RSA, ECC, and Diffie–Hellman. Grover’s algorithm also reduces the effective security of symmetric encryption and hash functions by half. This paper provides a systematic analysis of the impact of quantum attacks on current cryptographic infrastructures, including TLS, digital signatures, and blockchain. We then review the state of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as standardized by NIST, focusing on three leading candidates: CRYSTALS-Kyber for key encapsulation, and CRYSTALS-Dilithium and FALCON for digital signatures. Through simulation using the Open Quantum Safe (liboqs) library on a standard x86_64 platform, we measure key generation time, encryption/signing speed, decryption/verification latency, and key/signature sizes. Our results show that Kyber-768 achieves key generation in <0.1 ms and produces public keys of about 1.2 KB, while Dilithium-3 generates signatures of ~2.7 KB with verification times under 0.3 ms. Compared to RSA-2048 and ECDSA-P256, PQC algorithms offer competitive performance at the cost of larger key and signature sizes. Based on these findings, we propose a hybrid transition roadmap that combines classical and PQC algorithms in parallel, minimizing risk while maintaining backward compatibility. The paper concludes that organizations should begin immediate preparations for the post-quantum era, especially for data requiring long-term confidentiality.