Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security based on quantum mechanics, yet its implementation is hindered by source imperfections. Among these, correlations between transmitted pulses present a critical but underexplored threat to QKD's theoretical security. We propose a general framework for QKD security under correlated sources, achieving the first finite-key analysis by extending and reorganizing QKD rounds using the generalized chain rule. Inspired by side-channel-secure QKD, we design a protocol secure against correlated leakage sources, requiring only the correlation range and lower bounds on the vacuum component of the prepared states. Our framework also applies to other QKD protocols, providing a general approach to address correlation-induced vulnerabilities. Simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of our protocol and its significantly superior tolerance to imperfections compared to existing protocols. This work provides a crucial step toward closing security loopholes in QKD, enhancing its practicality, and ensuring long-distance, high-performance secure communication under real-world constraints.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security based on quantum mechanics, yet its implementation is hindered by source imperfections. Among these, correlations between transmitted pulses present a critical but underexplored threat to QKD's theoretical security. We propose a general framework for QKD security under correlated sources, achieving the first finite-key analysis by extending and reorganizing QKD rounds using the generalized chain rule. Inspired by side-channel-secure QKD, we design a protocol secure against correlated leakage sources, requiring only the correlation range and lower bounds on the vacuum component of the prepared states. Our framework also applies to other QKD protocols, providing a general approach to address correlation-induced vulnerabilities. Simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of our protocol and its significantly superior tolerance to imperfections compared to existing protocols. This work provides a crucial step toward closing security loopholes in QKD, enhancing its practicality, and ensuring long-distance, high-performance secure communication under real-world constraints.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers theoretical security guarantees for sharing secure key, but its practical systems face challenges due to the imperfections of devices. Widespread quantum state preparation imperfections, such as correlations between multiple rounds, significantly undermine the real-world security of QKD. In this paper, we propose a protocol that is immune to almost all kinds of state-preparation imperfections over multiple correlated rounds arising from both encoding and unknown non-encoding dimensions. The protocol relies only on three assumptions: the imperfect encoding produces unknown product states rather than entangled ones, a lower bound on the vacuum components is known, and the correlation has a finite range. The proposed protocol is also measurement-device-independent, ensuring high security at both the source and measurement sides. We provide the finite-key security analysis against coherent attacks and conduct numerical simulations to see the performance. The results show that for small correlation ranges, the protocol achieves excellent performance with a maximal transmission loss exceeding 60 dB (>300 km in standard fiber). Even for extreme cases, where one encoding affects up to 500 neighboring rounds, the protocol can still generate secret keys over a 10 dB-loss channel.
Based on the basic principles of quantum mechanics, quantum key distribution (QKD) provides unconditional security for long-distance communication. However, existing QKD with relevant source protocols have limited tolerance for source correlation, which greatly reduces the key generation rate and limits the secure transmission distance, thereby limiting their practical deployment. In this work, we propose an improved QKD with correlated source protocol to overcome these limitations by discarding the traditional loss-tolerant security frameworks. Our approach adopts the standard BB84 protocol for the security analysis, under the assumption that the source correlation has a bounded range and characterized inner product of the states. We theoretically analyze the performance of the improved protocol at different levels of source correlation and channel loss. Numerical simulations show that our protocol achieves a much higher secret key rate and longer transmission distance than traditional schemes. In the case of typical parameters and 0 dB loss, our protocol achieves about 1.5–3 times improvement in secret key rate. Additionally, the maximum tolerable loss is enhanced by about 2–6 dB. This highlights a promising direction for enhancing the robustness and practicality of QKD with correlated sources systems, paving the way for their deployment in real-world quantum communication networks.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security grounded in the laws of quantum mechanics rather than computational assumptions. While its theoretical foundations are robust, practical implementations necessarily deviate from the idealized models assumed in security analyses, opening the door to side-channel attacks and implementation loopholes. In particular, most research to date has focused on mitigating vulnerabilities in the measurement devices, leading to the development of Measurement-Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD) and Twin-Field QKD (TF-QKD), which effectively close all receiver-side loopholes. By contrast, the security of the source has remained less explored, despite being critical for the overall integrity of QKD systems. The goal of this thesis is to develop security proofs that explicitly account for realistic imperfections in QKD sources. Special emphasis is placed on three main aspects: correlations between emitted pulses that violate independence assumptions, imperfect phase randomization arising from practical modulation schemes, and leakage of internal settings through passive or active side channels. By formulating rigorous methods to analyze these imperfections, the work aims to provide a framework that enables practitioners to quantify and mitigate implementation risks systematically. Additionally, this thesis seeks to clarify under which conditions the commonly used decoy-state method remains secure, and to what extent source assumptions can be relaxed without compromising performance. This thesis aims to advance the understanding of how real-world deviations impact QKD security and to contribute to the development of protocols and devices. Ultimately, this work is motivated by the ambition to help bring QKD from a theoretically promising idea to a mature technology deployable with confidence in practical scenarios.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows the transmission of keys with unconditional security. Nevertheless, a discrepancy remains between the theoretical framework and the practical implementation, as device imperfections are frequently neglected in most QKD protocols. Some previous works proposed to use Hong-Ou-Mandel interference to quantify information leakage from side-channels. However, the security bound was relatively loose, resulting in poor performance. In this paper, we present an improved method for the security analysis of practical QKD protocols and provide a more precise parameter estimation. Furthermore, we apply it to several important QKD protocols, including BB84, measurement-device-independent, and twin-field, and carry out corresponding numerical simulations. Our work demonstrates significant improvements in both the key rate and the transmission distance compared to previous methods, representing a crucial step towards the practical implementation of QKD.
Abstract Despite the enormous theoretical and experimental progress made so far in quantum key distribution (QKD), the security of most existing practical QKD systems is not rigorously established yet. A critical obstacle is that almost all existing security proofs make ideal assumptions on the QKD devices. Problematically, such assumptions are hard to satisfy in the experiments, and therefore it is not obvious how to apply such security proofs to practical QKD systems. Fortunately, any imperfections and security-loopholes in the measurement devices can be perfectly closed by measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), and thus we only need to consider how to secure the source devices. Among imperfections in the source devices, correlations between the sending pulses and modulation fluctuations are one of the principal problems, which unfortunately most of the existing security proofs do not consider. In this paper, we take into account these imperfections and enhance the implementation security of QKD. Specifically, we consider a setting-choice-independent correlation (SCIC) framework in which the sending pulses can present arbitrary correlations but they are independent of the previous setting choices such as the bit, the basis and the intensity settings. Within the framework of SCIC, we consider the dominant fluctuations of the sending states, such as the relative phases and the intensities, and provide a self-contained information-theoretic security proof for the loss-tolerant QKD protocol in the finite-key regime. We demonstrate the feasibility of secure quantum communication, and thus our work constitutes a crucial step towards guaranteeing the security of practical QKD systems.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information-theoretic security based on quantum mechanics and idealized device models. Practical implementations, however, deviate from these models due to unavoidable device imperfections, and existing security proofs fall short of capturing the complexity of real-world systems. Here we introduce a versatile numerical finite-key security framework valid against general coherent attacks and applicable to a broad class of practical QKD setups. It accommodates most relevant imperfections at both transmitter and receiver, including non-independent-and-identically-distributed (non-IID) signals arising in high-speed QKD systems due to the limited bandwidth of optical modulators, while requiring only partial characterization of the apparatuses. We demonstrate the power of our framework by proving the security of a realistic decoy-state QKD implementation with laser sources, providing a practical route towards rigorous security certification of real-world QKD setups.